This article examines the relationship between the South Korean welfare administration’s reluctance to consider homeless women as deserving of state aid during the Asian debt crisis (henceforth the crisis) and the emergence of a pathologizing, popular discourse of family breakdown. Based on fieldwork I did in Seoul between 1998 and 2000, this article seeks to elucidate how the diagnostic discourses and prescriptive measures of “family breakdown” (kajong haeche or kajok haeche) proved congruent with a policy measure of selecting “deserving” homeless citizens defined as male breadwinners with employability and rehabilitating capacity. I argue that diverse social actors, including journalists, civic leaders, and government managers, enunciated logics of neoliberal human values; when social actors participated in the social governance of homelessness they relied on such logics to discipline gender and family relationships.¹

Building on this analysis I conclude that social governance, particularly of
homelessness, provides an effective opportunity to understand the prevalence of neoliberalism in South Korea. Neoliberalism in Korea is not just an economic doctrine promoted by international financial institutions or state administrations. Rather, the concept is better understood when we reconsider it as a social ethos that has gained wide explanatory power from various local actors. Although my argument does not imply that there was calculated complicity among various social actors, it does show that conflicting social actors can produce powerful coordination at a time of national crisis. In the South Korean case, activists did voice criticisms of Kim Dae Jung’s welfarism on grounds of its insufficient support for poor people. However, civil rights activists’ own activities devoted to social relief during the crisis echoed government policy. They too emphasized the need for beneficiaries to be rehabilitated within the confines of a normative family ideology. As a result, the “needy” subjects of the previous welfare regime were predominantly female citizens, especially mothers without family support. The “deserving” subjects of the Kim Dae Jung welfare regime, with the wide support of various civil forces, were breadwinning men with the potential of returning to or creating normative families.

**Background of Family Breakdown Discourse**

Before turning to the social welfare administration’s policy toward homeless women, I begin with an analysis of the film *Happy End* (*Haep’i endû*) to illustrate the discourse of family breakdown that emerged so forcefully during the crisis. An analysis of the film is central to my examination of how and why certain homeless people became “deserving” welfare citizens at that particular historical juncture. In the midst of the crisis, *Happy End* was one of the most popular films in South Korea. The film portrays a fictional, scandalous homicide as the consequence of an extramarital love affair: a man kills his wife for having an adulterous relationship with another man. The husband once worked as a bank teller but became a househusband after being laid off during the crisis. He appears to be unambitious and rather timid, dreaming only of simple happiness for his family. In contrast, his wife, Pora, is a successful and ambitious woman who runs her own after-school learning institute for children. Although the film is set during the
crisis, when most private learning institutes went bankrupt, somehow Pora manages to keep her business prosperous and to maintain her big apartment. The film climaxes when Pora agrees to her lover’s persistent appeals to go out one night, and to do so drugs her baby’s milk with sleeping pills. Pora’s husband, who has become gradually more suspicious of his wife’s late returns home, decides to kill Pora after he finds a remnant of a pill in the baby’s milk bottle. It is, in other words, Pora’s irresponsible motherhood, rather than her conjugal betrayal, that serves to justify the husband’s conviction that he must kill her.

The narrative of an emasculated husband justified for killing his wife because she is an “immoral” mother is hardly new in Korean literary and cinematic history. Nam Jung Hyun’s text *Letter to Father (Puju chônsangsô)* is one such example. In this story a husband confesses to his father that he must kill his wife because she has aborted his son. The representation of emasculated husbands as a tacit metaphor of lost sovereignty—or post-Korean War crisis—has been prevalent in Korean cultural texts throughout the twentieth century. In contrast to earlier cultural texts, however, *Happy End* does not depict the female protagonist as explicitly evil. Rather it romanticizes her as an independent woman who can enjoy sexual pleasure but who has momentarily erred. Thus, *Happy End* reveals the changed expectations of women in recent South Korean social history. On the one hand, the film shows how South Korean feminism blossomed in the 1990s pursuant to civil rights activism that emerged after the culmination of the Democratization Movement in 1987; Pora, in this regard, emerges as an independent women aspiring to gender equality.

Distinct from the pre-1987 political movements that featured collective activist opposition to the military dictatorship’s political oppression and capitalist exploitation of low-income laborers and farmers, the post-1987 socio-political movements cultivated diversified civil activism. This diverse agenda focused on individual happiness and rendered the middle class a legitimate object of social activism. During and in the immediate aftermath of the crisis from 1997, however, the feminist discourse on women’s independence was severely contested, if not subsumed, by the resurgence of a collectivistic-style activism in the face of national emergency. Not only did the women’s movement recede,
but women themselves were subtly reprivatized after enjoying a progressive social environment over the decade leading up to the crisis. This is the social context in which the discourse of irresponsible mothers or wives as the cause of family breakdown increasingly appeared in newspapers, editorials, novels, public forums, and films like *Happy End*. The discourse of family breakdown presumes employed men as the breadwinners of the family, women as the keepers of the hearth and supporters of their working husbands, and the nuclear family as the core of social well-being. This fundamentally conservative family ideology took as its enemy illicit sexual relations, rising divorce rates, and the emergence of same-sex unions. For example, newspaper articles took note of same-sex, couple-based families (*tongsŏngae kajok*) and divorce among elderly couples (*hwanghon yihon*) as signs of family breakdown.

The discourse of family breakdown is critical to understanding how “deserving” homeless people were conceived along gender and class lines at this particular historical juncture. Before proceeding to vignettes on the welfare governance of the homeless, I will briefly review the historical background of the Asian debt crisis and the political and social projects that converged in the South Korean response to it.

