Baltic Security Following NATO and EU Accession

 

Adrienne Hayes

hayesa2@u.washington.edu

Scand 455

3/10/2006

 

Outline:

 

I.          Introduction

II.                 Hard and Soft Security: No Longer Seen as Separate

-         definitions of hard and soft security

-         EU security strategy: Effective multilateralism and preventive engagement

-         NATO responses to security threats: Keyword – solidarity

III.               Increased Military Security Following NATO Accession

-         Status of National Militaries of each Baltic State, changes since enlargement

-         Estonia

-         Latvia

-         Lithuania

-         Contributions to NATO

-         Baltic Military Collaboration/Cooperation

IV.              Russian-Baltic Relations: A Continuing Struggle

-         Russia’s reaction to the Inclusion of the Baltic States in NATO

-         Sensitive Issues:

-         Lithuania’s efforts for effective collaboration with the Kaliningrad region

-         Unresolved Border Issues

-         Energy

-    Areas of collaboration

V.                 Global Security Actors

-         EU

-         UN

VI.              Baltic Support for Responses to New Security Threats by NATO and EU

-         Terrorism

-         Organized Crime

-         AIDS

VII.            Concluding Remarks

-         Effectiveness of security measures: Perception of security among citizens

-         Continued increase of security

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

            In his 2001 book, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Walter Clemens proposes ten different options available to the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the area of security enhancement.  Some of these options are no longer current, as all three Baltic countries have now become members of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).  One of the overarching themes of his options involved taking into consideration the Russian response to the direction that the Baltic countries would take so as not to make Russia feel threatened, and thus further strain relations.  Russian-Baltic relations still play an important role in Baltic security, as Russia now has a major portion of its border on the line that divides East from West.  Clemens also mentions NATO membership as one of his themes, but since this has become a reality, it is safe to say that it is another overarching theme.  This project will focus on the security developments of the Baltic States as a result of NATO and EU membership, which will include issues regarding cooperation with Russia and with the West, and an increase in Baltic unity.  However, new international security threats have emerged: terrorism, HIV/AIDS, and organized crime, to name a few, which have required the EU and NATO, and by extension, the Baltic states to adapt their security strategies accordingly. 

 

Hard and Soft Security: No Longer Seen as Separate

 

            An important distinction should be made regarding the definition of security.  This term includes both “hard” security, traditionally defined as military security, and “soft” security, or issues such as crime, poverty, and disease.  “Hard” security threats are typically thought of as external threats, (or originating outside national borders in a specific geographic location,) as military in character, motivated by state actors, and as having direct implications on a country.  However, today’s “hard” threats are much more dynamic in character, originating either externally, internally, or electronically, making it more difficult to pinpoint one geographic location as the origin of the threat.  Also, modern threats are not necessarily military or state-motivated, and can have both direct and indirect implications (Lindstrom, 15).  The reason for “hard” security threats emerging often has to do with the presence of “soft” security threats in a region.  Members of a society with low levels of poverty, organized crime, and regional conflicts, are much less likely to organize terrorist groups, for instance, which create global security threats.  Gustav Lindstrom of the EU Institute for Security Studies has created a diagram conceptualizing the relationship between hard and soft security threats (Fig. 1).  He notes, however, that security issues are more intricate than what is portrayed in the diagram in that “elements from the top of the pyramid can contribute to types of challenges listed below them” (Lindstrom, 18). 

 

Figure 1, Lindstrom, 17.

 

Clemens mentions at the beginning of his chapter on enhancing Baltic security that, “for small countries the coherence of state and society are the ultimate bulwark against internal and external foes” (Clemens, 201), although the majority of his options deal only with “hard” security issues.  More discussion of developments within the realm of “soft” security issues and how those are playing a role in the overall security of the Baltic countries is needed. 

The Latvian Defense Secretary, Edgars Rinkevic, stated in his address to the 22nd International Workshop on Global Security in 2005 that, “We know from our own experience that defense reform can be successful only when it is supported by a functioning market economy.  And there is no difference between membership in NATO and membership in the EU” (Rinkevic, ¶ 2).   While this last sentence can be perceived as an oversimplification, his statement communicates the interconnectedness of the two organizations regarding security.  Similar assertions can be found in the Lithuanian National Security Strategy and in the Estonian National Military Strategy.   Antonio Missirolli of the EU Institute of Security Studies takes a more cautious stance than Rinkevic, stating, “The risk is that by blurring entirely the traditional dividing lines between “soft” and “hard,” we may end up nowhere, without knowing really where to start from in policy terms” (Missirolli, 36).

