Modernism

lecture notes by Denis Bašić
based on Özkırımlı’s “Theories on Nationalism”
chapter 4
What is Modernism?

• **Modernism** is a belief in the modernity of nations and nationalism. According to modernists, both - **nation** and **nationalism** -
  
  • appeared in the last two centuries and
  
  • are the products of specifically **modern processes** like **capitalism**, **industrialization**, **urbanization**, **secularism**, and the emergence of the **modern bureaucratic state**.

• In that sense, modernists are making both a **chronological** and a **structural** claim, stating that **nations** and **nationalism**
  
  • are historically **novel**, i.e. there was no room for nations or nationalism in the pre-modern era;

  • are a **sociological necessity** in the modern world.
How and when did Modernism emerge?

- Modernism emerged as a reaction to the self-evident primordialism of the older generations who saw nationalism as a natural and universal, or at least perennial, feature of human societies.

- According to Smith, classical modernism, the belief that nations and nationalism are intrinsic to the modern world and the revolution of modernity, achieved its canonical formulation in the modernization theories of the 1960s, which achieved wide currency in social sciences in the wake of the movements for decolonization in Asia and Africa.
Three Types of Modernism

- stress on **economic** transformations
- stress on **political** transformations
- stress on **social/cultural** transformations

**NOTE:** It is necessary to stress, that modernist theorists are classified based on the factor they prioritize in their accounts. This does not mean that they rely on a single factor to explain nationalism, but that they attach a greater weight to one set of factors as opposed to others.
Modernist Theories
with stress on economic transformations
Economic Transformations

- Economic transformations are emphasized in Neo-Marxian and Rational Choice theories.

- Neo-Marxists believed that traditional Marxism was ill-prepared to cope with the challenges posed by nationalism which were given a new urgency in the late 1960s and 1970s, with the proliferation of anti-colonial nationalist movements in many parts of the so-called Third World - to which most left-wing intellectuals were sympathetic - and the recent 'ethnic revival' in Europe and North America which was now threatening the unity of the 'established' nation-states of the Western world. The new generation of Marxists attempted to reform the orthodox credo without 'dismantling the old edifice', attaching a greater weight to the role of culture, ideology and language in their analyses.
Tom Nairn & Uneven Development (1932-)

- **Tom Nairn** is a Scottish political theorist of nationalism. His major work is *The Break-up of Britain* (1981).

- Growing out of a series of articles published mainly in the *New Left Review*, *The Break-up of Britain* (1981) reflects Nairn's long-term theoretical and political engagement with issues of nationalism. Despite its Marxist credentials, it was dubbed a nationalist manifesto by some and 'an epitaph for Marxism' by others. Ernest Gellner, the British-Czech philosopher, who believes Nairn's theory to be substantially correct, is puzzled as to how Nairn could think his theory was at all compatible with Marxism.
Tom Nairn on Nationalism

• For Nairn, the roots of nationalism should not be sought in the internal dynamics of individual societies, but in the general process of historical development since the end of the 18th century. Thus, the only explanatory framework which is of any utility is that of 'world history' as a whole.

• Nationalism, in this sense, is 'determined by certain features of the world political ECONOMY, in the era between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present day'. Here, the influence of the 'dependency school' (video) on Nairn's views, especially the work of André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein on the international system of capitalist exploitation, is obvious.
Nationalism as a Result of Uneven Development

- The origins of nationalism are not located in the process of development of the world political economy as such however - in other words, nationalism is not simply an inevitable concomitant of industrialization - but the 'uneven development' of history since the eighteenth century.

- For many centuries, it was believed that the opposite would indeed be the case, that material civilization would develop evenly and progressively. According to this view, characteristic of the Enlightenment thought, Western European states have initiated the process of capitalist development, and managed to accumulate the necessary capital for perpetuating this process for a long period of time. The idea of 'even development' maintained that 'this advance could be straightforwardly followed, and the institutions responsible for it copied - hence the periphery, the world's countryside, would catch up with the leaders in due time'. But history did not unfold as expected; capitalist development was not experienced 'evenly.'
Nationalism as a Reaction to Imperialist Domination & Invasion

- The impact of the leading Western countries on undeveloped countries was experienced as **domination** and **invasion**. This was in a way inevitable because the gap between the core and the periphery was too great and 'the new developmental forces were not in the hands of a beneficent, disinterested elite concerned with Humanity’s advance'. The peoples of undeveloped countries learned quickly that ‘**Progress in the abstract meant domination in the concrete, by powers which they could not help apprehending as foreign or alien**’. However, popular expectations were not thwarted by the recognition of this fact. Since these expectations were always racing ahead of material progress itself, 'the peripheric elites had no option but to try and satisfy these demands by taking things into their own hands'. For Nairn, 'taking things into one's own hands' denotes a great deal of the substance of nationalism.
National Mobilization for Progress

- Third world peoples wanted factories, schools and parliaments, so they had to copy the leaders somehow; but they had to do this in a way which rejected the direct intervention of these countries. 'This meant the conscious formation of a militant, inter-class community rendered strongly (if mythically) aware of its own separate identity vis-a-vis the outside forces of domination.' There was no other way of doing it.

- In Nairn's opinion, 'Mobilization had to be in terms of what was there; and the whole point of the dilemma was that there was nothing there.' Or more exactly, there was only the people with its speech, folklore, skin colour and so on. Under these circumstances, 'the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood'.
Nationalism in the Core Area

- The process did not end with the emergence of nationalism in the peripheral countries under the impact of uneven development; once successful, nationalism reacted upon the core countries and they too fell under its spell.

- “These [i.e. core] countries did not invent nationalism; they did not need to since they were in front and 'possessed the things nationalism is really about' (factories, schools, parliaments). But once the nation-state had been transformed into a compelling norm, or the 'new climate of world politics', the core countries were bound to become nationalist.”

- In short, "uneven development" is not just the hard-luck tale of poor countries’. The 'founder-members' and the 'parvenus' were forcing each other to change continuously. In the long term, core area nationalism was as inevitable as peripheric nationalism.