**Contextualizing the IMF Crisis and the Kim Dae Jung Government’s Policies**

The Asian debt crisis in South Korea began on November 21, 1997, when the nation became the object of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout due to the lack of U.S. dollars with which to repay debts to foreign financial institutions. Major newspapers lamented the day as the “second national humiliation day” of Korea (the first being the Japanese colonization of Korea). This type of nationalist discourse urged citizens to protect the nation with donations, such as gold, recalling the early-twentieth-century movement to repay the national debt to the Japanese colonial government (*kukch’ae posang undong*). In South Korea, the crisis in fact came to be known as the IMF crisis. The label, *ai-em-epû* (IMF), itself was a conspicuous marker of the crisis and economic neoliberalization. As in the case of IMF homelessness or IMF unemployment, “IMF” denotes the involve-
ment and negative impact of a foreign power within this national disaster. Although this way of referring to the crisis does not necessarily mean that South Koreans blamed the IMF, or any international institution, as the sole cause of the national emergency, it does speak to considerable ambivalence about the intrusion of a foreign power in South Korean sovereign matters.

In fact, the causes of the crisis are more rooted at the level of the Asian regional economy, if not globally. The crisis began in Thailand on July 2, 1997, when foreign investors retreated from short-term and unhedged loans, fearing a currency hike after the collapse of assets and property market bubbles. The tendency to withdraw short-term investments rapidly spread through other Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is interesting to note that Joseph Stiglitz, former chairperson of the World Bank, also criticized the role of the international financial institutes, in particular the IMF. Regardless of the different explanations about the origin of the crisis (whether caused by intranational weakness or extranational push, and whether voluntarily or involuntarily), it seems that many Asian regimes, including that of Kim Dae Jung, to various degrees decided to change both the reality and international image of their protectionist economies and establish neoliberal state policies.

As a condition for receiving IMF bailout funds, the South Korean government agreed to restructure its economic and financial systems along liberal free market lines. These measures entailed the bankruptcy of many large companies (chaeból) and banks, and led to large-scale unemployment. Importantly, the crisis occurred almost concurrently with South Korea’s political transition. In December 1997, a month after the beginning of the crisis, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung was elected the first civilian president with no connection to military dictatorships. Although Kim Dae Jung’s victory was celebrated as a triumph for South Korean democratic movements and was endorsed by South Korean progressive political activist groups, the new president disappointed his supporters when his neoliberal policies contributed to a drastic increase in the unemployment rate. The 1998–99 official unemployment rate was 8 percent, though many observers noted that using more realistic figures including women at home and students who wanted to work, the unemployment rate was an astounding 20 percent. Either figure is striking in relation to the pre-IMF rate of less than
It is therefore all the more remarkable that President Kim Dae Jung orchestrated multifaceted reforms, particularly in the realm of welfare policy, with the support of civil activists.

Kim Dae Jung’s achievement in this respect can be attributed to his effective deployment of liberal forces and policies. Before he was elected, during his exile in Britain, Kim Dae Jung had developed commitments to economic liberalization and governmental restructuring as a means to limiting business-government relations and corruption. This focus was in line with the advice of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and became more conspicuous during the crisis. A crucial example of the prompt realization of his commitments was his success in establishing the Tripartite Committee (consisting of representatives from two labor unions, the biggest business association, and state administration). The committee made unprecedented decisions concerning workers’ layoffs.

Further, Kim Dae Jung garnered the support of many long-standing members of progressive civic groups. This he achieved by mobilizing partnerships between governmental organizations (GOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) when the government responded to the crisis. He expanded government funding for NGOs and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and elicited their participation in sharing the responsibility for managing social issues to help unemployed and homeless people. NGO/NPO’s collaboration with the government has roots in the Democratization Movement, which helped bring about the demise of the military regimes in 1987. In a critical sense, the historical moment was not only the official ending of military dictatorship and its enormous support for big conglomerates (chaebol), but also the beginning of a decline of radical or dogmatically idealistic political movements. On the one hand, the 1980s political movements resulted in pessimism about the efficacy of confrontational resistant activism against strict state law and chaebol owners. Support for militant labor unions was weakening among blue-collar workers who watched the fragmentation of socialist regimes and who were afraid of undermining their companies’ global competitiveness. On the other hand, the 1980s political movements engendered a new generation of identity politics and civil/human rights activism in the 1990s. This new direction partially passed down the spirit of resistance toward diverse arenas of social movements beyond class, labor,
and reunification issues. Indebted to white-collar workers’ participation in general social issues, this new generation of social and civil activism was characterized by a greater awareness of the various aspirations of civilians, addressing middle-class, as well as lower-class issues. This double-faceted inheritance from the peak of the Democratization Movement coexisted in the surviving activists and civil groups of the 1990s. In addition, this inheritance shaped progressive civil organizations’ relationships with state or city governments, causing them to become more diplomatic (meaning selectively militant or radical) as they appealed to a broader population that included not only the lower class, but the middle class as well.

In general, when civil groups involved themselves in labor and layoff issues, they tended consistently to disagree with the government administration, which suggests that civil groups had inherited and further developed the 1980s-style activism to some degree. For example, civil groups wrote complaint letters or collected mass complaint letters to the federal government. They held relatively peaceful rallies and demonstrations in the streets and gathered support from international allies to pressure the South Korean government. In contrast to civil groups’ actions regarding state policies on labor issues, when drawn into welfare issues, they inclined to be cooperative rather than to resist the government’s plans. Of course, civil groups were not always complicit with the Kim Dae Jung regime. Many professionals and activists criticized the government’s response to unemployment issues, charging that it was focused only on reemployable people and sidestepped broader welfare policies for people who could not expect employment. Yet these same critics were actively participating—at the government’s invitation—in partnership programs between GOs and NGOs. As previously mentioned, the government expanded opportunities and increased funding to support various NGO/NPO activities. In the past, under military dictatorship, there had always been government funding for NGOs, but it was granted only to NGOs affiliated with the official circle. The expansion of recipients of governmental funds for NGO/NPO activities in the postdictatorship years was proposed and audited by a group of mostly non-governmental experts, who were often involved with NGOs as voluntary consultants or board members.
The climate of the Asian debt crisis gave rise to a new phenomenon called “IMF homeless” (aimepû nosukcha or siljik nosukcha). This term refers to people, more accurately to men, who supposedly lost their means of subsistence and housing during and due to the crisis. The word for homeless people in Korean, nosukcha, is a neologism fabricated with the onset of the crisis, to distinguish itself from the existing purangin, a term that could be translated as “vagrant” or “vagabond.” Regardless of a longstanding and significant population of people living in the streets, the category “IMF homeless” implied an entirely new phenomenon. Scenes of crowded homeless people residing in the environs of the Seoul train station were broadcast locally and internationally. Homeless people were portrayed as the most pitiful victims of the crisis. After seeing these pictures, many South Koreans, as well as Koreans abroad and foreign humanitarian groups, made donations to alleviate conditions for the homeless and unemployed. The IMF homeless were particularly prominent because they were one of the first objects of attention of Kim Dae Jung’s welfare administration, and because never before had a South Korean government paid so much attention to homeless people as primary recipients or welfare citizens.