 

EU and NATO Security Strategies

 

Let us first look at the security strategies for the EU and NATO, keeping this distinction in mind.  Both organizations have become closely connected as a result of the EU-NATO declaration of 2002 on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  This agreement emphasizes mutual consultation and development of common military capabilities. It was further supported in March of 2003 with the “Berlin-Plus arrangements,” which provide “the basis for EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations.  In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.” (NATO-EU Strategic Partnership, 4). 

Both organizations have taken into consideration the changing definition of security.  The key security threats, aptly outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS), include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.  The EU and NATO largely concur in their security strategies, citing as elements to an effective security strategy: engagement, and the use of, for example, military, economic, and political pressures to ensure the protection of human rights and the spread of good governance.  Most importantly is the principle of effective multilateralism, or partnership with other international organizations towards common goals.  As members of both organizations, the Baltic countries have agreed to support these concerns.

 

Increased Military Security Following NATO Accession

 

          Clemens states at the beginning of the section regarding the option to join NATO that, “Balts saw full membership in NATO as the best guarantee against dangers from the East” (Clemens, 217).  As Clemens illustrates, the Baltic countries enhanced their security during the 1990s by participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.  A major component of the PfP program was international assistance to build up national forces.  One main goal was to create more Baltic unity, as exemplified by the inception of the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA), an alliance of 14 Western states with the intention of helping the Baltic states gain admission to NATO (Clemens, 218).  BALTSEA supports the development of a number of projects coordinating the three Baltic States such as the Baltic Defense College, or BALTDEFCOL.  Other projects will be discussed later.  Let us now look briefly at how NATO membership has affected the military forces in each of the Baltic countries.  We will then look at Baltic contributions to NATO, and at cooperation efforts between the three Baltic States.

 

Estonia

 

           In its efforts to meet NATO standards, Estonia has allocated 2% of its GDP to National Defense, and has been doing so since 2002 (Kõuts, ¶ 2).  International aid is still being received in the form of used equipment, such as the recent approval to acquire used Sandown class mine hunters from the United Kingdom, and in monetary aid, although this is decreasing (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs News Archive).  Estonia’s constitution requires its citizens to participate in national defense; thus every eligible male citizen is required to serve in the Defense Forces. 

 

Latvia

 

          The Latvian defense budget for 2006 makes up 1.95% of the GDP, and is expected to reach 2% by 2007 (Latvian Defense Budget for 2006).  Lativa’s National Armed Forces (NAF) are currently in a transition period expected to last until 2007 due to the revision of the National Defense Concept, approved in 2003.  It was implemented mainly for admittance to NATO, but also to prioritize collective defense capabilities, and to more effectively distribute defense budget allocations.  Informing the public about defense activities has also become an increasing priority, as evidenced by youth activities and competitions about NATO and NAF, as well as increased collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Another part of the Defense Concept involves transitioning to a fully professional military by phasing out mandatory military service.  As of February 13, 2006, the NAF consisted of more than 4,800 professional soldiers and 10,600 national guards (Latvian Ministry of Defense website).

 

Lithuania

 

          The Lithuanian National Defense System (NDS) consists of 18,250 servicemen and cadets, as of 2006.  As outlined in the approved guidelines of the minister of national defense, the NDS continues to expand its resources and acquire equipment mainly from other NATO member countries.  It is undergoing a reform consisting of a shift to “smaller, but more capable forces,” and a correspondingly revised management system, with expected completion in 2007 (Lithuanian Ministry of Defense website).

 

Contributions to NATO

 

          Baltic troops have been actively involved in and contributing to global missions since the mid-1990s.  The most recent contributions to NATO include active participation in missions to Afghanistan, Iraq, Southeast Europe, and Pakistan.  As can be gathered from the above paragraphs, Baltic militaries are not yet fully equipped, and independent systems are not yet completely established, but action is being taken to remedy deficiencies and improve effectiveness.  In the area of air policing, for example, it is planned “that the three Baltic countries will execute all air policing functions by themselves, except for the generation of the interceptor aircraft, flights and control… [and] that the full air policing executed by NATO must be reached in 2006” (NATO Activities in Lithuania, Air Policing, ¶ 7).  Baltic countries are also involved in communicating their experiences as new NATO members to countries that have clearly expressed a desire to enter NATO, mainly Central and Eastern European countries.  The Baltic countries do this in the form of sponsorship and assistance, both financial and practical, while candidate countries participate in the PfP program.[1]

