INTRODUCTION

What caused the outbreak of the second intifada? The conventional wisdom places the blame on one of two central figures, Ariel Sharon or Yasser Arafat. In one version, Sharon, then the leader of the Israeli opposition, started the intifada by going on an intentionally provocative visit to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000. Alternatively, Arafat, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), decided that the new State of Palestine should be launched in blood and fire; he unleashed Palestinian militants rather than accept a negotiated resolution of the conflict.

Both of these claims overplay the role of individual leaders and overlook a wider array of elite decisions and deeper political and social conditions. Decisions by Sharon and Arafat did matter, but not in the way that is conventionally portrayed. Instead, a chain of events starting in 1993 set the stage for renewed conflict.

First, popular Palestinian discontent grew during the Oslo peace process because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the peace agreements. From 1993-2000, many aspects of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip deepened rather than abated. Palestinians expected their lives to improve in terms of freedom of movement and socioeconomic standing; when both worsened, significant resentment built up in Palestinian society. This discontent, further fed by the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000, laid the groundwork for popular support for a more confrontational approach with Israel.

Second, organizations on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides prepared for violence, in part because the other party was using or preparing for violence. On the Palestinian side, younger militants also believed that the ability to respond with force would improve any negotiated outcome by highlighting for the
Israelis what would happen if they were not sufficiently forthcoming at the negotiating table. When the confrontations started, Israeli and Palestinian organizations followed their game plans, exacerbating and escalating the violence.

Third, Sharon and Arafat helped shift the status quo from a tense situation to a violent one. Sharon’s visit was the spark that set the second intifada into motion; it was a match in a dry forest and should be viewed historically among a long line of individual events that served as triggers for major confrontations. Arafat did not launch the intifada, but he and some other Palestinian leaders decided not to try to rein in the violence once it started. Once the intifada began, Arafat incorrectly assumed that he could use the violence to improve the Palestinian position.

This multi-factor explanation for the outbreak of the intifada sheds light on several theoretical debates. First, rather than assuming that the uprising resulted from unmet expectations or political opportunities alone, this article highlights factors from both schools of thought. Second, both the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and some Palestinian factions thought the threat of violence would deter the other side, but instead strong positions fed spirals of insecurity and escalation. This escalatory impact of firm policies was exacerbated because Israel assumed that external motivations rather than domestic ones explained growing Palestinian militarization and because Palestinian militants assumed that force or the threat of force could be used to advance diplomatic negotiations.

In the first section of the article, I critique existing explanations for the intifada that blame Arafat and Sharon for the violent outbreak. In section two, I present an important element of a more compelling explanation by discussing the manner and impact of continued Israeli occupation. In section three, I highlight Israeli and Palestinian military preparations that fed a conflict spiral. This is followed by a section on the failed summit at Camp David in July 2000. Section five details how Israeli and Palestinian responses during the early protests led to escalation, not calm. I offer closing thoughts in section six.

The Conventional Wisdom

Two of the common explanations for the outbreak of the second intifada revolve around individuals, Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, but neither explanation fully captures the pathway to violence. Both ascribe too much intentionality to the actions of these two leaders and miss other important factors. Many Israelis, including former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, contend that Arafat and the Palestinians planned and executed a violent uprising because they wanted to destroy Israel and win a Palestinian state through violent means. Many Palestinians claim that Sharon went to the Temple Mount on 28 September with the intention of provoking Palestinians and ending Israeli-Palestinian political negotiations.
Such actions are not a priori unthinkable. Just because a movement is, at one point, committed to a peace process does not mean that at a later point it might not see an advantage to turning to violence for a short or long period. Or, just because the leadership of a state is pursuing a diplomatic route does not mean that its domestic opponents or some other domestic actor might not seek to cause unrest and thereby undermine the political talks.\(^1\) The evidence in each case, however, does not support these deductive possibilities.

