THE LAY OF THE LAND
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AS BEFORE THE DISSOLUTION
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAVIA: TIMELINE

- 1918 - Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is formed as a monarchy.
- 1929 - King Alexander changes the monarchy’s name to Yugoslavia.
- 1945 - After World War II, it becomes a communist republic under the leadership of Josip Broz (Tito).
- It was composed of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (with two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo in the south), and Slovenia
- 1980 - Tito dies and ethnic tensions and nationalism starts to surface
- 1991 - In June, Slovenia and Croatia declare independence and the violent conflict starts.
- 1992 - Macedonia declares independence in January. Bosnia and Herzegovina declares independence in April and Serbia and Montenegro form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with Slobodan Milošević as the leader. The Bosnian Civil War begins
- 1995 - In November, Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia sign the Dayton Peace Accord to end the war.
- 1996 - Kosovo with its Kosovo Liberation Army begins attacking Serbian police.

- 1998 - In March, Milošević sends troops to Kosovo to squash the unrest and guerilla warfare ensues.

- 1999 - After peace talks fail, NATO launches an airstrike on Serbian targets.

- 2000 - In January, the US and other world players impose a trade embargo on Serbia. In September, despite Vojislav Koštunica (the opposition leader) winning the election, Milošević refuses to release the results and demands a runoff election. In October, an uprising begins and one million people flood Belgrade, attacking the Parliament building and Milošević steps down. The US and the EU lift economic sanctions and offer aid.

- 2001 - Milošević is arrested and charged with corruption and abuse of power in April. In June, he is turned over to the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. In September, the UN Security Council officially lifts its arms embargo against Yugoslavia.

- 2002 - Milošević begins his trial for war crimes against humanity in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo as well as genocide in Bosnia.
DEMOGRAPHICS

Demographics as of 1981 Yugoslavia Census (rounded to the nearest whole number) ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<td>Serbs and Montenegrins</td>
<td>39%</td>
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</table>

Percent of Population by Ethnicity
1981 Yugoslavia Census ²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Bosniak</th>
<th>Mont.</th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Maced.</th>
<th>Sloven.</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>.34</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>.11</td>
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<td>68.54</td>
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<td>.15</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<td>54.42</td>
<td>.19</td>
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The Causes of the Yugoslav Wars: Bosnia and the Beginning

A study by Katya Browning
There were two distinct nationalist policies struggling for primacy: Croatian separatism and Serbian centralism.

The Yugoslav state became a vehicle for Serbian domination, which, in turn, stimulated Croatian national opposition.

Both policies preordained the failure of a unitarian and liberal Yugoslavia.

Almost every ethnic group in Yugoslavia had both been perceived as a threat to another group and felt threatened itself.

There was a general atmosphere of fear, resentment, and ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism: the belief in the superiority of one’s own ethnic group.
State Level of Analysis: Nationalism

What spawned the Nationalist sentiments?

Rivalries between the Serb, Croat, and Slovene elites had been around since the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, & Slovene in 1918 when the Serbian elites’ attempt to monopolize the central government.

During WWII, Croat nationalists “Ustashas” and Serb nationalists “Chetniks” fought each other. The Ustashes cooperated with the Italian Fascists and Nazis from the very onset of WWII. The Chetniks opportunistically cooperated with both, the Nazis and the Allies. Only the People’s Liberation Army led by Yugoslav communists and Josip Broz Tito consistently fought the foreign invaders.

During his rule over Yugoslavia from 1945–1980, Tito kept nationalists agitations under control. After Tito’s death in 1980, ethnic conflict re-emerged, first between Albanian Muslims and Serbians in Kosovo in 1981.

Kosovo was considered sacred ground for both the Serbs and the Albanian Muslims.
State Level of Analysis: Nationalism

- What else spawned the Nationalist sentiments?