 

Baltic Military Collaboration

 

One of the most important effects of NATO involvement in the Baltic countries has been the establishment of the numerous trilateral defense units.  Clemens outlines how, when, and with whose help many of these organizations were formed.  These include the aforementioned BALTSEA and BALTDEFCOL, as well as the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Whole Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET), and the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT).  A number of other projects have been established and implemented since the publication of Clemens’ book, such as the Baltic Command and Control Information System (BALTCCIS), which was started in 2001with assistance from the German Ministry of Defense, to be operated within BALTSEA.  BALTBAT was closed in 2003, as it was deem that the goals of the project had been achieved, but a new project to coordinate Baltic land forces was signed in 2004.  In 2002 the Baltic Virtual Military Academy (BALTVIMA) was established following collaborations with the Norwegian and US militaries in the area of formal education over the internet.  The Riga Initiative was also introduced in 2002 in an attempt to coordinate military efforts and sustainable development of the environment in the whole Baltic Sea region (Baltic Security Assistance Forum).

A recent step furthering Baltic collaboration was taken in November of 2005 when the Foreign Ministers of all three countries signed a joint communiqué.  The communiqué approved increased budgets for BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL and authorized improvements in the areas of  “contribution to NATO operations, development of operational facilities in Baltic states, air policing, fight against international terrorism and co-operation on military education” (“Defence ministers of Baltic states agree on co-operation,” ¶ 3).  Baltic armed forces are becoming increasingly organized and well-equipped, not least through international assistance, and are substantially heightening their abilities to provide security by cooperating as a unit.  Another factor in enhancing Baltic security involves improving relations with Russia.

 

Russian-Baltic Relations: A Continuing Struggle

 

          Clemens highlights the importance of Russian-Baltic relations by giving the topic first priority in his chapter on Baltic security.  Russia was not shy about expressing its disapproval of NATO expansion during the 1990s, going as far as creating an anti-NATO Commission in the Duma, the Russian parliament.  Nor was it shy about showing dislike for the idea of Baltic membership in NATO.  There were even allusions toward a Baltic takeover if they were accepted.  While the prospects of a Russian invasion these days are slim, friendly relations with Russia are important for other reasons.  They will undoubtedly affect relations between ethnic Balts and ethnic Russians living in the Baltic countries, the settling of border disputes, and trade and commerce, especially in the area of energy.  The Baltic countries have been making what might feel like counterintuitive attempts at friendliness and cooperation, but have encountered difficulties from the Russian side on multiple occasions. 

 

Lithuania’s efforts for effective collaboration with the Kaliningrad region

 

Economically, Lithuania is quite dependent on Russia, as it is the largest source of imports for Lithuania, and is among its top export partners and investors.  Therefore, it is in Lithuania’s best interest, as with the other two Baltic countries, to maintain friendly relations with Russia.  The Russian Kaliningrad enclave, on the Baltic coast between Lithuania and Poland, is a security concern especially because of its location; transit between Russia and Kaliningrad goes through Lithuania.  Clemens discusses some of Lithuania’s initiatives to cooperate with Kaliningrad on a variety of issues such as transport, health care, and trade and investment.  He also mentions EU-sponsored projects for assistance in the region, most notably the EU Northern Dimension Action Plan aimed at improving, for example, transit between the Baltic states, Kaliningrad, and the rest of Europe.  A second Northern Dimension Action Plan was approved in 2003 to continue the work of the first.

Relations with Kaliningrad seem to be plagued by contradictions, as some areas indicate a healthy relationship, while others show cause for concern.  One setback, perhaps, came in 2003 when visa-free travel was cancelled.  A new travel regime has been established in which Russian Nationals are required to have Facilitated Rail Travel Documents.  However, some improvements are that more Lithuanian consulates have been established, and an agreement has been made to collaborate on environmental issues such as sharing data regarding water quality, especially around the oil field, D-6, off the Baltic coast, which the Russian oil company LUKoil began exploiting in 2004.  Despite this agreement, and despite Russian reassurances that the oil field is safe, Lithuania is still concerned about the pollution risk and has been lobbying international organizations including the EU, the Council of Europe, and UNESCO for support. Another improvement is that Lithuania and Russia have established “Days of Cooperation” in which recent developments are introduced.  Three of these days have been held: one in 2001, 2003, and 2005. 