**Arafat**

Arafat and the Palestinian leadership wanted an outbreak of violence.\(^2\) The Palestinians did not get what they wanted at Camp David, and they believed violence would pressure Israel into further concessions. Another variant of this explanation is that being seen as the leader of a new intifada would rescue Arafat from being viewed as an obstacle to peace in the wake of the failed summit at Camp David in July 2000. In any case, it would be better and more heroic if the Palestinian state were born through violence. This explanation for the intifada is coupled with a second idea: that the violent outbreak would serve as a platform for the unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. The Israeli government pushed the idea of pre-meditated Palestinian violence in its public relations efforts.\(^3\)

The view that Arafat and the Palestinian Authority orchestrated the outbreak of the initfada was rejected by the Mitchell committee, the investigative body set up by the United States and others in late 2000.\(^4\) In an especially insightful analysis of Palestinian decision-making, the academic Yezid Sayigh suggested Arafat’s approach was the exact opposite: “Contrary to the Israeli account, [Arafat’s] behaviour since the start of the intifada has reflected not the existence of a prior strategy based on the use of force, but the absence of any strategy.”\(^5\) Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel’s Shin Bet (General Security Service), was clear: “Yasser Arafat neither prepared nor triggered the Intifada.”\(^6\) Menachem Klein, an Israeli academic, agreed: “[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that there was any such pre-planned decision by the Palestinian Authority.”\(^7\) Much of the evidence often cited for a PA-led uprising was misconstrued, as I explain in discussing Palestinian and Israeli military preparations in section three below.

The PA twice tried to avoid provocations in September 2000, something that is inconsistent with the search for a pretext for violence. First, it let pass the perfect opportunity for launching an intifada, the 13 September date when Palestinian leaders considered but decided against unilaterally declaring Palestinian statehood. Despite repeatedly threatening to declare independence, the PA consistently backed off from such threats and let “sacred dates” slide.\(^8\) This also reflects a quiet year until the intifada: in the first nine months of 2000, one Israeli died from Palestinian terrorism.\(^9\)

The PA’s unwillingness to pursue a unilateral route to statehood suggests
that it was aware that a unilateral declaration was more likely than not to backfire. It would have given Israel license to act unilaterally as well. Barak, and Benjamin Netanyahu before him, had stated that he would annex certain coveted areas in response to a unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence. Given the imbalance in power between the two sides, Israel would very likely emerge in a better position than the Palestinians in a battle of unilateral steps. In short, the pathway to Palestinian statehood associated with violence was unlikely to bring the Palestinians anything close to a state defined by the 4 June 1967 lines.

In the second instance, Palestinians repeatedly asked Israel and the United States to block Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary. This again suggests they did not want a pretext for a violent outbreak. Saeb Erekat, a Palestinian negotiator, said he warned Shlomo Ben-Ami, then Israel’s acting foreign minister, in the presence of Dennis Ross, the top US negotiator. Ross has since stated that Erekat told him of Sharon’s impending visit which led Ross to speak to Ben-Ami. Ross says Ben-Ami told him (Ross) that Israeli law prevented the Israeli government from blocking Sharon’s visit. Arafat said he warned Barak that Sharon’s impending visit might cause unrest, but Barak later denied that Arafat had ever warned him. According to the Mitchell Report, “Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit.” PLC Speaker Ahmed Qurei opposed the visit: “The timing is not suitable . . . It will provoke problems.” Faisal Husseini, the late Palestinian representative in East Jerusalem, phoned an Israeli negotiator, Yisrael Hasson, and warned against the visit fearing it would ignite the territories. “The warning was relayed to the most senior echelons.” Leaders of the Islamic Movement “adamantly oppose the idea of Sharon visiting the holy site and have asked Barak to stop Sharon from carrying out his ‘provocative’ plan.” Ben-Ami claimed Jibril Rajoub, a top Palestinian security official on the West Bank, approved the visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary as long as Sharon did not enter the two mosques. Rajoub denied this version. Rajoub’s position is backed up by comments he made to the Jerusalem Post on the eve of Sharon’s visit: “The visit is a provocation which will trigger bloodshed and confrontation . . . Sharon is putting oil on fire.” He added: “If Sharon tries to enter the Haram a-Sharif, the Moslems will stop him.” In short, “Many among the Palestinian leadership sought the assistance of their Israeli counterparts to prevent Sharon’s visit. They were turned down.”