- **Economic** reasons:
  - The impact of the *worldwide economic crisis of the 1980’s* yielded a rise in unemployment, national debt, a decline in real income per capita.
  - The *economic transition* from a command economy to a market economy *caused social stress*. The most developed republics (Slovenia & Croatia) called for *self-determination/self-help* partially due to their desire to keep *economic assets at home* (not to pay tax to Belgrade.)
  - The Serbian leader, Milošević, needed a *scapegoat* to blame for the country’s internal (political and economic) issues and the Kosovo and Bosnian *Muslims* were an easy choice stemmed from already widely established *misperceptions*.  

- **Command economy**: an economy in which production, investments, prices and income are determined centrally by a government.

- **Market economy**: an economy that relies chiefly on market forces to allocate goods and resources and to determine prices.
State Level of Analysis:
Nationalism
Belgrade alleged that “Islamic fundamentalism was being spread under the disguise of the national assertion of Muslims in Yugoslavia.”

Serbian nationalists realized that Kosovo and Bosnian Muslims were making it impossible to create a Greater Serbia.

It was alleged that Muslims were financed by radical Islamists from abroad and the Islamic way of life was “alien” to the European civilization.

Negative Muslim stereotypes were present in all media and were suspected of “being easily tempted to religious hysterics and uncontrolled action.”

Serbians saw Yugoslavia as, “The Extended Serbia,” for which they had fought and sacrificed in two world wars.

The other groups saw the state as a melting pot of different ethnicities and an association of equal nations.
State Level of Analysis:
Misperceptions

About the magnitude and severity of the conflict:

- Serbians thought they would be able to quickly and efficiently take over territories where other ethnic groups made a majority.
- Serbians overestimated their national role concept, believing they were the key player in Europe and the Balkans.
- Bosnians and those in Sarajevo, especially, thought there was a way to avoid violence. Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović and Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov proposed that Slovenia and Croatia be in a confederative relation with the rest of the country. It was only Slobodan Milošević who refused this proposal. He obviously wanted to have unlimited control over the entire country.

About third party involvement:

- Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović eventually asked for independence from the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, assuming that both the European Commission and the US would extend a guarantee of support. ¹⁰
- Many citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina when interviewed by reporter Robert Fisk, stated that they assumed the West, namely the US, would send over financial aid and troops to come to their rescue. ⁶
State Level of Analysis:
Bureaucratic Politics Model

- The trend of **decentralization:**
  - There were many **constitutional changes from 1946–1974** which helped the momentum of the emancipation and equality of the nations within Yugoslavia. ¹
  - The **1946 Constitution** first established the rights of the separate nations.
    - Article 1 states, “The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia is ...a community of peoples enjoying equal rights, who on the basis of the **right to self-determination, including the right to secede**, have expressed their will to live together in a federated state.”
    - Article 6 states, “All power derives from the people and belongs to the people.” ¹¹
  - The **1953 Constitution**: ⁴
    - It established the Federal People’s Assembly with two houses – a **Federal Chamber representing the different regions** and a **Chamber of Producers**, representing economic and working groups.
State Level of Analysis: Bureaucratic Politics Model

The **1963 Constitution**: It established the **Chamber of Peoples (Nations)** as part of the Federal Chamber to directly represent the individual republics.

The **1974 Constitution served as the basic frame** for the movement. It protected the self-management system of the republics from state interference and expanded their representation in all electoral and policy forums.

It also reduced the State Presidency from twenty-three to nine members, with equal representation for each republic.

It gave Kosovo and Vojvodina, the two provinces of Serbia, substantially increased autonomy, including de facto veto power.

De facto – exercising power or serving a function without being legally or officially established
State Level of Analysis:
Stimulus-Response Theory

Ivan Stambolić
1936-2000

Franjo Tuđman
1922-1999

Milan Kučan
1941-present

State Level of Analysis:
Stimulus-Response Theory
State Level of Analysis: Stimulus-Response Theory

- Conflict between the **Albanian Muslims and the Serbians in Kosovo** quickly escalated over a few years.  