- CRITICISM: The latter statements are highly questionable. How come that the Western states “did not invent nationalism?” What were they before becoming ‘nationalistic’ under the influence of ‘peripheric nationalism’? Maybe ‘imperialistic’? Can imperialism be considered a form of nationalism?
Good vs. Bad Nationalism

- According to Nairn, it is not meaningful to make a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms. All nationalisms contain the seeds of both progress and regress. In fact, this ambiguity is its historical raison d'être:

‘It is through nationalism that societies try to propel themselves forward to certain kinds of goal (industrialization, prosperity, equality with other peoples, etc.) by a certain sort of regression - by looking inwards, drawing more deeply upon their indigenous resources, resurrecting past folk heroes and myths about themselves and so on.’

- It follows that the substance of nationalism is always morally and politically ambiguous.
Nairn’s Disagreement with Marxism

According to Nairn, orthodox Marxism's greatest failure was the conviction that class is always more important in history than national differences.

But, Nairn claims, the uneven, imperialist, spread of capitalism has insured that the fundamental contradiction was not that of class struggle, but that of nationality.

′As capitalism spread, and smashed the ancient social formations surrounding it, these always tended to fall apart along the fault-lines contained inside them. It is a matter of elementary truth that these lines of fissure were nearly always ones of nationality.′

CRITICISM: Nairn fails to realize that ′uneven development′ creates the ′hierarchy of nations′ of which Luxemburg and Lenin spoke. And while Luxemburg stressed, like Enlighteners, that undeveloped nationalities should accept the rule of developed nations for the sake of their own development, Lenin stressed that in the case of ′oppression′ undeveloped nations are entitled to rebellion. Luxemburg agreed. Hence, it could be said that classical Marxian thinkers thought of the struggle among nationalities for equality.
Nairn's Conversion to Neo-Primordialism

- Nairn contends that 'the remaking which features in modern nationalism is not creation *ex nihilo* but a reformulation constrained by a determinate past.' (therefore, the primordialist switch)

- The key to understanding nationalism lies in ‘human nature’. The intense emotionality and violence of ethnic nationalism make much more sense when traced to this particular root. What we need is a fusion of perspectives, a 'life science', which incorporates the new genetics, via 'bio-sociology' and 'paleo-anthropology', and the sociology of the modernists.

- It is clear, however, that Nairn's preferences tilt towards the new genetics; the sole alternative, he writes, is a frankly psychological one: ‘a story of “human nature” in fact, where feelings of “belonging” or extended kinship are read as the essential realities offended by the circumstances of modernity.'
Michael Hechter & *Internal Colonialism* (1932-)

- Michael Hechter introduced the concept of *internal colonialism* to the study of nationalism. Originally coined by Russian populists to describe the exploitation of peasants by urban classes, it was later adopted by Gramsci and Lenin to draw attention to the persisting economic underdevelopment of certain Italian and Russian regions. In this usage:

  ‘*Internal colonialism* refers to a process of unequal exchange between the territories of a given state that occurs either as a result of the free play of market forces or of economic policies of the central state that have intended or unintended distributional consequences for regions. Since the 1960s, however, the term has been largely reserved for regions that are simultaneously economically disadvantaged and culturally distinctive from the core regions of the host state.’ [Hechter 1999: xiv]
Hechter's point of departure was the problems of ethnic conflict and assimilation which preoccupied American politics since the 1960s.

Broadly speaking, there were two alternative ways of solving these problems in the scholarly literature on intergroup relations: 'assimilationism' and 'nationalism'. Hechter notes that the majority of academics endorsed the assimilationist position at the time. Briefly, assimilationists held that ethnic/racial minorities were poor and frustrated because they were isolated from the national culture; the norms and values of ghetto communities were dysfunctional in the wider society.

This implied that if the governments were to invest the necessary resources to educate and socialize the ghetto children, then the problems of maladjustment and the so-called 'culture of poverty' would cease.
Three Stages of the Diffusion Model

- **The first stage** is pre-industrial. At this stage, there is no relationship between the core and the periphery; they exist in virtual isolation from one another. Moreover, there are fundamental differences in their economic, cultural and political institutions.

- Increased contact between the core and peripheral regions leads to the **second stage** of national development, which is generally associated with the process of industrialization. It was believed that the institutions of the developing core will, after some time, 'diffuse' into the periphery. The cultural forms of the periphery, evolved in complete isolation from the rest of the world, will renew, or in Hechter's words 'update' themselves as a result of increased contact with the modernizing core. True, massive social dislocation brought about by industrialization and expansion of regional interaction might initially lead to an increased sense of cultural separateness in the periphery, inducing those who suffer from this process of rapid change to cling to their familiar cultural patterns. However, this 'traditional behaviour' is temporary; it will tend to decline as industrialization promotes the general welfare and reduces the initial regional differences. The model posits that the core and peripheral regions will become culturally homogeneous in the long run as the economic, political and cultural bases of ethnic differentiations will disappear.

- In the **third and final stage**, regional wealth will become equal; cultural differences will no longer be socially meaningful; and political processes will be conducted within a framework of national parties.
Hechter views the diffusion development model of social change as 'over-optimistic'. For him, the model which seems to be more realistic is what he calls the 'internal colonial model'. This model holds that an altogether different relationship will ensue from increased core-periphery contact. The core will dominate the periphery politically and exploit it economically. With the exception of a small number of cases, industrialization and increased regional contact will not lead to national development.

The uneven wave of modernization over state territories creates 'advanced' and 'less advanced' groups. As a result of this initial fortuitous advantage, resources and power are distributed unequally between the two groups. The more powerful group, or the core, tries to stabilize its advantages through the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. The economy of the core is characterized by a diversified industrial structure, whereas the peripheral economy is dependent and complementary to that of the core:

Peripheral industrialization, if it occurs at all, is highly specialized and geared for export. The peripheral economy is, therefore, relatively sensitive to price fluctuations in the international market. Decisions about investment, credit, and wages tend to be made in the core. As a consequence of economic dependence, wealth in the periphery lags behind the core.
Cultural Division of Labor

- In stratified states, the advanced group regulates the allocation of social roles in such a way that the more prestigious roles are reserved for its members. Conversely, the members of the less advanced group are denied access to these roles. Hechter calls this system of stratification the 'cultural division of labour'.