Even after the violence broke out, Israel and the PA continued to negotiate suggesting that neither side had abandoned the diplomatic route. During December 2000 and January 2001, the two parties engaged in high-level, comprehensive talks to try to resolve remaining differences. They dealt with substantive issues and considered further concessions. This casts doubt on the claim that the Palestinians had abandoned talks for a violent path. Sections two through four outline an alternative and more compelling explanation.
Sharon

On 28 September, Ariel Sharon, along with over 1,000 Israeli police officers, entered the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary. Some have blamed Sharon for the ensuing violence.21 Sharon likely had two inter-related motives for visiting the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary. First, by demonstrating his commitment to Israeli access to the site, he may have sought to gain an edge in his internal political party battle with Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu, the then recently redeemed former Israeli prime minister. Netanyahu was cleared in a political scandal on 27 September.22 Although Netanyahu had been soundly defeated by Barak in 1999, he had experienced an “amazing revival in his public standing” by the summer of 2000. Polls indicated he could now beat Barak in a new election for prime minister.23 However, Netanyahu also would have had to move Sharon aside to retake control of the Likud opposition. Sharon’s visit, then, could have been an effort to block Netanyahu’s political comeback.24

Given the Israeli-Palestinian talks going on at the time and the imminence of high-level talks on the matter, Sharon also may have hoped to scuttle Barak’s post-Camp David attempts to find a compromise on the future status of Jerusalem. Likud spokesman Ofir Akounis called Sharon’s visit “a political statement to show that under the Likud the Temple Mount would remain under Israeli sovereignty.”25 Sharon could either assert the right of Israelis to visit the Temple Mount or, if turned away, demonstrate that Barak had already effectively handed over the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary to the Palestinians.26 Either way, his image among right-wing Israelis would be strengthened.

While critical of the visit, the Mitchell committee rejected the idea that it alone caused the intifada: “The Sharon visit did not cause the ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada.’ But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.”27 The cause of the intifada is more complex and begins with deeper structural factors like the continuing Israeli occupation during the Oslo years.

Occupation

The continuing Israeli occupation, even after the Oslo agreements, was the underlying cause of the second intifada. Palestinians had thought that the 1993 Oslo agreement would lead to better lives, greater freedoms, the end of Israeli control, and, at the end of five years (1998), Palestinian statehood. Oslo was thought to mean the end of Israeli occupation and the start of Palestinian self-determination. When such changes failed to materialize and, in many ways, the situation on the ground worsened in the mid and late 1990s, many Palestinians started to believe that the diplomatic process was a dead end and renewed confrontation was the only alternative. This dynamic explains much of the popular support for the second intifada.
The importance of the Israeli occupation in understanding the outbreak of the second intifada plays into a larger debate about the causes of revolts or uprisings. Ted Gurr noted that civil strife is often the result of a gap between what individuals believe they are entitled to and what they actually get. This “relative deprivation” leads to discontent and anger, “and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response.” Thus, the deepening of the Israeli occupation during the Oslo years had a volatile impact given the rising Palestinian expectations.

Other scholars, in contrast, have downplayed Gurr-like grievances and suggest that the key factors that explain civil strife are those that affect the opportunity to rise up. James Fearon and David Laitin explain: “[our finding] provides strong support for the big message that comes through in our country/year analysis (Fearon and Laitin, forthcoming), namely that the conditions allowing for successful insurgency is a better guide to its occurrence than are the social, economic, political and cultural conditions that might motivate a group to organize rebellion.” Conditions allowing for successful insurgency might include geographic factors or the residential concentration of particular groups.

The next three sections of this article draw from both theoretical camps. While the emphasis in this section on occupation highlights Palestinian grievances and dashed expectations, the followings sections on military preparations and the failure of the Camp David summit (2000) are more directed at the resources, organizational capabilities, and policy opportunities for both parties. This case study of the second intifada, then, argues for a synthetic approach in which multiple factors are needed to explain the outbreak of violence.

Sumit Ganguly’s analysis of the Kashmir insurgency offered a related understanding of uprisings. Ganguly, drawing on Samuel Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies*, noted the central relationship between a political system’s ability to allow for the expression of political demands and the outbreak of violence: “The failure of governments to accommodate rising political demands within an institutional context can culminate in political violence.” Whatever the source of “heightened political awareness” that leads to greater political demands, people will turn to violence if they lack avenues through which to channel those demands. In the rest of this section, I demonstrate how the occupation worsened during the Oslo years and what this meant to Palestinians.