In a meeting in November of 2005, the Lithuanian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for cooperation in trade and economic, scientific and technical, humanitarian and cultural spheres held its fourth meeting, in which the above-mentioned issues were discussed, along with other issues such as border structures and organized crime.  At this meeting, Lithuania did not fail to call attention to Russia’s need to meet the obligations of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee regarding the environmental safety of the Curonian Spit, an area in close proximity to the D-6 oil field.  The main conclusion, according to the press release of the Lithuanian government, was that more discussions were needed.  (Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)

 

Unresolved Border Issues

 

          Estonia has drafted and signed some twelve treaties dealing with relations with Russia on a range of issues, and has shown willingness to cooperate with Russia, but it is usually Russia that cancels meetings and agreements.  This can be seen, for instance, with planned meetings to discuss cooperation through the Estonian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission, in which the Russian side backed out on meetings in 2000, 2001, and 2003.  The most recent example of tensions between Russia and Estonia involved a series of border treaties, which the Riigikogu (the Estonian Parliament) quickly ratified in June of 2005.  The Russian government, however, chose to refrain from ratifying the treaties, claiming that Estonia had added new aspects.  No resolution has been reached regarding the issue. (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)

          Latvia has drafted a border treaty with Russia, but this too remains unsigned by Russia.  In checking the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, one finds citations of meetings between Russian and Latvian officials in which the only conclusions reached are that the border issue needs further discussion. The Lithuanian government signed a border treaty with Russia in 1997, and its parliament ratified it two years later.  However, the Duma has refrained from ratifying this treaty as well, citing issues with Lithuania’s 3rd largest city, Klaipeda, also a main port on the Baltic coast. 

          Thoughts on why the Russian government has abstained from ratifying border treaties with the Baltic states vary. The Prime Minister of Latvia Aigars Kalvitis stated in April of 2005, “We are certain that Latvia's and Russia's differing opinions on the historic matters of the 20th century is the reason for the exasperated rhetoric between both countries” (Statement by the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs).  Others speculate that Russia saw holding out as a tactical maneuver.  The EU would not want to admit countries with unresolved border issues.  Yet this explanation holds less ground now that all three countries are EU members.

 

Energy

 

         Energy is a major drain on the economies of the Baltic countries, which are dependent on Russia for a large portion of their energy needs.  According to the March 2005 analysis brief of the U.S. Government’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Baltic countries import 90% of their oil from Russia, and are entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas.  Estonia and Latvia both produce enough electricity to export, Estonia using its oil shale-fired power plants in Narva as its main source, and Lithuania using its Soviet Chernobyl-style nuclear power plant.  Latvia does have some hydroelectic plants, but must still import electricity from its neighbors to meet demand (U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief).  Baltic energy companies are also largely privatized, with large portions of the ownership going to Russian companies. 

While a military attack from Russia is not a current fear of the Baltic countries, having their energy supplies cut off is, as this would have a significant negative impact on Baltic economies.  This has already been done at the Latvian port of Ventspils, a major oil export terminal for Russia, which has not been in use for three years.  Estonia and Lithuania’s economies are stronger in comparison to Latvia’s in part because they are transporting Russian energy.  It should come as no surprise that Russia is so aggressively pursuing control over the energy industry.  Russia’s President Vladimir Putin wrote his thesis for his Candidate of Sciences degree in economics from the St. Petersburg Mining Institute about the significance of natural resources. 

The Baltic countries could explore alternative energy sources, or try diversifying their foreign suppliers in order to create more competition and to reduce dependency on Russia.  Plans are currently being made between Latvia, Estonia, and Finland for an underwater cable that will link the Baltic States to the Scandinavian and Nordic power grids (U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief).  The plans are in line with the ideas set out in the most recent EU Green Paper, in which sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply are the main objectives of the energy policy.  The EU realizes that diversifying its energy sources is important to sustainability (EU Green Paper, 2006).