- This system may be enforced *de jure*, when the state actively intervenes to deny certain roles to the members of the disadvantaged collectivity. Alternatively, it may be preserved *de facto*, through discriminatory policies, that is by providing differential access to institutions conferring status in the society, such as educational, religious or military institutions.

- The cultural division of labour leads individuals to identify themselves with their groups and contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification. ‘Social actors come to define themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play. They are aided in this categorization by the presence of visible signs’. Such visible signs increase group solidarity and unite them around a certain commonality of definitions.
Four conditions for the emergence of group solidarity

- According to Hechter,

- First, there must be substantial economic inequalities between individuals such that these individuals may come to see this inequality as part of a pattern of collective oppression.

- But this in itself is not sufficient for the development of collective solidarity since there must also be 'an accompanying social awareness and definition of the situation as being unjust and illegitimate',

- hence the second condition: there must be adequate communication among members of the oppressed group.
Chances for Successful Political Integration

- When objective cultural differences are superimposed upon economic inequalities, leading to a cultural division of labour, and when an adequate degree of intra-group communication exists, the chances for successful political integration of the peripheral collectivity into the national society are minimized, and the chances for the creation of a separate national identity are maximized.

- The members of the disadvantaged group may start to assert that their culture is equal or superior to that of the advantaged group, claim the separateness of their nation and seek independence.
Counter-criticism of Hechter

• The most important objection to Hechter’s theory of *Internal Colonialism* concerned its factual (in)adequacy; certain cases did not seem to fit the model.

• **Scotland**, in particular, constituted an anomaly for Hechter's account since the **Scots** were not relegated to inferior social positions in Britain, and Scotland has been as industrialized as Britain from the eighteenth century onwards.

• The other case is the case of **the Jews in America** who also had high solidarity, but 'in no sense could they be regarded as materially disadvantaged'.

• However, if we carefully look at Hechter’s fourfold requirements for successful political integration of the peripheral collectivity into the national society, we shall see that the Scotts in the UK as well as the Jews in America actually confirm his conclusion. In the case of both, the Scotts and the American Jews, the elements of economic inequality and disadvantaged cultural division of labor were missing, and therefore their integration into the larger states was not hindered.
Modernity of Nationalism

Hechter defines nationalism as ‘collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit’. To the extent that a group strives for something less than complete sovereignty, writes Hechter, 'it is perforce less nationalist'.

It follows that the demand for nationalism can only exist when the boundaries between the nation and the governance unit are not congruent. This in turn explains the modernity of nationalism since prior to the last two centuries, most states were not governance units as we understand them today.

'Before the advent of modern communications technology, no central ruler had the capacity to enforce his will on territories at a spatial remove.' And for regions at a distance, the rulers were compelled to rely on some form of 'indirect rule'. The logic behind indirect rule is simple: the central ruler of a geographically extensive state delegates authority to local agents in return for compensation which may take the form of a tribute, taxes or payments in kind and the obligation to provide military service in the event of war. This was the only way to exert at least limited control over extensive territories and populations in pre-modem times, that is before the advent of industrialization and the development of modern communications technology. Yet indirect rule thwarts nationalism.
Rational Choice Analysis

• In his rational choice analysis of intergroup relations, Hechter focuses in particular on the question of how to contain nationalist violence.

• A good deal of nationalist violence which, on the face of it, seems to be irrational has a plausible rational account, says Hechter. And if it is largely, if not wholly, the outcome of rational action, then under certain conditions it can indeed be contained 'because rational actors will respond to institutional incentives.'
How can nationalism be contained?

• Hechter believes that nationalist conflict will decline under three types of conditions:
  • those that increase the costs of collective action,
  • those that reduce the salience of national identity and
  • those that decrease the demand for national sovereignty.

• The costs of collective action is highest in repressive regimes, but repression is growing more difficult in the global age we live in, and there are certainly no signs of national identities abating.

• Given these, the best hope for containing nationalist violence seems to hinge on conditions that decrease the demand for sovereignty among national groups. This can only be done, Hechter concludes, by reintroducing some form of indirect rule, by creating institutions which provide decentralized decision-making within multinational states.

• Consider this idea in the light of Chechnya in Russia and Kosovo in Yugoslavia.
Modernist Theories
with stress on political transformations
Political Transformations

• Another variant of modernism has been propounded by scholars who focus on political transformations to explain nationalism. They put stress on, for example:
  
  • the rise of the modern bureaucratic state,
  
  • the extension of suffrage,
  
  • the growing role of elites and their power struggles, or
  
  • the changing nature of warfare.

• In what follows, we will discuss the contributions of three scholars who espoused the 'political transformations' approach, namely John Breuilly, Paul R. Brass and Eric J. Hobsbawm.
John Breuilly (1946-)

John Breuilly's *Nationalism and the State* has become established as one of the key texts on nationalism since its initial publication in 1982. Breuilly's massive historical survey differs from the historical studies of earlier periods, which were mainly chronological narratives of particular nationalisms by its insistence in combining historical perspectives with theoretical analysis. Through the comparative analysis of a wide variety of cases, Breuilly introduces a new conception of nationalism, that is nationalism as a form of politics and constructs an original typology of nationalist movements. The breadth of his book, which covers more than thirty individual cases of nationalism from different continents and historical periods is even appreciated by critical reviewers, who concede that the book is a 'valuable and useful' source of information.
Breuilly notes that nationalism has been variously explained in the literature by reference to ideas, class interest, economic modernization, psychological needs or culture. But for him, although particular nationalisms can be illuminated with respect to this or that class, idea or cultural achievement, none of these factors can help us understand nationalism generally.

He contends that all these approaches overlook a crucial point, namely that nationalism is above all about politics and politics is about power. 'Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state.' Our central task therefore is 'to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power.'
Nationalism as a “Political Movement”

• For Breuilly, nationalism refers to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments.