As originally conceived in the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP or Oslo I), the Oslo process included an interim phase of up to five years. By the end of the third year, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were supposed to begin permanent (or final) status talks on what were expected to be the most difficult issues: “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.” Although it was not mentioned explicitly at the time, this is the point at
which Palestinians expected statehood.\textsuperscript{33}

Initial Palestinian expectations were high as is reflected in Arafat’s lofty rhetoric at the start of the process. At the signing ceremony of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993, Arafat expressed Palestinian hopes: “My people are hoping that this agreement which we are signing today marks the beginning of the end of a chapter of pain and suffering which has lasted throughout this century . . . [and that it] will usher in an age of peace, coexistence and equal rights.”\textsuperscript{34} Two years later at the signing of the Oslo II agreement, Arafat continued this message: “A significant portion of Palestinian national rights reverts today to the Palestinian people through their control of the cities, villages and populated areas.” He added: “We urge you all to recognize the importance of this historic interim step that demonstrates [that] . . . the Israeli and Palestinian peoples would coexist on the basis of mutual recognition of the rights, while enjoying equality and self-determination without occupation or repeated wars and without terrorism.”\textsuperscript{35}

What did the Oslo process change? First, it ended the day-to-day policing of most Palestinians by Israeli soldiers. Second, it gave the Palestinian Authority control over civilian agencies, though many were still at the mercy of Israeli decisions as I explain below. Third, the Oslo II agreement (28 September 1995) divided the land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip into three areas: Area A with full Palestinian responsibility for civilian and security affairs; Area B with Palestinian civil responsibility and Israeli security responsibility; and Area C under full Israeli control. By mid-2000, the West Bank was divided into A (about 17 percent), B (24 percent), and C (59 percent). The land under Palestinian control (A and B) was often not contiguous, and a map of the West Bank looked more like a Rorschach test.

Despite these changes, Israel’s power over Palestinian life remained dominant.\textsuperscript{36} Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was not explicitly forbidden by the Oslo agreements, and the construction of new settlements and the expansion of old ones continued.\textsuperscript{37} From 1993 to 2000, the number of Israeli settlers increased by at least 117 percent in Gaza and at least 46 percent in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem).\textsuperscript{38} In 2000, seven years after Oslo I, Israel still fully controlled East Jerusalem, 20 percent of Gaza land, and about 59 percent of the West Bank land (Area C). In another 24 percent of the West Bank, Israel still retained security control (Area B). Much taxation and revenue still went through Israeli coffers, and Israel decided when to hand over such money to the Palestinian Authority. A customs union meant that Palestinians had to pay Israeli prices for major consumer items and other goods. As more Israelis moved to Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, Israel also implemented a policy of revoking permission to live in Jerusalem from Palestinians who could not prove the center of their life was in Jerusalem; over 1,600 Palestinians and their families were removed in this way from 1996-98, according to Israeli officials.\textsuperscript{39}
Israeli land expropriation of Arab land and Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses, aspects of the Israeli occupation since 1967, continued under Oslo. Approximately 670 Palestinian homes in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) were destroyed from September 1993 to June 1998. In the first two years after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel confiscated 41,000 acres of West Bank land. In 1999, Israel took another 10,000 acres of land in the West Bank.\(^40\) The loss of land decreased the contiguity of Palestinian towns and villages, inhibited natural Palestinian growth patterns, and undermined Palestinian agricultural efforts in some areas.

One of Israel’s most powerful tools was full control of borders including international borders with Jordan and Egypt, borders with Israel itself including occupied East Jerusalem, linkage between Gaza and the West Bank, and internal borders between Palestinian cities and towns. Israel frequently closed any and all of these borders thereby disrupting travel, trade, taxation, postal services, banking, medical, and educational activities. A safe passage route was supposed to be agreed upon to allow easy Palestinian travel and movement of goods between Gaza and the West Bank but the talks dragged on for years; a “southern” Gaza-West Bank route opened in late 1999.\(^41\) For close to a decade, Palestinians have needed to secure travel permits, for instance, to travel from Gaza to the West Bank or to enter East Jerusalem. Particularly as Israel continued turning over control of villages and cities – but often not the land connecting them to other Palestinian locales – to the Palestinian Authority, Israel could cut off individual villages and cities. The Palestinian economy and nascent efforts to develop trade and foreign investment were particularly vulnerable to the multi-level Israeli border control.

