| ENV H 471: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH REGULATION |
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READING #12
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U.S. v. OUELETTE
U.S. District Court
Eastern District of Arkansas
11 ERC 1350 (1977)
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Pending before this court is a motion by the defendant
to require the government to prove "specific intent" as an essential element
of the offense charged in the information, to wit:
"[K]nowingly making a false statement, representation
and certification in the monthly Discharge Monitoring Report required to
be filed with the United States Environmental Protection Agency and in
other records required to be maintained under the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System . . . and the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments
. . .in violation of Title 33, United States Code, Section 1319(c)(2).
"In pertinent part, section 1319(c)(2) provides the following:
"Any person who knowingly makes any false statement . . . in any .
. . report . . . required to be maintained under this chapter . . . shall
upon conviction be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000Ý or by imprisonment
for not more than six months, or by both."
It is the defendant's position that the government must
prove specific criminal intent in order to sustain a conviction under this
statute. The defendant bases this argument on the contention that
"making false statements" is a "common law type offense", and, therefore,
the government must prove specific criminal intent. In response,
the government contends that this statute proscribes a "public welfare
offense" as opposed to a common law offense. Thus, the government
argues that specific intent is not an essential element.Ý In analyzing
this issue, the Court first notes that "the existence of a mens rea is
the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence." +++Ý However, an equally well established principle
is that "the Constitutional requirement of due process is not violated
merely because mens rea is not a required element of a proscribed crime."
+++ For example, in Lambert v. California, 355 US 225, 228
(1957), Justice Douglas stated the following:
"We do not go with Blackstone in saying that a 'vicious will' is necessary
to consti-tute a crime, . . ., for conduct alone without regard to the
intent of the doer is often sufficient.Ý There is wide latitude in lawmakers
to decide an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence
from its definition."
Historically, courts have held that statutes which proscribe
common law offenses require specific intent as an essential element.Ý However,
in recent years a growing number of statutes have been enacted to proscribe
what have been termed "public welfare offenses". Due to the "very
different antecedents and origins" of these statutes, courts have generally
refused to infer specific criminal intent as an essential element. +++Ý
In Morrissette v. UnitedÝ States 342 US 246, +++ (1951), the Court
discerned certain characteristics common to this class of offenses:
"Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions
or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the
nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes
a duty.Ý Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate
injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability
of it which the law seeks to minimize.Ý While such offenses do not threaten
the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded
as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency
of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted.
. . . The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position
to prevent it with no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from
one who assumed his responsibilities.Ý Also, penalties commonly are relatively
small, and conviction does no grave damage to the offender's reputation.Ý
Under such considerations, courts have turned to construing statutes and
regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding
that the guilty act alone makes out the crime."
However, even in the face of clear legislative intent
that a public welfare statute is not to include the element of specific
intent, this result must comport with fundamental constitutional standards.
In Holldridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302,310 (8th Cir. 1960),
the court established the following criteria to be used in making this
decision:
"Where a federal criminal statute omits mention of intent and where
it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard
imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly
expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction
does not gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not one taken over
from the common law, and where congressional purpose is supporting, the
statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent.Ý The elimination
of this element is then
Applying these tests to this case, the Court concludes
that the statute at issue was intend-ed to proscribe a public welfare offense.
Furthermore, the Court concludes that in order to establish a violation
of this statute, the government need not prove that the accused possessed
specific criminal intent to violate the statute.*
In reaching this conclusion, it should be noted that
this statute, unlike many of the statutes at issue in the aforementioned
cases, does not completely do away with the "mental element".Ý Rather,
this statute requires that the accused must have "knowingly" made the alleged
false statements or representations.Ý Section 14.04 of Devitt and Blackmar,
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, defines "knowingly - to act" as
follows:
"An act is done 'knowingly' if done voluntarily and intentionally
and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason."
"The purpose of adding the word 'knowingly' is to insure that no one
will be convicted for an act done because of mistake, or accident, or other
innocent reason."
Here, the government will have to prove that the defendant
knowingly (i.e, voluntarily and intentionally) made false statement, but
will not have to prove that the defendant, in so doing, knowingly violated
the law or purposely intended to violate the law.
It is therefore ordered that the defendant's motion
to require the government to prove specific intent as an essential element
of the aforementioned offense be, and it is hereby, denied.
Revised: 11/25/2000