Seoul, where I conducted my research, was an optimal setting for observing the process entailed in the making of homeless policy because the nation’s homeless were centered in the capital. During my fieldwork period, I acted not only as an anthropologist, but also as an assistant to the Seoul Committee on Unemployment Issues, created in response to the crisis. Furthermore, I had been hired in that capacity as part of a Seoul public works initiative for unemployed citizens (konggong kûllo saôp). I myself was registered as a so-called highly educated, unemployed person (kohangnyôk sirôpa). I was assigned the task of collecting data on social needs related to unemployment issues in cooperation with Seoul city managers. In addition, because the city had hired me to gather fresh data, I spent a great deal of time meeting experts, social workers, and quasi-governmental welfare agents who were involved in planning and executing emergency social policies, including the policy on homelessness.

To explicate the complex matrix through which “deserving” homeless-
ness was measured, I need first to delineate the categories IMF homeless and purangin. I then turn to the question of how discourses supporting these categories managed to efface women. I portray South Korean welfare and moral governance through the diverse narratives of city managers, social workers, editorials, and civic activists. Although I appreciate that these actors occupy varied social positions and claim diverse experiences, they nonetheless collectively produced the new era of “deserving” welfare citizenship.

Particularly from the city managers’ narratives, I came to understand how it was that they distinguished IMF homeless from purangin. The primary criteria that demarcated IMF homeless as deserving subjects and purangin as undeserving were the desire to work and the intention to rehabilitate toward a “normal” life. According to Mr. Yang, a middle manager dealing with homeless issues for the Seoul city government, “IMF homeless are people who came to be homeless, due to layoffs after the IMF crisis. They are normal people, not purangin. They have the intention to rehabilitate [chachwal ëiji] and the desire to work [kûllo ëiyok]. As opposed to the IMF homeless, purangin have lived in the streets for a long time. Purangin neither want to work, nor do they have the possibility of resuming regular lives.” In fact, these kind of images were widely circulated by the mass media, as illustrated by the following article in OASIS, a newsletter for unemployed people:

Although 1998 was a time when the national IMF crisis had all citizens breathing hard and tightening their belts, everybody learned how to cope with difficult situations. But, with the severe economic blow that led to the bankruptcy of many conglomerates and to the layoff of many breadwinners and to the breakdown of families, we also find an unprecedented number of nosukcha [homeless people]. There are two kinds of nosukcha: those originating from the IMF crisis and purangin-type nosukcha. The purangin-type nosukcha became homeless due to disease, heavy drinking, family breakdown, and unaffordable living expenses. Most of them are in their late forties or early fifties. They have lost their ability to labor as well as their hope for life; and they move between welfare facilities and street living. IMF nosukcha, on the other hand, became homeless due to family breakdown related to the IMF crisis. They are noticeably young and have the capacity to labor and the desire to work.
Social workers who met and lived with homeless people, however, contested this clear division between IMF homeless and *purangin* and also challenged the idea that IMF homeless can be easily rehabilitated. For instance, the head social worker of a well-known homeless shelter asserted that the government had been mistaken to order social workers to distinguish IMF homeless from long-term street-living people because in real life the distinction was fuzzy. That head social worker also questioned the government’s claims about rehabilitation within a short period. However, as we will see later, social workers who ran the homeless shelters did not problematize the idea that homeless people should be rehabilitated into being productive mainstream citizens, but rather actively participated in this mobilization.\(^{23}\)

It is important to consider how it was that the policy on homelessness was chosen to be one of the first social policies implemented in response to the crisis. In general, social policies during the crisis accreted over time. Most were developed to address problems affecting those who had been subject to the employment insurance system prior to the crisis and included unemployment benefits, an employment stabilization program, a job skill development program, and a public works program. Although the employment insurance system drastically expanded during the crisis and came to include persons employed in workplaces having fewer than five employees, most recipients of the insurance during the crisis were people who were employed in privileged big companies who had previously enjoyed the option of having an employment insurance system and who had been laid off during the crisis. Thus unemployment benefits, including the job-seeking allowance and employment promotion benefits, were strictly limited to people insured before the crisis, and beneficiaries were mostly white-collar, middle-aged men at, in many cases, the managerial level. In spite of its limited application, nonetheless, the program’s direct cash benefits for the unemployed through the public works program were unprecedented. This same public works program was also used to attract homeless people into homeless shelters with the artificial criteria of employability and potential for rehabilitation.\(^{24}\) I would argue that homelessness was effectively equated with or subsumed into the category of unemployment so as to exclude long-term street-living people. Thus, from the very beginning, President Kim’s welfare policy was conceptualized as “workfare” or “postwelfare.” Kim’s was South Korea’s
first self-proclaimed, long-term, planned welfare state. The abrupt emergence of a workfare instead of welfare policy is, I argue, symptomatic of the establishment of Kim’s neoliberal state policy, which was amplified in the liberal atmosphere in South Korea. Although Kim’s administration had differentiated itself from previous regimes by announcing the state’s primary role in securing individual and social well-being, in short, the government persisted with the idea that families remain the primary unit responsible for individual security.