- President **Ivan Stambolić abhorred the confrontation and sent his friend, Milošević**, in to settle the issues, but Milošević’s underlying nationalism only proved to incite both parties more.

- As Milošević started spreading Serbian dominance beyond Serbia, first **Slovenia** and then **Croatia**, more prominently, responded with equal threats and violence.

- **Slovenia and her president, Milan Kučan**, were the first to secede followed by a much more aggressive **Croatia led by Franjo Tuđman**.

- After the Serbian nationalists expanded into **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the newly-established Croat army swept into Krajina, an enclave of Croatia with a Serb majority, forcing the Serbs to flee.  

10.
State Level of Analysis: Stimulus-Response Theory

The red area denotes the entity of Serb Krajina inside Croatia
Josip Broz Tito was the leader of the Communist partisans in Yugoslavia during World War II. He was a locksmith and was half-Slovene and half-Croat. He covered ethnic strife with the slogan, “Brotherhood and Unity.” He was an achievement oriented person, pursuing cooperative strategies at first and was more risk adverse in personality, albeit at times a moderately authoritative leader. He lead by the use of both diplomatic skill and occasional brutality and remained unquestioned throughout his long reign from 1945–1980.
Individual Level of Analysis: Slobodan Milošević

- Slobodan Milošević had a **superiority complex** and was a **narcissistic, power-oriented** person.

- He had a dominance of grandiosity, pomposity, excessive entitlement and desire for power and had very little empathy. 7

- He had both an **authoritarian** and **domineering personality**, willing to take risks.

- He relied on **stereotypes**, rigidity and was highly ethnocentric and nationalistic.

- Much like Hitler and Stalin, Milošević might also have been influenced by a **deprived childhood**.

- Both of his parents had committed suicide and had grown up during World War II. 10
Individual Level of Analysis: Franjo Tuđman and Milan Kučan

Franjo Tuđman:

- **Power-oriented** as well, Tuđman took risks and met Milošević with an equally authoritative, nationalistic personality.
- He had a religious mother and a strong-willed father.
- In 1946, his father and stepmother were found dead. There were multiple different theories, one of which was an attack by the Ustashe guerilla. ⁹

Milan Kučan:

- His father died in World War II and he spent his childhood in Nazi occupied Serbia, displaced from his home of Slovenia by the Nazis. ³
- A communist, he valued cooperation and was achievement-oriented.
Individual Level of Analysis:
Ratko Mladić

A Serb lieutenant, he was the power behind the Srebrenica massacre and many other operation of ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian Muslims.

He is a **power-oriented, authoritarian with a domineering personality**.

His worldview was shaped by World War II, having been orphaned at the age of two.

His father had been killed in a raid against a Croat Ustashe.

Highly nationalistic and ethnocentric, he is a risk taker.
He was very **nationalistic** and **ethnocentric** as well and was easily coerced into following Milošević’s movement.

The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, he had a Montenegro peasant background and was the **first in his family to get an education**.

He is a psychiatrist, a very **intelligent** man who had managed to stay in hiding from the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia for over a decade. He hid ostensibly with the help of the nationalistic Belgrade governments.
1. Do you think the wars would still have happened without the economic strife beforehand? What if Milošević had not gone to Kosovo originally, but Stambolić had gone?

2. What role did Tito play in the cause of Yugoslavia’s dissolution? Do you think his policy of states’ (constitutive republics’) rights contributed to the separatism that he was actively trying to avoid? Why was he capable of maintaining unity when no other leader seemed capable beforehand or after his death?

3. What role did nationalism play in these wars? Does pride truly goeth before a fall? What do you think could have been done to slow down or halt the movement?