             

 

Areas of Collaboration

 

          The Baltic countries and Russia share common interests in certain international organizations, and have thus had to set aside bilateral tensions in order to achieve results within these organizations.  One such organization is the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which was established in 1992 with the intention of maintaining stability in Europe after the end of the Cold War.  This organization has been highly effective in areas including, “removing regional economic barriers to trade and investment; … facilitating cross-border cooperation; transforming curricula and teaching methods at the three main universities in the Baltic States and at Kaliningrad State University by way of the EuroFaculty Program; and finally, contributing input to the EU’s policy frameworks for Northern Europe such as the Northern Dimension” (CBSS history, ¶ 3).

As mentioned above, Russia has not been overwhelmingly supportive of NATO.  However, Russia showed a change of heart following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York.  Plans were being made just one month after the attacks to create a NATO-Russia Council, and were finalized in 2002, in which fighting terrorism held the top priority (Kelin, ¶ 6).  In general, it is a higher priority for the Baltic countries to maintain good relations with Russia than vice versa, as each country still is quite dependent on business and trade with Russia.  However, membership in NATO and the EU has undoubtedly given the Baltic countries more confidence in dealing with Russia.

 

Global Security Actors

 

          NATO membership has supported “hard” security, but membership in and collaboration with other international organizations helped the Baltic countries address “soft” security issues.  While it is not the main purpose of this paper to discuss these issues, it is worth a brief mention of how international cooperation has affected life for citizens in the Baltic countries, as they play a significant role in determining the level of security of a nation or region. 

 

EU

 

The EU is important for increasing “hard” security, and has recently taken measures to increase its capabilities, which were discussed earlier.  However, cooperation with the EU has produced more tangible changes in the daily lives of Baltic citizens, thus increasing “soft” security.  Boyka Stefanova describes the expansion of the EU as a mechanism for enhancing European security.  The EU used a “logic of conditionality and fulfillment of preliminary criteria for membership” when considering admittance of Eastern and Central European countries (Stefanova, 59).  Through intense collaboration with the EU during the years before membership, the candidate countries had time to adopt the norms of governance of EU member states.  Baltic economies were stimulated, encouraging foreign investment, and promoting the conditions for good governance.  With a growing economy, higher life expectancy, and high levels of education, the Baltic countries achieved a decent Human Development Indicator (HDI) figure.  Yet some problems remain; high unemployment rates in certain sectors of the population, discrepancies in quality of life between city and rural populations, high levels of alcoholism, and increasing rate of HIV/AIDS infection.

 

UN

 

          United Nations (UN) support has been important for Baltic security, especially in the realm of “soft” security.  Each Baltic country has participated in the UN Development Program (UNDP); a program acting as a networking agent for countries around the world to find and share solutions for development challenges, including: poverty reduction, HIV/AIDS, gender equality, the environment, information and communication technology, and ensuring democratic governance.  Estonia and Latvia have both moved from receiving UN aid to giving aid, and Lithuania is not far behind.  Other UN organizations such as UNESCO remain active in all three countries.  In addition to their support for EU and NATO peacekeeping efforts, the Baltic countries claim their full support for UN peacekeeping missions as well.  In fact, the Baltic countries have been sending troops on UN peacekeeping missions since the mid-1990s.

 

Baltic Support for Responses to New Security Threats by NATO and EU

 

All EU and NATO partners recognize that modern security threats are too large an undertaking for one country, but must be confronted through a joint effort.  The security policies of each of the Baltic countries express their commitment to supporting NATO and the EU’s efforts to protect against security issues.  Responsibility is delegated throughout different sectors to assist in making the Baltic countries secure against other threats.  For example, the Ministry of the Interior helps fight organized crime, and the Ministry of Health works with HIV/AIDS treatment.[2] 

NGOs are also important players in ensuring Baltic security in a myriad of areas, as they tend to work on a more tangible, grassroots level.  This is, however, a relatively new sector in the Baltic region.  Public awareness of NGOs is not what it could be, nor is management.  Baltic governments are making efforts to facilitate collaboration with NGOs in order to increase their effectiveness.  There seems, also, to be a lowering tolerance for corruption as well, as exemplified by the impeachment of the Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas in 2004 for illegal activities with and divulging state secrets to a Russian businessman and financial supporter. 