The issue of homeless women further helps us understand the ways in which the appellation of deserving welfare citizenship is designated. Interestingly, from the very beginning of these policies on homelessness, Seoul city managers assumed that there were no homeless women. Indeed they went so far as to omit gender in their statistics of homeless people. When pressed, city managers would later claim that the number of homeless women was negligible. They reported two hundred women out of a total of four thousand homeless people. According to Yang,

There is no such thing as homeless women. After all I didn’t see any homeless women. My job is really tiring. I can hardly sleep. But, I have become friends with IMF homeless, and sometimes I even drink with them. So, I know their agony very well. They lost their jobs, houses, wives, children, families, friends—everything. You won’t find any homeless women, I’m sure. . . . [after a moment of pause] There are a few female purangin among the male homeless. But they are not IMF homeless; they are mentally ill. (emphasis added)

In this narrative, the city manager imagines the IMF homeless as stable home-owning male workers who sustained “normal” lives, including marriage and a family wage before the crisis hit. This is congruent with the media representation of IMF homeless having middle-class backgrounds and of the faltering middle class, as the following article from the Han’guk kyôngje sinmun (Korea Economic Daily) reports:

The middle class is falling—it has lost its wings. Salary reduction, layoffs, property deflation, and sky-rocketing living expenses are chasing the South Korean middle class to the edge of a cliff. Until November 1997, the
middle class was full of hope. Newlyweds renting a single room in other peoples’ apartments imagined that after ten years of saving they could buy a sizable apartment. And they bought cars dreaming of themselves as rich people. And the stock market went up steadily until the IMF crisis. According to the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, salaried workers have experienced on average a 32.6 percent wage reduction as a result of the crisis. Workers cannot afford to pay back the interest on their loans, let alone save money. And they have given up the idea of ever owning an apartment. The faltering middle class is most vividly revealed in the phenomenon of homeless people. Mr. Koh (thirty-four years old), who began living in Sôsomun Kongwon [West Small Gate Park], used to be a middle manager in a big conglomerate. He was laid off last December. At the time his wife began working as an insurance saleswoman. She ended up having an affair with the branch head of her insurance company and often did not return in the evening. Mr. Koh asked his wife to quit her job, but she instead asked for a divorce. He then left home, without divorcing his wife, on account of his children. In the Seoul train station, the Yongsan train station, and the city hall subway station, there are many street-living people like Mr. Koh, the so-called IMF-style homeless. The fact that these homeless men still have the intention to work differentiates them from foreign homeless who have ended up living in the street because of alcoholism, escapism, and mental problems. Many South Korean homeless are “involuntary” street living people, the victims of bankruptcy or the sufferers of shame in front of their family members. The South Korean middle class is losing hope. The bedrock of our society is in crisis.25

IMF homeless women, on the other hand, were epitomized as purangin, the undeserving homeless. Here, I would like to recall that the dismissal of homeless women cannot be accounted for merely by gender discrimination because not all homeless men were considered deserving homeless either. However, it is interesting that while long-term homeless men were considered to be purangin by virtue of being lazy or resistant to “normal” life, homeless women were considered to be purangin because of their pathology or immorality. I turn now to the comments of Ms. Pang, a Seoul city lower
manager assigned to women in need of public protection. This is what she said to me when I asked if she knew about homeless women:

Do you really think that there are homeless women? I can't imagine there being any homeless women. How can women with children run away from home and leave their children? Mothers cannot be that irresponsible. Women who do that could only be insane. And in the case of single women, they can live by selling their bodies [i.e., as prostitutes/sex workers]. So why would they have to live on the streets? (emphasis added)

With this moralistic, maternalist perspective, Pang judges women who have left their children to be inhumane and insane, regardless of their reasons for leaving their children or rational decisions not to return to that place called home. Entirely outside of this lower manager’s imagination is the possibility of single women without family choosing to live in the streets. That much is clear from her bluntly enunciated view that women are either sacred mothers or prostitutes. Pang’s remarks reflect a resurging conservative view, which refuses to legitimate the possibility that a divorcée or widow might decline to remarry or prefer to lead a single woman’s life.

In light of the fact that Pang’s responsibility was dealing with destitute women who had nowhere to go, including battered women and mothers out of wedlock, her comments are striking. Had she known that women who run away from home have often endured domestic violence, perhaps it would have been easier for her to imagine that some runaway women had become homeless only after women’s shelters and religious retreat centers failed them. Under the previous welfare system, mentally ill women without family were the objects of protection in the name of maternalism. In the current system the maternalism remains; ironically, however, using maternalist ideologies to pathologize homeless women, governmental managers have become unable to count homeless women as legitimate welfare subjects. Selective deployment of moralistic maternalism is a symptom of the neoliberal welfare state that has shifted its definition of deserving welfare citizenship from “needy” to “productive” subjects. From the perspective of the state, productive subjects are those people whose activities result in the maximization of profit. This is the logic of the neoliberal state policy as it applies the principles of entrepreneurship. Not surprisingly, the “needy”
subjects of the previous welfare regime were predominantly female citizens, especially mothers without family support, while the “productive” subjects of the Kim Dae Jung welfare regime were breadwinning men with the potential of returning to or creating normative families.

I would like to return to my central argument by noting that state functionaries were not the sole social agents who contributed to the moral regime of deserving welfare citizenship and the normative family. Liberal social governance relies on a wide social consensus or moral authority drawn from civil forces to legitimize democratic state decision-making processes, such as the formulation of a policy on homelessness. The cultural and political logics entailed in the demarcation of welfare subjects or the proper domain for moral discipline were widely shared by the media, experts from academics or research institutions, and civil activists, as well as by state elites. To recall my earlier discussion, the city manager’s negative deployment of moralistic maternalism to exclude homeless women from eligibility for state programs echoes the perspective of the discourse of family breakdown. I discovered in the process of my fieldwork that many self-employed homeless shelter managers shared this conservative family ideology. They too blamed homelessness on nonnormative family situations and promoted the “normal” family as the best way to prevent homelessness. Newspapers and public forums reported that the biggest concern of homeless people was related to family matters (27 percent), rather than job searching (22.4 percent) or securing shelter or food (0.3 percent). In discussing family matters, the majority of homeless people (30.9 percent) were reported to be suffering from fragile family relationships. Reports reveal clear boundaries allegedly separating “normal” from “abnormal” families. By privileging conjugal relationships in heterosexual marriages, reports divulge cultural assumptions that middle-aged men cannot live alone and should be attended by female sexual partners. Because the breakdown of the family was alleged to be the cause of homelessness and other social problems, the homeless welfare agency responded with a variety of rehabilitation programs. For instance, one homeless shelter offered match-making, co-wedding ceremonies, short-term reunion events with relatives, and transportation and presents for visits to families or hometowns on the holidays. These rehabilitation events were targeted to motivate homeless people to “resume normal life,” and to
promote the ideal type and function of family as the basic unit responsible for social needs. Marriages between homeless people living in homeless shelters were presented as successful stories during the crisis. High officials in government, as well as other political and civil leaders, repeatedly visited the few homeless shelters with the wedding scenes rather than the majority of homeless shelters without those scenes. This would suggest that idealizing homeless men and women creating “normal” families had become politically valuable. Some South Korean scholarly observers noted that the sociocultural fragility the crisis set in motion was rooted in long-standing latent issues connected with compressed modernity and rapid industrialization. While I do not disagree, I still think it is important to note that most mass media as well as governmental and civil documents presented family breakdown as largely the product of the crisis.