• A nationalist argument in turn is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions:
  • There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
  • The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
  • The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.
According to Breuilly, the modern state originally developed in a liberal form. Thus, 'public' powers were handed over to specialized state institutions (parliaments, bureaucracies) and many 'private' powers were left under the control of non-political institutions (free markets, private firms, families and so on). This involved a double transformation: 'institutions such as the monarchy lost "private" powers ... other institutions such as churches, guilds, and lordships lost their "public" powers to government.'

With the breakdown of corporate division of labour, there was now a new emphasis upon people as individuals rather than as members of particular groups. Under such circumstances, the main problem was how to establish the state-society connection, or to put it differently, how to reconcile the public interests of citizens and the private interests of selfish individuals. It was precisely at this juncture that nationalist ideas came on the scene.
How to establish the state-society connection?

- **Political answer:**
  The society of individuals was simultaneously defined as a polity (civil government) of citizens. According to this view, commitment to the state could only be generated by participating in democratic and liberal institutions. The 'nation' was simply the body of citizens and only the political rights of the citizens - not their cultural identities - mattered. Breuilly claims that such a conception of nationality underlaid the programmes of eighteenth century patriots.

- **Cultural answer:**
  This answer stresses the collective character of society. This was initially formulated by political elites confronted both by an intellectual problem (how did one legitimize state actions?) and by a political problem (how could one secure the support of the masses?). Subsequently, this solution was standardized and became the major way of providing an identity to members of different social groups.
Liberalism vs. Nationalism

Breuilly maintains that liberalism's inability to cope with collective or community interests was very crucial in the birth of nation. Moreover, many groups were not attracted to liberalism, 'the first major political doctrine of modernity' in Breuilly's words, since the system it gave birth to was largely based on socially structured inequality.

According to Breuilly, such groups were easy prey for nationalist ideologues. But the picture was not that simple. What complicated matters further was the 'modern' need to develop political languages and movements which could appeal to a wide range of groups. This could best be done by nationalism which has been a 'sleight-of-hand ideology' connecting the two solutions, that is the nation as a body of citizens and as a cultural collectivity, together.
Two Aspects of Nationalist Movements

- The first aspect concerns the relationship between the movement and the state to which it either opposes or controls (nation-state or non-nation state, i.e. empire).

- The second aspect concerned the goals of nationalist movements (separation, reform, or unification).

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<th>Opposed to non-nation-states</th>
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<td>Separation</td>
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<td>Unification</td>
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Three Functions performed by Nationalism

- Breuilly identifies three different functions performed by nationalist ideas: 'coordination', 'mobilization' and 'legitimacy'.

- By coordination he means the use of nationalist ideas 'to promote the idea of common interests amongst a number of elites which otherwise have rather distinct interests in opposing the existing state'.

- By mobilization he means the use of nationalist ideas 'to generate support for the political movement from broad groups hitherto excluded from the political process'.

- And by legitimacy he means the use of nationalist ideas 'to justify the goals of the political movement both to the state it opposes and also to powerful external agents, such as foreign states and their public opinions.'
Paul Brass, Constructionism & Instrumentalism

- **Paul Brass** is best known in the literature on nationalism for his stress on the 'instrumental' nature of ethnicity and nationality.

- Broadly speaking, **instrumentalism** explains the genesis of and continuing support for nationalism by the interests it is alleged to serve. In this view, **ethnic and national identities** become convenient **tools** at the hands of **competing elites** for generating **mass support** in the universal struggle for **wealth, power, and prestige**. In stark contrast to **primordialists** who treat ethnicity as a 'given' of the human condition, **instrumentalists** argue that ethnic and national attachments are continually redefined and reconstructed in response to changing conditions and the machinations of political elites.
What is the Study of Ethnicity and Nationality?

According to Brass:

“the study of ethnicity and nationality is in large part the study of politically induced cultural change. More precisely, it is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups.” (Brass 1979, 40-41)
Brass’s Theoretical Framework

- Brass's theoretical framework is based on a number of assumptions.

- The first concerns the variability of ethnic identities. For Brass, there is nothing inevitable about the rise of ethnic identities and their transformation into nationalism. To the contrary, the politicization of cultural identities is only possible under specific conditions which need to be identified and analysed carefully.

- Second, ethnic conflicts do not arise from cultural differences, but from the broader political and economic environment which also shapes the nature of the competition between elite groups.
Brass’s Theoretical Framework

• Third, this competition will also influence the definition of the relevant ethnic groups and their persistence. This is because the cultural forms, values and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites in their struggle for power and prestige. They are transformed into symbols which can facilitate the creation of a political identity and the generation of greater support; in other words, the meanings and contents of symbols are dependent on political circumstances.

• Finally, all these assumptions show that the process of ethnic identity formation and its transformation into nationalism is reversible. Depending on political and economic circumstances, elites may choose to downplay ethnic differences and seek cooperation with other groups or state authorities. (Brass 1991: 13-16)
Necessary Conditions for Ethnic Transformation & Successful Nationalist Movements

Brass notes that the existence of objective cultural markers - here, read ethnic differences - in a given population is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the process of ethnic transformation to begin.

Another necessary, but still not sufficient condition, is the presence of elite competition for the leadership of an ethnic group or for control over various tangible and/or intangible resources.
Four Forms of Competition among Elites

- According to Brass, competition for local control may take four different forms:
  - those between local land controllers and alien authorities,
  - between competing religious elites,
  - between local religious elites and collaborationist native aristocracies,
  - and between native religious elites and alien aristocracies.

- Another general type of competition arises from the uneven processes of modernization and takes the form of competition for jobs in the government, industry and universities.
Sufficient Conditions for Ethnic Transformation & Successful Nationalist Movements

- Neither the existence of ethnic differences nor elite competition are sufficient conditions for the inception of the process of ethnic transformation. The sufficient conditions, Brass argues, are:
  - “the existence of the means to communicate the selected symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic group,
  - the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom the symbols may be communicated, and
  - the absence of intense class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between elites and other social groups and classes.”
What promotes interclass communication?