4. Think about the correlation of authoritative, power-oriented leaders and times of economic or political downfall. Could we argue that aggression and “strength” are qualities generally looked for after a time of strife? How important to mankind is having an “answer” right away and something or someone to blame?
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KOSOVO
1998-1999
Former Yugoslavia
Kosovo
Timeline

- **September 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1992** – Ethnic Albanians declare Kosovo an independent republic; elects writer Ibrahim Rugova as President. Election declared illegal by Serbia.
- **1996** – Sporadic attacks against Serbian authorities by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
- **1997** – Violence continues to escalate between Serbian security forces and the KLA in Kosovo.
- **February to March, 1998** – Serbian forces begin to raid villages and murder ethnic Albanians in the Drenica region of Kosovo.
- **March 31\textsuperscript{st}, 1998** – UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1160; condemns excessive use of force by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and imposes sanctions.
- **May 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1998** – Milosevic and Rugova meet in a meeting arranged by Holbrooke. Dialogue quickly breaks down.
- **May 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1998** – Rugova seeks President Clinton’s support in Kosovo.
- **June, 1998** – Escalation of economic sanctions and display of NATO air exercises over the Balkans.
- **August, 1998** – Escalation by Serbian forces in Drenica region.
Timeline

- September, 1998 – UN Security Council demands ceasefire with Resolution 1199, backed with unspecified “additional measures” for non-compliance by Serbia. Secretary Albright pushes for airstrikes, though the Clinton Administration notes no plans for ground troops.
- January 29th, 1999 – Contact Group (US, UK, Germany, France, Russia, Italy) offers Serbs and Albanians an ultimatum to peace talks in France starting February 6th.
- March 18, 1999 – Serbian delegation refuses to sign the Rambouillet Accords. The agreement fell apart over the KLA’s insistence on a referendum for independence against the Serbian objection to the stationing of NATO troops.
- March 20th, 1999 – Serbian offensive begins to drive thousands of refugees across Kosovo under Operation Horseshoe.
- March 24th, 1999 – NATO airstrikes begin. Clinton rules out the use of ground troops on national television.
Timeline

- **March 25th, 1999** – FRY breaks off diplomatic relations with the West.
- **April 8th, 1999** – Discovery of Operation Horseshoe publicized by Germans.
- **April to May, 1999** – Continued NATO airstrikes, civilian casualties by both sides of the conflict, refugees swelling by the tens of thousands in neighboring regions.
- **May 27th, 1999** – Milosevic and four close associates are indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal for crimes against humanity.
- **June 3rd, 1999** – Milosevic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepts term for peace, brought to Belgrade by Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia’s special envoy. Clinton and allies greet the news cautiously, at the brink of considering ground troops.
- **June 10th, 1999** – UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1244; permits international peacekeeping forces to deploy in Kosovo to oversee withdrawal and recovery.
- **June, 1999** – Ethnic Albanians begin to return to Kosovo by the thousands; thousands of Serbians flee to Serbia to escape retribution.
**Key Player:**

**Bill Clinton**  
President of US

- Guilt over inaction during 1994 Rwandan and Bosnian tragedies
- **Wag the Dog?**
  - GOP leaders accused Clinton of using cruise missile strikes on Osama Bin Laden and the Kosovo Crisis in an attempt to divert national attention away from the Lewinsky scandal
  - Impeachment effort ends after February 12th, 1999, a month before the Rambouillet Accords
- **Clinton Doctrine**
  - Role of United States in combating instability around the world in interest of national economic interests
  - Humanitarian interest, especially after failures in Rwanda and Bosnia (*National Role Conception*)
Key Player: **Madeleine Albright**  
**US Secretary of State**

- Daughter of the Czech diplomat Josef Korbel; spent two years of childhood in Belgrade, Serbia during the Holocaust
- Found political asylum in the United States after the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948
- Discovered that several members of her family were Czech Jews that perished under the Nazi regime during WWII
- Madeleine’s War
  - Fleeing from Hitler, then Stalin during her youth in Europe maybe have shaped her personal stake in Kosovo
  - Pushed for military intervention throughout 1998-1999 in both the Clinton Administration and the UN Security Council
  - Helped escalate NATO’s role from defensive alliance to interventionist alliance
  - “Where do you think we are, Munich?!”
Stoessinger on Milošević’s Goals