The flip side of such moralistic maternalism celebrates the female homemaker who maintains domestic cohesion through her responsible motherhood. In September 1998, an editorial in Hankyoreh sinmun, a progressive newspaper in South Korea, used John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath to equate the South Korean crisis with the Great Depression in the United States and to underscore that mothers are the central axis for holding family members together in dire times. As such, mothers need to make strenuous efforts to protect the family. The editorial’s emphasis on maternal strength is congruent with the anxiety and fear of family breakdown discourses and the tacit blame assigned to undutiful mothers, wives, and daughters-in-law. To promote women’s employment, the government implemented a policy privileging responsible motherhood. It initiated policies of small-business loans only to exemplary mothers who had no men capable of breadwinning in their households. However, even these exemplary mothers could not access the benefits if they failed to get financial sponsorship from their closest male kin. Women’s legal eligibility is obviously bound to the patriarchal structure even when mothers are eulogized as central figures of the family.

Civil-society activists with longstanding histories of antistate activism were no exception. They actively contributed to promoting the moral economy of a conservative normative family. Although some of them voiced criticisms of Kim Dae Jung’s welfarism primarily because of its insufficient support for poor people, their own activities emphasized the capacity of its
beneficiaries to rehabilitate within the confines of a normative family ideology. At the onset of the crisis, Chaeya, the long-standing progressive political activists’ collective, mobilized a huge donation fund, called the National Movement to Overcome Unemployment (NMOU) (sirôp kûkpok kungmin undong ponbu). NMOU inherited its nationalist motifs from the Gold Collection Movement (kûm moûgi undong) that was created at the onset of the crisis and operated various activities throughout the crisis. In 1998 and 1999, NMOU prioritized its charity distribution to poor people with rehabilitation potential and a commitment to self-sufficiency. NMOU also led the Pan-National Network Movement (pômgungmin kyôrônundong) and the Movement to Survive Winter (kyôulnagi undong) to help the unemployed during the winter by providing subsidies and food. Note that families were the beneficiaries of the two programs, rather than destitute individuals, regardless of their belonging to families. Further, the fact that women’s NGOs were singularly assigned to take care of beneficiary families for the programs suggests not just individual women, but also women’s organizations were held to have moral responsibility as caretakers of the family. In other words, neoliberal welfare principles and conservative cultural logics operated as the major social engineering technology in civil activists’ actions as well.

Let me turn now to a brief example of the ways in which civic activists were complicit in moral governance through the discourse of family breakdown. In May 1999, mass media reported that the rate of domestic violence had drastically increased after the crisis. These reports were based on information provided by respected NGOs that ran hotlines and shelters for victims of sexual harassment and domestic violence. I was astonished to hear these media reports because when I had called the same agencies three months earlier, executives had denied any relationship between the rates of domestic violence and the crisis. It is interesting that issues like homeless women were made invisible, while others such as domestic violence appeared anew. Ms. Hyun, the acting director of a leading domestic violence agency, told me about the relationship between the crisis and domestic violence when I had called three months earlier:

Well, I haven’t observed any influence of the IMF crisis on domestic violence. I am a little bit frustrated by everybody’s talking about ai-em-epû
[IMF crisis]. Domestic violence has existed for a long time independent from the IMF crisis. I don’t understand why people try to connect issues of domestic violence to social tides like the IMF crisis. We are busy enough counseling battered women on the phone, how can we worry about who is an IMF victim or not? (emphasis added)

In those early days, these important civil organizations for women’s rights were not paying attention to the crisis’s impact on women’s issues, except in the case of women’s labor issues. A few months later I observed a huge change in attitude: the crisis and domestic violence had become intimately tied.

I also suspect that the NMOU’s funding for the Movement to Survive Winter to women’s NGOs pressed the organizations to reconceptualize their social welfare concerns in relation to the crisis. We can thus observe how issues under the discourse of family breakdown begin to be seen and counted differently by various social actors. I would not assert that women’s NGOs and feminists completely disassociated women from family in the 1990s before the crisis. Recalling the background of the family breakdown discourse in this essay, however, 1998–99 is a historic time, when revived conservative, collectivistic family ideology superseded a decade-long feminist contest of women’s independence over domestication and privatization. Further, I do not want to give the false impression that responses to the crisis were consolidated by complicity and conspiracy among various social forces. We have learned already that civil groups deployed manifold strategies beyond oppositional methods to negotiate with Kim Dae Jung’s government to maximize civil powers towards democratic social governance. The condition of national emergency offered full-grown civil forces optimal context to participate in the implement of social policy because Kim Dae Jung’s government actively promoted partnership of social governance between GOs and NGOs. Like the women’s hotline example above, domestic violence that was perceived as a separate issue from unemployment in the beginning became effectively staged as a crucial consequence of the crisis and deeply related to unemployment.