- Brass cites growth in literacy rates, the development of media of mass communication, particularly newspapers, the standardization of local languages, the existence of books in local languages and the availability of schools where the medium of instruction is the native language among the factors necessary to promote such interclass communication.

- Referring to Deutsch, Brass contends that the growth of communication facilities should be complemented by the emergence of new groups in the society who are ‘available’ for more intense communication, and who demand education and new jobs in the modern sectors of the economy. In other words, demand is as important as supply.
How to avoid ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic states?

• Brass contends that unitary states containing geographically concentrated minorities will definitely face at some point demands for administrative and/or political decentralization, if the political needs of these minorities are not adequately satisfied by the state authorities. Under such circumstances, governments may opt for the reorganization of old political arenas or the construction of new ones to satisfy ethnic demands. According to Brass, the use of these strategies works best under the following conditions:

  • where there is a relatively open system of political bargaining and competition;
  • where there is a rational distribution of power between the federal and local units so that the capture of power at one level by one ethnic group does not close all significant avenues to power;
  • where there are more than two or three ethnic groups;
  • where ethnic conflicts do not overlap with ideological disagreements between unitarists and federalists; and
  • where external powers are not willing to intervene.
The distinguished Marxist historian Eric J. Hobsbawm is another scholar highlighting the role of political transformations in understanding nationalism. Hobsbawm's views on nationalism form part of his broader project of writing the history of modernity. He assembled his theses in *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) and in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (1990).

According to Hobsbawm, both nations and nationalism are products of 'social engineering'. What deserves particular attention in this process is the case of 'invented traditions' by which he means 'a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.'
Two Processes of Invention

- Hobsbawm distinguishes between two processes of invention, namely the adaptation of old traditions and institutions to new situations, and the deliberate invention of 'new' traditions for quite novel purposes.

- According to Hobsbawm, the period from 1870 to 1914, which coincides with the emergence of mass politics, can be considered as the apogee of invented traditions.

- The incursion of hitherto excluded sections of the society into politics created unprecedented problems for the rulers who found it increasingly difficult to maintain the obedience, loyalty and cooperation of their subjects now defined as citizens whose political activities were recognized as something to be taken into account, if only in the form of elections. The 'invention of tradition' was the main strategy adopted by the ruling elites to counter the threat posed by mass democracy.
Three Major Inventions

- Hobsbawm singles out three major innovations of the period as particularly relevant:
  - the development of primary education,
  - the invention of public ceremonies (like Bastille Day), and
  - the mass production of public monuments.

- As a result of these processes, 'nationalism became a substitute for social cohesion through a national church, a royal family or other cohesive traditions, or collective group self-presentations, a new secular religion.'
Nations do not make States & Nationalism

- Hobsbawm assents to Gellner's definition of nationalism as 'a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'.

- For him, this principle also implies that the political duties of citizens to the nation override all other obligations. This is what distinguishes modern nationalism from earlier forms of group identification which are less demanding. Such a conception of nationalism overrules 'primordialist' understandings of the nation which treat it as a 'given' and unchanging category.

- Hobsbawm argues that nations belong to a particular, historically recent, period. It does not make sense to speak of nations before the rise of the modern territorial state as these two are closely related to each other.

- In short, 'nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.'
The Origins of Nationalism

According to Hobsbawm, the origins of nationalism should be sought at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation.

Nations are not only the produces of the quest for a territorial state; they can only come into being in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development. For instance, national languages cannot emerge as such before the invention of printing and the spread of literacy to large sections of the society, hence mass schooling.

According to Hobsbawm, this shows that nations and nationalism are dual phenomena, 'constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist.'
The First Stage of the Historical Evolution of Nationalism (1789-1918)

- The first stage covers the period from the French Revolution to 1918 when nationalism was born and gained rapid ground, Hobsbawm makes a distinction between two kinds of nationalism in this stage:

  - the first, which transformed the map of Europe between 1830 and 1870, was the democratic nationalism of the 'great nations' stemming from the ideals of the French Revolution.

  - the second, which came to the fore from 1870 onwards, was the reactionary nationalisms of the 'small nations', mostly against the policies of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Tsarist empires.

{NOTE: Remember Rosa Luxemburgs “radical internationalism” and Mill’s and Kohn’s view on the nationalism of “backward nationalities?”}
The Second Stage of the Historical Evolution of Nationalism (1918-1950)

- Hobsbawm's second stage covers the period from 1918 to 1950. For him, this period was the 'apogee of nationalism', not because of the rise of fascism, but the upsurge of national sentiment on the left, as exemplified in the course of the Spanish Civil War.

- Hobsbawm claims that nationalism acquired a strong association with the left during the anti-fascist period, 'an association which was subsequently reinforced by the experience of anti-imperial struggle in colonial countries'. For him, militant nationalism was nothing more than the manifestation of despair, the utopia of 'those who had lost the old utopias of the age of Enlightenment.'
The Third Stage of the Historical Evolution of Nationalism (1950-1990)

• The late twentieth century constitutes Hobsbawm's last stage. He argues that the nationalisms of this period were functionally different from those of the earlier periods. Nationalisms of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 'unificatory as well as emancipatory' and they were a 'central fact of historical transformation'. However, nationalism in the late twentieth century was no longer 'a major vector of historical development'. They are:

“essentially negative, or rather divisive ... In one sense they may be regarded as the successors to, sometimes the heirs of, the small-nationality movements directed against the Habsburg, Tsarist and Ottoman empires ... Time and again they seem to be reactions of weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world.”

• Hobsbawm cites Quebec, Welsh and Estonian nationalisms to illustrate this claim and argues that 'in spite of its evident prominence, nationalism is historically less important'. After all, the fact that historians are now making rapid progress in analysing nationalism means that the phenomenon is past its peak.
Modernist Theories
with stress on social/cultural transformations
Social/Cultural Transformations

- The last group of theories stresses the importance of social/cultural transformations in understanding nationalism.