- Crush KLA resistance
- Expulsion of the majority ethnic Albanians from Kosovo (*normative Lebensraum theory*)
- Overwhelm NATO with an unmanageable relief crisis to divert air campaign
Stoessinger on NATO Resolve

- **Massacres**
  - The discovery of numerous massacres of ethnic Albanians, including women and children, hardened immediate NATO resolve

- **Operation Horseshoe**
  - The detailing of Milosevic’s plan to drive out the Albanians from Kosovo to clear land for the Serbian people was reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s *lebensraum* – the specter of WWII and Nazism
Stoessinger on Misperception

**NATO**
Simultaneously threatened airstrikes while promising little guarantees to the Albanians...

Stated that no ground forces would be committed...

**Milošević**
...perceived that Western threats were bluffs. NATO failed to establish credible threat against Milošević.

...perceived that NATO resolve was weak and divided. Escalation of campaign hastens defeat.
Stimulus-Response Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KLA</th>
<th>FRY</th>
<th>UN/NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Attack on Serbian police forces.</td>
<td>Repression of student and ethnic protests.</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Continued skirmishes with security forces.</td>
<td>Further repression of resistance.</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1998</td>
<td>Continued skirmishes with security forces.</td>
<td>Escalation to village raids and massacres.</td>
<td>UN condemns both the KLA and the FRY in Resolution 1160.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1998</td>
<td>Continued skirmishes with security forces.</td>
<td>Intensified assaults in Drenica region.</td>
<td>Diplomacy and signaled threats of NATO airstrikes to Milošević.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Federal Republic of Yugoslavia retaliated against Kosovo Liberation Army activity
• Brutal retaliation helped recruit new members into the Kosovo Liberation Army
• Brutal retaliation urged the West to escalate diplomatic outreach and threaten military action against the Serbians
Clinton’s Decision-Making Process

• Poliheuristic Theory (Mintz)
  – Reconciles rational-actor model (RAM) and cognitive approaches to decision-making (individual level of analysis)
  – Proposes two-stage decision-making process; policy-makers first reject unacceptable policy options outright, then determine policy based on perceived costs/benefits of remaining options
Clinton’s Decision-Making Process

• Clinton’s Available Policy Options (Redd)
  – (1) NATO/US Airstrikes
  – (2) Commit ground forces
  – (3) Continued sanctions and diplomatic pressure
  – (4) Do nothing
  – (5) Allow the UN to take lead in peace initiative
  – (6) Arm the Kosovar Albanians

• Elimination of Clinton’s Policy Options
  – (3), (4), and (5) eliminated based on experiences with Milošević in Bosnia
  – (6) was unacceptable, due to fear of spreading conflict in the region

• Clinton’s Remaining Policy Options
  – (1) and (2) were the only remaining possible options for Clinton after the fallout of the Rambouillet Accords, as they had already threatened the Serbians with military force for non-compliance
Clinton’s Decision-Making Process

• **Clinton’s Decision on Airstrikes**
  – Rationally-motivated; need to consider public interest in minimizing American casualties in Kosovo

• **Influence of Madeleine Albright**
  – Redd argues that while Clinton’s impeachment occupied his attention, his foreign policy advisors gained additional influence in handling the Kosovo Crisis
  – Redd found that Albright’s influence was critical in 1) persuading Clinton that the situation in Kosovo could not be ignored and 2) rationalizing the advantages and drawbacks of airstrikes and/or ground troops
Russian Perception

• **Broad Concerns for the Future**
  – NATO airstrikes overstepped UN rules and represented an unprecedented transformation from defensive alliance to interventionist alliance
  – Russian political elites did not take humanitarian arguments as credible; why else would the West not intervene in Chechnya?
  – NATO’s military operation was clearly meant to follow through on NATO’s threats and establish long-term credibility; only power is respected on the international playing field (*the world system is anarchic*)
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