Conceptualization of Neoliberalism

It is essential to acknowledge how I have conceptualized neoliberalism in dialogue with two different strains of research. These are neoliberalism as a macroeconomic doctrine of state policy, and neoliberalism configured as epistemology or social ethos. Much literature discusses neoliberalism in relation to shifting political power at the state-institute level, crystallizing key symptoms of neoliberalism such as welfare to workfare, Keynesian welfare state to Shumpeterian welfare state, Fordist industrial society to post-Fordist industrial society, privatization of state agencies, emphasis of civil society, reorganization of labor as "flexible," and reprivatization of women. Especially relating to the "hollowed-out" state, the works of Bob Jessop, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, and Kwang-Yeong Shin have presented the contours of changes in the mechanism of state power.33 “Hollowing out” literally means the state withdrawal of its power from society. Welfare states in Western European nations are a good example of this process. Whereas these states used to exert direct control and provision to the welfare subjects, the state found apolitical or private agencies to take over these functions, and the state began to fund more selectively through criteria like means tests. These observations correspond to the way in which NGOs have participated in policy and management of homeless issues during the crisis in South Korea by agreeing upon employable and potentially rehabilitated homeless people as appropriate recipients of social care. An important point that scholars sometimes make, contemplating neoliberalism in relation to state institutional power, is that state control is expanded rather than reduced through outsourcing agencies and privatization.

While these works are helpful in terms of visualizing the changes of policy and of state control that commonly occur in various local nations under neoliberalism, it is unfortunate that the very meaning of neoliberalism is rarely conceptualized as a sociocultural logic.34 At best, these works treat neoliberalism as if it is self-explanatory and assume it to be an economic doctrine exclusively mobilized by state bureaucrats. This is unfortunate because the presumption leads analysts away from addressing the significant question of how neoliberal logic is enunciated by a variety of social actors, even though people often experience the measures of neoliberalism (e.g,
mass layoffs) as an oppressive imposition. These literatures criticize the state bureaucracy for its craftiness in devising neoliberal policies as a cost-effective and efficient way of expanding the state’s actual power to control state subjects. However, the literature tends to overlook or discount the agency of civic leaders and lay people who participate in neoliberal social governance and state practices.

I cautiously recommend thinking of neoliberalism as a social ethos of economic-moral value that gains its explanatory power through a wide variety of social agents. I propose this as an alternative to considering neoliberalism primarily as an economic ideology or doctrine that is mobilized by an exclusive segment of social forces or agencies. The relationship between neoliberalism and global economic restructuring in pursuit of a free-market world economy is an obvious one. Similarly evident are the predominantly destructive effects of these processes on disenfranchised people and the have-nots of society. In this sense, neoliberalism’s robust connection to supranational financial institutions’ tendency to force late industrialized countries to open their local economies to the world market is apparent. However, as Lesley Gill succinctly argues, the IMF or the World Bank cannot be held solely responsible for neoliberalization at the level of daily life.35 In other words, political power does not exclusively rely upon a certain social agency’s authority, nor is it necessarily destructive. Here, political philosophers’ articulation of neoliberalism, which builds upon Michel Foucault’s idea of liberal governance, is crucial to an inquiry into why and how neoliberalism is powerfully spread and practiced.

If we view these observations on the changing nature of political power from a top-down perspective (where bureaucrats are the ultimate actors fulfilling their duties of state planning), they might not look much different from the aforementioned understanding of neoliberalism as an effect of economic doctrine. In other words, the state government might be viewed as strategizing policies that require the least responsibility and are most lucrative to the state administration, as exemplified in Jessop’s expression “bureaucrats’ entrepreneurization.”36 However, the excellence of Foucauldian studies of neoliberal governmentality in this context is their elaboration of power working through multiple focuses and agents. This concept of power underlies my argument that neoliberal governmental policies in
South Korea during the crisis were powerfully implemented because a liberal ethos and vision of a better life had historical roots and gained explanatory power from people’s daily and political lives throughout the 1990s.

The South Korean people’s concept of well-being was not created out of thin air by Kim Dae Jung’s motto, “elevation of quality of living,” instead of quantity of living (i.e., economic wealth). As many scholars note, most South Koreans, from lay people to the president, realized the limitations for development regimes that emphasized rapid economic growth. The heat of the Democratization Movement certainly opened a space for voicing diverse desire for more civil freedom. Impressive examples of those voices include the unionization of white-collar workers, the proliferation of environmental and civil rights movements, and the mainstreaming of the women’s movement (e.g., the development of anti-domestic violence activists, tensions between heightened levels of domestic consumption and the moral project to prevent excessive consumption, and the emergence of sexual identity politics).

Predicated upon a Foucauldian understanding of liberal rationality and governing technology, however, anthropologists suggest that the key paradigm for understanding the emergence of liberalism or neoliberalism is the pragmatic ethos of pursuing efficiency and effectiveness for optimal productivity. Challenging the presumption or predominance of liberal governmentality as a Western or Eurocentric phenomenon, these scholars encourage exploration of non-Western contexts of neoliberalism. Building on their contention of West-centric knowledge production, this essay probed how the historical conjunction of the Asian debt crisis and Kim Dae Jung’s focus on the establishment of the first welfare state effected an intensification of liberal social governance. Using the South Korean case, this article has asserted the aptness of understanding neoliberalism as a social ethos that transcends economic doctrine. This is relevant to a new direction for studying the state or social governance, which would eschew conflation of state administrative powers with the conceptual construct of the state. More productively, scholars of the state could explore ethnographic and theoretical inquiries into the processes through which epistemologies and ideologies of social governance are elaborated, intensified, or weakened through multilateral social agents.
Conclusion

I have argued that we need to think about the convergence of political and cultural logics if we are to understand how homeless women came to be rendered invisible and undeserving during the Asian debt crisis. At the level of welfare state policy, I have argued, neoliberal principles made short-term street-living men the only deserving homeless, while categorizing homeless women and long-term street-living men as undeserving homeless. Homeless women were, moreover, pathologized in the name of a moralistic maternalism. At the level of social and moral governance, the media, experts, and civil activists contributed to reifying ideas about the normative family. The media forged seamless connections between the crisis and volatile family relationships, thus reinforcing the view that homeless women had abandoned the home and underscoring the idea that homeless women could be excluded from welfare eligibility. Civil activists did not challenge the neoliberal logic of the policy on homelessness. Nor did they question the moral governance that consolidated the normative family.