- The influential analyses of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson stand prominent in this approach alongside with Miroslav Hroch's account of the rise of national movements among the ‘small nations' of Central and Eastern Europe.
Ernest Gellner & High Cultures

- Gellner's theory is generally considered as the most important attempt to make sense of nationalism. The originality of his analysis, which lies in its broad theoretical sweep, is conceded even by his staunchest critics. However, the sweep of his analysis also made him the target of a large number of criticisms.

- Gellner's theory can be better understood within the context of a longstanding sociological tradition whose origins go back to Durkheim and Weber. The cardinal feature of this tradition is a distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. Following in the footsteps of the founding fathers of sociology, Gellner posits three stages in human history: the hunter-gatherer, the agroliterate and the industrial. This distinction forms the basis of Gellner's explanation which he presents as an alternative to "false theories of nationalism".
Gellner on "False Theories of Nationalism"

- Gellner identifies four such theories:

  - **the nationalist theory** which sees nationalism as a natural, self-evident and self-generating phenomenon;
  
  - Kedourie's theory which treats nationalism as 'an artificial consequence of ideas which did not need ever to be formulated, and appeared by a regrettable accident';
  
  - 'the wrong address theory' favoured by Marxists which holds that the 'awakening message was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to nations'; and
  
  - 'dark Gods theory' shared by both lovers and haters of nationalism which regards it as 'the re-emergence of the atavistic forces of blood or territory.'
Gellner’s Definition of Nationalism

• For Gellner, 'nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'.

• It is also a fundamental feature of the modern world since in most of human history political units were not organized along nationalist principles. The boundaries of city-states, feudal entities or dynastic empires rarely coincided with those of nations. In pre-modem times, the nationality of the rulers was not important for the ruled; what mattered for them was whether the rulers were more just and merciful than their predecessors.

• Nationalism became a social necessity only in the modern world, and the task of a theory of nationalism is to explain how and why did this happen.
Relationship between Power & Culture in Hunter-Gatherer & Agroliterate Societies

- Gellner does not dwell too much on the hunter-gatherer phase as there are no states at this stage, hence no room for nationalism which intends to endow the national culture with a political roof.

- Agro-literate societies, on the other hand, are characterized by a complex system of fairly stable statuses: 'the possession of a status, and access to its rights and privileges, is by far the most important consideration for a member of such a society. A man is his rank'. In such a society, power and culture, two potential partners destined for each other according to nationalist theory, do not have much inclination to come together; the ruling class, consisting of warriors, priests, clerics, administrators and burghers, uses culture to differentiate itself from the large majority of direct agricultural producers who are confined to small local communities where culture is almost invisible.
‘High’ & ‘Low Cultures’ in Agroliterate Societies

- Communication in these self-enclosed illiterate units is 'contextual', in contrast to the 'context-free' communication of the literate strata. Thus, this kind of society is marked by 'a discrepancy, and sometimes conflict, between a high and a low culture'. There is no incentive for rulers to impose cultural homogeneity on their subjects; on the contrary, they derive benefit from diversity.

- The only class that might have an interest in imposing certain shared cultural norms is the clergy, but they do not have the necessary means for incorporating the masses in a high culture. The overall conclusion for Gellner is straightforward: since there is no cultural homogenization in agro-literate societies, there can be no nations.

{NOTE: Check Hechter’s & Brass’s view on communication mechanism as a devices of national integration.}
Relationship between Power & Culture in Industrial Societies

- **Shared culture** is not essential to the preservation of social order in **agro-literate societies** since status, that is an individual's place in the system of social roles, is ascriptive. (*The definition of ascriptive is a group in which status is based on a factor other than achievement. A group that only has members of a certain race or sex is an example of an ascriptive group.*) In such societies, culture merely underlines structure and reinforces existing loyalties.

- Conversely, **culture** plays a more active role in **industrial societies** which are characterized by **high levels of social mobility**, and in which roles are no longer ascribed.

- **Manual work in industrialized societies** generally involves controlling, managing and maintaining a machine with a fairly sophisticated control mechanism. This has profound implications for culture in that the system can no longer tolerate the dependence of meaning on 'local dialectical idiosyncrasy' hence the need for impersonal, context-free communication and a high level of cultural standardization. For the first time in history, culture becomes important in its own right. It does not so much underline structure: rather it replaces it.'
Modern Society like a Modern Army

According to Gellner:

“A modern society is, in this respect, like a modern army, only more so. It provides a very prolonged and fairly thorough training for all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills ... The assumption is that anyone who has completed the generic training common to the entire population can be re-trained for most other jobs without too much difficulty.”

This system of education is quite different from the one-to-one or on-the-job principle found in pre-modern societies: 'men are no longer formed at their mother's knee, but rather in the école maternelle’. A very important stratum in agro-literate societies was that of the clerks who can transmit literacy. In industrial society where exo-education becomes the norm, every man is a clerk; they are and must be 'mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to an other, and must possess the generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation.'
Nationalism & ‘High Culture’

According to Gellner:

“Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population ... It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind.”
Five Stages on the Path from an Ethnicity to a Nation

1. Baseline. At this stage, ethnicity is not yet important and the idea of a link between it and political legitimacy is entirely absent.

2. Nationalist irredentism. The political boundaries and structures of this stage are inherited from the previous era, but ethnicity - or nationalism as a political principle begins to operate. The old borders and structures are under pressure from nationalist agitation.

3. National irredentism triumphant and self-defeating. At this stage, multiethnic empires collapse and the dynastic-religious principle of political legitimation is replaced by nationalism. New states emerge as a result of nationalist agitation. But, Gellner contends, this state of affairs is self-defeating since these new states are just as ‘minority-haunted' as the larger ones they replaced.
Five Stages on the Path from an Ethnicity to a Nation

4. *Nacht und Nebel*. This is an expression used by the Nazis to depict some of their secret operations in the course of the Second World War. At this stage, all moral standards are suspended and the principle of nationalism, which demands homogeneous national units, is implemented with a new ruthlessness. Mass murder and forcible transplantation of populations replace more benign methods such as assimilation.