 

Concluding Remarks

 

          In Lithuania, government surveys show that public support for EU membership is consistently above 70%, with similar results regarding NATO membership as well.  A July 2005 poll by the Latvian government showed support from 78% of citizens surveyed as supporting NATO membership.  A January, 2005 survey of its participation in the EU was not quite as encouraging, however, with only 37% of respondents calling membership positive, and 40% calling it neither positive or negative.  In a government survey of the Estonian population taken in October of 2005, 73% of all respondents, both ethnic and non-ethnic Estonians, supported NATO membership, and 62% supported EU membership.  When asked whether or not the security situation had changed, 47% agreed that it had improved, while 41% noticed no change. (All statistics can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for each country.) 

The 2002-2003 UN Human Development Report for Latvia includes the results from a survey in which respondents were to given a list of security risks and were asked whether or not they feared the risks and whether or not they felt that they could influence the risks.  The top fears among respondents were the spread of HIV/AIDS, organized crime, and the spread of narcotics, and the percentage of respondents who felt that they could influence these risks was low.  Fear of terrorism was towards the bottom of the list of concerns (UN Human Development Report for Latvia, p. 25).  These results underscore the difference between perception of security and actual security.  “Soft” security issues resonate with Baltic citizens most, yet these are also the issues that require time and the cooperation of the entire society when being addressed.

          The Baltic countries have been able to improve their security situation at an impressive rate of speed through consistent and dedicated international support, eventually achieving membership in the EU and NATO in 2004.  Baltic militaries are becoming better equipped and more organized, and are continuing to reinforce their security as a region through collaboration with each other, surrounding countries, and international organizations such as the UN.  As the statistics show, approval ratings for Baltic involvement in the EU and NATO are relatively high.  Each country maintains a policy of transparency and issues clear and coherent statements on policies, creating the potential for a well-informed public.  

          The Baltic countries have done and are continuing to do what they can to increase their national security, including creating good relations with Russia.  The ball is now in Russia’s court.  While military attack is unlikely, Russia’s decision to cooperate with, or to not cooperate with, the Baltic countries will have significant effects on Baltic economies, and by extension, security.

 

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http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/baltics.html

 

Public Opinion and National Defence Population Survey. (November, 2005).  Faktum, Estonian Ministry of National Defense.  Retrieved March 6, 2006, from

http://www.mod.gov.ee/static/sisu/files/2006-01-11_Kmin_okt_2005_eng.pdf

 

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Overview. (February, 2002). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro

 

Baltic Council of Ministers and Baltic Assembly (cooperation organization for the parliaments) … underwent major reforms in 2003 and 2004 to increase effectiveness.

http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_202/840.html (most comprehensive info).

 

The United Nations in Lithuania. (n.d.). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.un.lt/en 

 

Estonian Market Opinion Research (EMOR). (February 6, 2006). Public Opinion on the European Union. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved March 6, 2006, from

http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/kat_315/2973.html

 

Council of the Baltic Sea States website. (n.d.). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.cbss.st/ 

 

Council of the Baltic Sea States history website. (n.d.). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.cbss.st/history 

 

Act on the Ratification of The State Border Treaty Between The Republic of Estonia and The Russian Federation and the Treaty on the Delimitation of Maritime Areas of Narva Bay and the Gulf of Finland between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation. (June 20, 2005). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_200/5733.html

 

Paet, Urmas (June 20, 2005). Address to the Riigikogu on behalf of the Government of Estonia. Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_558/5774.html

 

Statement by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (June, 27 2005). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_138/5753.html

 

Baltic Defence Co-Operation - General information. (March 8, 2002). Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4494/4497

 

The NATO-EU Strategic Partnership (2004). [Electronic version]. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/006.pdf

 

The Latvian Defense Budget for 2006. Retrieved March 6, 2006, from http://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid=113 

 

Commission of the European Communities. Green Paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.  Brussels, March 8, 2006.  Retrieved March 10, 2006, from http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf

 

Websites with more general information:

 

Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

http://www.am.gov.lv/en/

 

Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

http://www.urm.lt/index.php?1321219448

 

Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

http://www.vm.ee/eng/index.html

 

Latvian Ministry of Defense

http://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid=1

 

Lithuanian Ministry of Defense

http://www.kam.lt/index.php?ItemId=7599&Lang=5  

 

Estonian Ministry of Defense

http://www.mod.gov.ee/  

 

The Latvian National Armed Forces.

http://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid=1297

 

Latvian Ministry of the Interior

http://www.iem.gov.lv/index.php?lng=en&l=2&zank=

 

Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior

http://www.vrm.lt/index.php?id=124&lang=2

 

Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs

http://www.sisemin.gov.ee/atp/?lang=en