Indeed, Kim Dae Jung government’s welfare state conveyed an image of successfully “guaranteeing the minimum standard of living” through its inauguration of measures on homelessness. However, the administration’s “guarantee” was not of the state as provider to all homeless people, but of the state as a mediator that only targeted certain homeless people with proven employability. Disciplining welfare citizenship toward workfare citizenship in the interests of a long-term, planned welfare state, the Kim Dae Jung administration aimed to mobilize self-governable citizens who would not be dependant on the state.

The government’s goal, I have argued, was to foster the emergence of neoliberal welfare policy in South Korea, a crucial element to amplify a neoliberal ethos in the nation. Before the crisis, the institutions responsible for individual well-being in South Korea were family and chaeból. In the past, the ideology that families should tend to all personal needs and be responsible for social and individual well-being buttressed the South Korean developmental state’s minimal enhancement of the welfare system. South Korea’s successive military, authoritarian regimes actively employed and reproduced the familistic and paternalistic social order. In addition, the chaeból upheld
tremendous systems of employee allowances by extending family allowances to married employees, education allowances for children, housing allowances, and owner-driver car allowances, and thus covered needs that might otherwise have fallen to the state.

These benefits demonstrate how the South Korean developmental state not only incubated chaebol but also depended on them in a symbiotic relation. The crisis saw the Kim Dae Jung regime creating welfare as a scaffold for securing the nation, following a “Third Way” tradition of workfare states mediating between social democratic and liberal agendas. It would not be accurate to say that the Kim Dae Jung regime merely enlivened existing partial programs and continued a basic structure. Major changes were made in the largest welfare programs. Health insurance, national pension, and employment insurance systems were all nearly universalized. Distribution of the services was effectively rearranged, creating conflicts among various social interest groups (e.g., medical doctor associations and pharmacy associations, local health insurance agencies and private health insurance agencies, and, more in the general working middle class, the taxpayers, and government).

At first glance, the guarantee of a minimum standard of living appears contradictory to the economic emphasis of Kim Dae Jung’s welfarism. However, the logic of Kim’s welfarism is to optimize its governance by launching the welfare state at minimum cost. As a result, the responsibility of family units for their members’ economic and welfare security was not reduced. Rather, during the crisis, the discourse of family breakdown” tended to intensify the family responsibility system. Using a national emergency to mobilize the public-private social management partnership with enlarged social/civil activist groups, the Kim Dae Jung government was able to make the social security welfare state a site for implementing neoliberal policies. Under its logic only employable male breadwinners open to being rehabilitated into normative familial life were considered deserving welfare subjects.
Notes

I would like to thank Nancy Abellmann, Ann Anagnost, Tani Barlow, Matti Bunzl, Brenda Farnell, Michael Goldman, Theodore Hughes, Ken Kawashima, William Kelleher, Martin Manalansan, Andre Schmid, Jennifer Shaffer, and two anonymous reviewers. Quotations in the text from Mr. Yang, Ms. Pang, and Ms. Hyun are from interviews conducted between 1998 and 1999. Names of interviewees are pseudonyms. All translations are mine.

1 See Rayna Rapp, “Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes toward an Understanding of Ideology,” in Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions, ed. Barrie Thorne and Marilyn Yalom (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 49–69. Rapp urges us to make a distinction between families and households, as they are commonly conflated. While households are “the empirically measurable units” and “the entities in which people actually live,” family is an analytical term for the composition of the nuclear family and the network of kin relations. My discussion of family builds upon Rapp’s definition.

2 Haepi endû (Happy End), dir. Chi-uh Chông, Myông Film, South Korea, 1999.


4 The culmination of the Democratization Movement in 1987 entailed historic mass protests calling for the end of nearly three decades of military dictatorship (1960–87). In the aftermath of 1987, when mass protests achieved electoral democracy, South Korea experienced a growth of popular civil movements for women’s rights, sexual identities, environmental issues, and economic justice. In turn, middle-class citizens came to be more appreciated as the movements’ main supporters. See Hagen Koo, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). Koo’s interpretation of the legitimization of the middle class as deserving social protection from the civil organization derives from white-collar workers’ contribution to the Democratization Movement in 1987, when their unprecedented joining of a dissident group was much welcomed by long-standing dissident forces, such as blue-collar workers and student, civil, and political activists. Civil organizations that emerged during the post-1987 era became major social engineers.

5 Progressive women’s organizations, such as the hotline for domestic violence, Yŏsong úi Chônhwa (Telephone for Women), the hotline for sexual harassment, Sŏngpongnyok Sŏngdamso (Counseling Center against Sexual Violence), and the Korean women’s link, Han’guk Yŏsong Minuhoe (Korean Democratic Friends for Women), became very active in the early 1990s. Feminism at this time contributed to the recognition of women’s individuality based on sexual autonomy, which is distinct from the previous era’s feminism, which focused on collectivity in association with anti-authoritarian and labor movements. See Seungsook

6 Examples include Cho Ch’ang-In, *Kasi kogi (Needle Fish)* (Seoul: Palgûn Sesang, 2001); Yi Na-Mi, *Uri ga sarang han namja (Men Who We Loved)* (Seoul: Haenaem, 1999); and *Sûlpûn yuhok (Sad Temptation)*, writ. No Hi-Kyung, dir. Yun Hûng-Sik, Seoul Broadcasting System, December 26, 1999. In 1999 the Korean Social and Cultural Institute held a public discussion with the title “Crisis of Korean Middle Class and Family Breakdown—Causes and Solutions.” The Seoul city government also held a memorial seminar for women’s week relating to family breakdown in April 2000.


8 “Kusimnyôndae dûrô tobae ro chûngga han yihon” (“Divorce Doubled over the 1990s”), *Hankyoreh sinmun*, June 11, 1998; Kim U-sôk, “Kajông i munôjigo itta” (“The Family is Collapsing”), *JoongAng Ilbo*, August 18, 1998; Yi Tae-hyi, “Ajôssi ka ani e yo, ton i e yo: 15 sal úi wonjokyoje ch’ungkyôk” (“He’s Not an Elder, but Money: Shocking Teen Prostitution”), *Hankyoreh sinmun*, November 18, 1999. The last article starts, “After running away, girls work part-time in a gas station or coffee shop, and later become prostitutes through Internet chat rooms, charging $80 a night, but sometimes ending up robbed by adult male clients.”