5. *Post-industrial stage*. This is the post-1945 period. High level of satiation of the nationalist principle, accompanied by general affluence and cultural convergence, leads to a diminution, though not the disappearance, of the virulence of nationalism.
Benedict Anderson & Imagined Communities

- The year 1983 saw the publication of yet another very influential book on nationalism *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* by Benedict Anderson. The initial impetus for writing this book, its author later recalls, came from 'the triangular warfare between the so-called revolutionary states of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia at the end of the 1970s.

- The book had an - unexpectedly, according to its author - wide appeal; and Anderson's memorable description of nations as *imagined communities* - 'a pair of words from which the vampires of banality have by now sucked almost all the blood' (Anderson, 2006 : 207) - has become 'a mantra' in academic discussions of nationalism, something of 'the rightness and efficiency of a classic ("why hadn't anyone realized this before?")

[NOTE: Shils and Geertz spoke of people’s *perception* of nation as eternal. “Perception” as “imagination.”]
Nationality & Nationalism as Cultural Artefacts

To understand nationality and nationalism properly, we need to find out how they have come into being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time and why they command such profound emotional legitimacy.

Anderson argues that nationalism emerged towards the end of the 18th century as a result of the 'spontaneous distillation of a complex "crossing" of discrete historical forces' and once created, they became models which could be emulated in a great variety of social terrains, by a correspondingly wide variety of ideologies.

For him, a persuasive explanation of nationalism should not confine itself to specifying the cultural and political factors which facilitate the growth of nations. The real challenge lies in showing why and how these particular cultural artefacts have aroused such deep attachments.
Anderson’s Definition of Nation

- Nation is “an imagined political community” Why “imagined?”
- It is imagined because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'.
- It is imagined as limited, because each nation has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations.
- It is imagined as sovereign because it is born in the age of Enlightenment and revolution, when the legitimacy of divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm was rapidly waning; the nations were dreaming of being free, and if under God, then at least directly so. (who was dreaming? nations or their elites?)
- Finally, it is imagined as a community because, 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship'. According to Anderson, it is ultimately this sense of fraternity which makes it possible for so many millions of people to willingly lay down their lives for their nation.
“Imagined” but not “false”

- It is worth stressing that for Anderson, 'imagining' does not imply 'falsity'. He makes this point quite forcefully when he accuses Gellner of assimilating 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation', with the intention of showing that nationalism masquerades under false pretences.

- Such a view implies that there are 'real' communities which can be advantageously compared to nations. In fact, however, all communities larger than small villages of face-to-face contact (perhaps even these) are imagined.

- Communities, Anderson concludes, should not be distinguished by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.
Cultural Roots of Nationalism

- According to Anderson, 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which - as well as against which - it came into being'.

- He cites two such systems as relevant, the religious community and the dynastic realm, which held sway over much of Europe until the 16th century. Their gradual decline, which began in the 17th century, provided the historical and geographical space necessary for the rise of nations. (the Wars of Religion of 1562–1598)
Decline of
“the great religiously imagined communities”

- Anderson emphasizes **two reasons for this decline**.

- The first was **the effect of the explorations of the non-European world** which widened the general cultural and geographical horizon, and showed the Europeans that alternative forms of human life were also possible.

- The second reason was **the gradual decay of the sacred language itself**. Latin was the dominant language of a pan-European high intelligentsia, and in fact, the only language taught in medieval Western Europe. But by the 16th century all this was changing fast. **More and more books were coming out in the vernacular languages and publishing was ceasing to be an international enterprise.**
Were nations born out of and replaced religious communities and dynastic rules?

- It would be too simplistic, Anderson believes, to suggest that nations grew out of and replaced religious communities and dynastic realms. Beneath the dissolution of these sacred communities, a much more fundamental transformation was taking place in the modes of apprehending the world. This change concerns the medieval Christian conception of time.

- The occurrences of the past and the future are linked neither temporally nor causally, but by Divine Providence which alone can devise such a plan of history. (Fatalism, see, for instance, Proverbs 16:9)

- This conception of simultaneity (all events preordained and simultaneously existing - Fatalism) was replaced by the idea of 'homogeneous empty time' (malleable events in time, shaped by our Free Will - the idea of the Enlightenment present in religions, too). Simultaneity is now understood as being transverse, cross-time, marked by temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar. The new conception of time made it possible to 'imagine' the nation as a 'sociological organism' moving steadily down (or up) history.
Cultural Origins of Modern Nationalism

Summary

- To recapitulate, the cultural origins of the modern nation could be located historically at the junction of three developments:
  - a change in the conceptions of time,
  - the decline of religious communities and of dynastic realms.

- But the picture is not complete yet. The missing ingredient is provided by commercial book publishing on a wide scale, or what Anderson calls 'print-capitalism'. This made it possible, more than anything else, for rapidly growing numbers of people to think of themselves in profoundly new ways.

- More than anything else, Anderson believes, the coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism quickly created large reading publics and mobilized them for political/religious purposes, laying the bases for national consciousnesses.
Criticism of Anderson

- Anderson analyzes nationalism in Latin America and comes to a controversial conclusion that ‘the creole communities of the Americas developed their national consciousnesses well before most of Europe.’
- Regardless whether the above conclusion is reliable or not, what is interesting in his analyses is his conclusions that:
  - First, language did not play an important role in the formation of Latin American nationalisms since the colonies shared a common language with their respective imperial metropoles.
  - Second, the colonial national movements were led by creole elites and not by the intelligentsia.
- This second conclusion may indicate that after all those modernists who put stress on politics and even economy rather than culture might be closer to uncovering the origins of nationalism.
Miroslav Hroch & the Three Phases of Nationalism

• Hroch begins his analysis with an empirical observation. At the beginning of the 19th century, he says, there were eight 'state-nations' in Europe with a more or less developed literary language, a high culture and ethnically homogeneous ruling elites (including the aristocracy and an emerging commercial and industrial bourgeoisie). These eight state-nations - England, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and later Russia - were the products of a long process of nation-building that had started in the Middle Ages. There were also two emerging nations with a developed culture and an ethnically homogeneous elite, but without a political roof, the Germans and the Italians.
Stateless Ethnicities in the 19th century Europe

- At the same time, there were more than thirty 'non-dominant ethnic groups' scattered around the territories of multiethnic empires and some of the aforementioned states.

