Quantum Cryptography

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Overview

- Current Cryptography Methods
- Quantum Solutions
- Quantum Cryptography
- Commercial Implementation

Cryptography algorithms:

Symmetric – encrypting and decrypting key are identical (Data Encryption Standard, Rivest Ciphers)

Asymmetric – encrypting and decrypting keys differ (Elliptical Curve; Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)

Hash – no decryption by design, meant to uniquely identify a message such as a password (Message Digest)



C) Hash function (one-way cryptography). Hash functions have no key since the plaintext is not recoverable from the ciphertext.

Symmetric Key Distribution

- RC5 and others takes sufficiently long decrypt (72 bits with distributed computing ~1000 years for RC5)
- How do we securely distribute keys?
- Some methods work on simple binary addition:

 $s = m \oplus k, m = s \oplus k = m \oplus k \oplus k$

 Others, such as DES, shuffle blocks of information



Asymmetric Key Distribution

- Rivest, Shamir, Adelman (RSA) use the property of factoring a large number in terms of primes is sufficiently complex with classical computers.
- Elliptical Curves make use of another sufficiently complex classical problem of calculating the discrete logarithm.
- Codes can be broken more readily than symmetric keys (72 bits sym ~ 2048 bits asym)

RSA Algorithm

- Pick two large prime numbers p and q and calculate the product N = pq, $\phi = (p-1)(q-1)$
- Choose a number that is co-prime with ϕ_i c
- Find a number d to satisfy cd = 1 mod φ, using a method such as Euclid's algorithm
- Using your plaintext, a, the ciphertext is encoded as $b = a^c \mod N$
- To retrieve the plaintext, $a = b^d \mod N$
- The numbers N and c are made public, so anyone can encrypt information, but only someone with d can retrieve the plaintext

Example

- Plaintext a = 123
- *p* = 61 and *q* = 53

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$$N = pq = 3233$$

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$$\phi = (p-1)(q-1) = 3120$$

- Pick a coprime of ϕ , c=17
- Find d such that $cd = 1 \mod \phi$, d=2753
- Encode with $a^c \mod N$, in this case $123^{17} \mod 3233 = 855$
- Decode message by evaluating $b^d \mod N$, in this case $855^{2753} \mod 3233 = 123$

855^2753 mod 3233



Enter Shor's Algorithm

- Let f(x) = b^x mod N, if we can find some r that f(x) = f(x+r), then we can find a number d' such that cd' = 1 mod r
- The value d' works like the decoding value we calculated from $cd = 1 \mod \phi$
- In addition, using different values for b<N, we can determine the prime components of N

What's the quantum algorithm?

 Initialize log₂ N qubits an equal superposition state (input qubits)

 $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} (|000...000\rangle + |000...001\rangle + ... + |111...111\rangle)$

- Using log₂ N more qubits, enact f(\u03c6) on them while retaining the state \u03c6 in the input state (output qubits)
- Apply the quantum fourier transform on the ψ portion of the circuit
- Measure the input and output qubits $(y, f(x_0))$, with high probability you will measure an of $f(x_0 + (y/N)r)$ where y/N is close to an integer







So we've broken it, now what?

- In general symmetric keys are harder to crack but tough to distribute, while asymmetric keys are easy to distribute but easier to crack
- Start thinking about using quantum systems to implement cryptography
- Restrictions on polarization bases measurements ($\uparrow \rightarrow \searrow \swarrow \sigma^+ \sigma^-$)
- Restrictions on state duplication
- Very easy to create state perturbation

BB84 (Bennett and Brassard)

We have two parties, Alice and Bob who want to securely distribute their symmetric key over a public channel











- Alice randomly chooses one of two orientations from two bases to measure in: (for spin ½ situation analogous to z-basis, and x-basis)
- Alice then assigns the value of 0 and 1 in each basis (up-z and up-x = 0, down-z and down-x = 1)
- Alice sends a state from one of the four bases at random, and Bob selects (with his own random generator) a basis (x or z) to measure in
 - If they choose the same basis, they will agree with 100% probability, if they choose a different basis they will have no way of correlating the results (error rate $\sim 25\%$)

BB84

In order to verify the transmitted information, Alice and Bob decide which bits can be kept and which bits will need to be retransmitted

The correlated measurements will only be in compatible bases (both x or z)

http://monet.mercersburg.edu/henle/bb84/demo.php







Multiple Photon Attack

 Eve can attack an optical channel by measuring multiple photon signals with a PBS and recreating the signals



2/3 of the time Eve can recreate the original state and send it to Bob, the rest of the time she introduces an error rate of 1/6

Eavesdropping Thresholds



Commerical Quantum Crypto Systems

- Magiq: Currently have an implementation of a secure quantum network, the QPN 7505
- Works on a single photon source, and can transmit up to about 75 km with reasonable loss

Price? \$97000

Single Photon Manipulation

Entanglement occurs in the timefrequency domain, there is a high probability that a single photon is produced, and low probability of multiple photons





Single Photon setup



Fidelity Considerations

- The system tries to maximize G, the probability of transmitting a secure bit with a single initial pulse
- This attenuates about 10dB for every 50 km of transmission









Eavesdropping!







Other systems

Id quantique:

Vectis – Their crypto system, uses typical QKD and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

Quantis – Random number generator, based on standard 50/50 polarization probabilities (4 Mbit/s number generation) PCI hardware

 Toshiba Research – Cambridge, QKD and single photon emission with quantum dots



Sources

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