9 Han Sang-jin, “Tongyangkwôn munhwa wa inkwôn chôngch’aek” (“Eastern Culture and Human Rights Policies”), *Korea Economic Daily*, December 11, 2000. It is interesting to note that same-sex partnership was introduced as a problem caused by the IMF-led westernization of South Korea when, for the first time, a South Korean actor was outed as being gay by a tabloid newspaper report in September 2000. Editorials characterized same-sex loving people as having a social disease that originated in Western countries and contagiously spread to South Korea.

10 Yun Chong-yôl, “Hwanghon yihon bulhô” (“Elderly Divorce Disapproved”), *Hanguk ilbo*, December 8, 1999. *Hwanghon yihon* literally refers to “divorce at golden sunset.” The duration of a day is a common allegory for life: morning signifies the period of youth, and evening, the elder. *Hwanghon* (golden sunset) is a romantic, euphemistic way of referring to the elderly. It is a paradox to place “golden sunset” and “divorce” together, as divorce is not a respected action at all, especially within the context of the elderly phase of life. The synthesis of these words may have been used for rhetorical effect to emphasize normative expectations to stay together in the elderly period of life.

17 Kim Dae Jung, Mass-Participatory Economy: Korea’s Road to World Economic Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1996); Kim Dae Jung, Kungnan kûkpok ūi kîl: Kim Tae Jung taet’ongnyông ch’uiim 6-kaewõl yônsolmun (Ways of Overcoming National Crisis: President Kim Dae Jung’s Speeches in the First Six Months after His Inauguration) (Seoul: Taet’ongnyông pisôsil, 1998).
18 I consider the establishment of and agreements in the Tripartite Committee as one of the major markers of neoliberalism introduced by the Kim Dae Jung government. Rather than regulating a decision by force of the state machinery, the Tripartite Committee symbolizes liberal governance dedicated to finding a reasonable way to resolve the critical issue of
unemployment through mediating a negotiated consensus among equally invited social forces. In other words, the state administration’s method of operation changed from acting as regulator with direct interventions to acting as mediator of diverse social and political forces for significant decisions to govern society. See also Huck-ju Kwon, “Transforming the Developmental Welfare States in East Asia” (paper presented at the International Sociological Association Research Committees 19: Poverty, Social Welfare and Social Policy, University of Toronto, August 21–24, 2003).

19 Some NGOs held conferences with and invitation talks by progressive international scholars on the negative consequence and ineffectiveness of following the IMF instructions. Human rights movements in South Korea were more actively connected and received supports from related international groups, such as Amnesty International and Astraea.

20 Experts and academics were actively involved in government committees, such as the Presidential Committee for Elevating Life Quality (Sal ū Chil Hyangsong Wiwonhoe), the Seoul Policy on Homelessness Commission (Nosukcha Taeh’aeck Hyŏpûihoe), and the Seoul Committee for Unemployment Policy (Sirôp Taeh’aek Wiwonhoe). See note 24 regarding the development of the policy on homelessness. Regarding the complex interests of experts and academicians and the ambivalent ways in which they were involved, see Jesook Song, “Shifting Technologies: Neoliberalization of the Welfare State in South Korea, 1997–2001” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2003), 80–249.

21 The main building of the Seoul train station is one of the few remaining edifices from the Japanese colonial period. Colonial period buildings have been consciously removed from the urban landscape, most recently with the wrecking of the chungangch’ông building (the Japanese colonial general’s office). The Seoul train station square has been one of most popular public places for democratic rallies and demonstrations, including the April Revolution.


23 I would like to clarify that I do not disparage the good intentions of social workers and city managers to provide homeless people help for them to gain survival skills and to receive subsistence. Rather, my focus in this paper is to trace the way in which rehabilitation programs of homeless people were seamlessly connected with workfare unemployment policy by promoting productivity as the prior quality of being deserving welfare citizens. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

24 The Seoul policy on homelessness implemented during the crisis consisted of two shelter systems: one House of Freedom and about 120 Houses of Hope. The former was a large shelter that any homeless people who wanted to get government benefits should go to first. The shelters were managed by a quasi-governmental agency called the Homeless Rehabilitation Center. There, the center welfare workers classified homeless people as to whether they were qualified to go to the other shelters through the standard of employability and rehabilitating capacity. The other shelters were run mostly by religious groups or
private welfare agencies. It was a significant process to be classified to go to the other ones because those shelters were the only place providing an opportunity to work in the public works programs (affording a basic income) and receive free home food. Most of the decisions regarding policies on homelessness were executed by either the Seoul Policy on Homelessness Commission or the Seoul City Committee for Unemployment Policy. Both are so-called temporary institutes with government-civic partnership (min’gwang hyømnyok kigwan). For a more detailed explanation about the policy on homelessness and tensions involving social actors during the crisis, see Song, “Shifting Technologies,” 120–78; also, regarding changes of welfare policy in general, see Kwon, “Transforming the Developmental Welfare States in East Asia.”


27 Hankyoreh Sinmun, June 22, 1998.

28 The Homeless Rehabilitation Center Report (Seoul: Homeless Rehabilitation Center, 1999).

29 Salintô Newsletter (Fall, 1999). The cover page features a picture depicting a homeless shelter hosting collective marriage ceremonies for homeless people. The newsletter also reported anecdotes about each couple’s success.


Disciplining family is not a new governing ideology to contemporary South Koreans.

31 Hankyoreh sinmun, September 18, 1998.

32 This issue is related to a South Korean feminist movement for the removal of the house-hold head system (Hojuje pyeji undong). The household head system used to recognize only a patrilineal head of a household, which gives legal authority to the children and patrilineal male kin over the wife when the breadwinning man is absent. In early 2005, this controversial system was legally removed as a result of strenuous feminist effort.


38 Cho Hee-Yeon, Han’guk úi minjujuûi wa sahoe undong (Democracy and Social Movements in Korea) (Seoul: Tangdae, 1998); Hagen Koo, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of