- These groups lacked their own state, an indigenous ruling elite and a continuous cultural tradition in their own literary language. They usually occupied a compact territory, but were dominated by an ‘exogenous' - that is belonging to a different ethnic group - ruling class. Hroch notes that although these groups have come to be identified with Eastern and Southeastern Europe, there were many similar communities in Western Europe, too. Sooner or later, some members of these groups became aware of their own ethnicity and started to conceive of themselves as a potential nation.
National agitation in Europe

• Comparing their situation with that of the established nations, they detected certain deficits, which the future nation lacked, and began efforts to overcome them, seeking the support of their compatriots.

• Hroch observes that this national agitation started very early in some cases, that is
  • around 1800 (the Greeks, Czechs, Norwegians, Irish),
  • one generation later in others (the Finns, Croats, Slovenes, Flemish, Welsh), or
  • even as late as the second half of the nineteenth century (Latvians, Estonians, Catalans, Basques).
“National” vs. “Nationalist” Movements

- Hroch calls these 'organized endeavours to achieve all the attributes of a fully-fledged nation' a national movement.

- He argues that the tendency to speak of them as 'nationalist' leads to serious confusion since nationalism stricto sensu is something else, namely that 'outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests'. In that sense, nationalism was only one of many forms of national consciousness to emerge in the course of these movements.
Programmes of the Classical National Movements

... include three groups of demand:

1. The development or improvement of a national culture based on the local language which had to be used in education, administration and economic life.

2. The creation of a complete social structure, including their 'own' educated elites and entrepreneurial classes.

3. The achievement of equal civil rights and of some degree of political self-administration.

The timing and relative priority of these three sets of demands varied but the trajectory of any national movement was only completed when all were fulfilled.
Three Stages in the Development of a National Movement

1. During the initial period, which he calls Phase A, activists committed themselves to scholarly inquiry into the linguistic, historical and cultural attributes of their ethnic group. They did not attempt to mount a patriotic agitation or formulate any political goals at this stage, in part because they were isolated and in part they did not believe it would serve any purpose.

2. In the second period, Phase B, a new range of activists emerged who intended to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to the project of creating a nation. Hroch notes that these activists were not very successful initially, but their efforts found a growing reception in time.

3. When the national consciousness became the concern of the majority of the population, a mass movement was formed, which Hroch terms Phase C. It was only at this stage that a full social structure could be formed.

The most important criterion for any typology of national movements is the relationship between the transition to Phase B and then to Phase C on the one hand, and the transition to a constitutional society on the other.
How did the experiences (and structures) of the past affect the modern nation-building process?

1. According to Hroch, the experiences of the past, or what he calls 'the prelude to modern nation-building', were not only important for the 'state-nations' of the West, but also for the non-dominant ethnic groups of Central and Eastern Europe. The legacy of the past embodied three significant resources that might facilitate the emergence of a national movement.

The first of these were 'the relics of an earlier political autonomy'. The properties or privileges granted under the old regime often led to tensions between the estates and the 'new' absolutism, which in turn provided triggers for later national movements. Hroch points to the resistance of Hungarian, Bohemian and Croatian estates to josephine centralism to illustrate his argument.

A second resource was 'the memory of former independence or statehood'. This could also play a stimulating role as the cases of Czech, Lithuanian, Bulgarian and Catalan movements demonstrate.

Finally, the existence of 'a medieval written language' was crucial as this could make the development of a modern literary language easier. Hroch argues that the absence of this resource was much exaggerated in the nineteenth century, leading to a distinction between 'historical' and 'unhistorical' peoples. In fact, its salience was limited to the tempo at which the historical consciousness of the nation developed.
How and why did the scholarly interests of a small number of intellectuals transform into political programs underpinned by strong emotional attachments?

- Whatever the legacy of the past, the modern nation-building process always started with the collection of information about the history, language and customs of the non-dominant ethnic group. The ethnic archaeologists of Phase A excavated the group's past and paved the way for the subsequent formation of a national identity. But, Hroch maintains, their efforts cannot be called an organized political or social movement since they articulated no national demands as yet. The transformation of their intellectual activity into a movement seeking cultural and political changes was a product of Phase B. Hroch distinguishes three developments that precipitated this transformation:
  
  1. a social and/or political crisis of the old order, accompanied by new tensions and horizons;
  2. the emergence of discontent among significant elements of the population;
  3. loss of faith in traditional moral systems, above all a decline in religious legitimacy, even if this only affected small numbers of intellectuals.

[NOTE: What is the nature of these three developments? Are they political, economic, cultural, or social?]
What accounts for the success of some of these movements and the failure of the others?

On the other hand, the initiation of national agitation (phase B) by a group of activists did not guarantee the emergence of a mass movement. Mass support and the successful attainment of the ultimate goal, that is the forging of a modern nation, depended in turn on four conditions:

1. a crisis of legitimacy, linked to social, moral and cultural strains;
2. a basic volume of vertical social mobility (some educated people must come from the non-dominant ethnic group);
3. fairly high level of social communication, including literacy, schooling and market relations;
4. nationally relevant conflicts of interest.
Why were social conflicts of this kind articulated in national terms more successfully in some part of Europe than others?

- **National consciousness** can be attained in a relatively short time if the goals articulated by agitators correspond to the immediate needs and aspirations of the majority of the non-dominant ethnic group. In regard to the ethnic revival in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 20th century, Horch states:

  “in a social situation where the old regime was collapsing, where old relations were in flux and general insecurity was growing, the members of the 'non-dominant ethnic group' would see the community of language and culture as the ultimate certainty, the unambiguously demonstrable value. Today, as the system or planned economy and social security breaks down, once again the situation is analogous - language acts as a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society. When society fails, the nation appears as the ultimate guarantee.”

[Note: in the last observation Horch must have had Czechoslovakia in mind. But, how about Yugoslavia in which Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and Montenegrins spoke the same language?]