Settlement building and land transfers to the Palestinian Authority also led to the proliferation of bypass roads in the West Bank. Bypass roads were built for Israeli drivers who were often heading to and from Israeli settlements and skirted Palestinian cities and villages. While designed to reduce contact between Israelis and Palestinians and thereby prevent attacks against Israeli cars, the roads also further cut the West Bank into pieces. This further limited the possibility of finding a political resolution in which the Palestinians ended up with a state composed of contiguous territory. In some places, Israel destroyed Palestinian buildings or orchards to clear a wide swath of land for a bypass road and a security strip alongside the road.\(^42\)

Israel justified most measures on security grounds and lamented the hostile rhetoric of the PA and its leaders. Israeli leaders decried the militant opposition to the Oslo process, complained of faulty implementation on the part of the PA, and regularly called for more arrests and more general effort on the part of Palestinian security forces to rein in Palestinian terrorists.

Israel’s position, however, also became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The psychological impact of prolonged repression and subjugation as well as the denial
of political rights and non-violent means of political action set the stage for more violence. Stringent security measures, frequent closures that brought daily life to a standstill, expropriation of land, and other anti-democratic tendencies created and strengthened deep-seated animosity toward Israel and Israelis that then, in part, fueled militant movements and skepticism of the diplomatic route. Furthermore, some measures went beyond security and lasted longer than Israel’s security needs required. This suggests other factors that influenced Israeli decision-making, such as a belief in the efficacy of collective punishment and the desire to gain irrevocable control of key areas of land and settlement.

Continued Israeli control of Palestinian life led to resentment that boiled just below the surface for several years. Palestinians saw the peace process as a failure, a “sham.” Critics of the Oslo process regularly pointed to this repression and discontent as proof that the Palestinians were being shortchanged by the Oslo process. Even after the Israeli redeployments from 1994 onward, Israeli forces were just over the horizon and operated behind the scenes. Palestinian bureaucrats often did little more than convey paperwork and requests from Palestinians to Israeli authorities; the Israelis would make the decisions.

This perception that the peace process had not met Palestinian expectations set the stage for the second intifada. According to Muhammad Dahlan, a leading Palestinian security official, the intifada “did not occur because of planning or ill intentions but due to Palestinian desperation after seven years without arriving at a final agreement . . . . The intifada happened because of the loss of hope in the peace process.” Robert Fisk, a British journalist who has long covered the region, argued that, “[s]heer despair at the perceived injustice of the Oslo agreement . . . simply overwhelmed the clichés about the ‘peace process’ and the need to put Oslo ‘back on track.’” Amira Hass, an Israeli journalist, claimed that, “The intifada broke out because the Palestinian public was tired of this situation of occupation that adopts other names.” In short, the ground was fertile for a renewed clash. Palestinians still felt the heavy hand of Israel in the suppression of Palestinian national rights.

Some Israeli officials were aware that the situation was explosive. Major General Yaakov Or, coordinator of Israeli government activities in the territories, warned Barak “several times that without real progress in the talks with the Palestinians, an explosion [in the territories] could be expected.” On 26 September 2000, two days before Sharon’s visit, “senior military intelligence and assessment officers attached to all of Israel’s various security agencies, arrived at the conclusion that the head of the Palestinian preventive security agency, Jibril Rajoub, was not issuing empty threats. The officers concluded that Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount would ignite the flames of violence” and Arafat would then exploit the opportunity.
Military Preparations

Perhaps the most important but least understood part of the story of the outbreak of the intifada is the way in which military preparations starting in the mid-1990s fueled the drive toward violence. The Israeli-Palestinian interactions created a classic spiral of insecurity in which both sides saw the other as aggressive and themselves and their own moves as only reactive. Furthermore, each side assumed that its adversary was motivated by external factors when domestic ones often played as important a role.

Israel

In many ways, the Israeli-Palestinian spiral started on the night of 23-24 September 1996, when Benjamin Netanyahu authorized the opening of one access point to a passage along the Western Wall. Palestinians protested on 24 September, and the “tunnel” protests intensified the next day. The casualty numbers climbed and the confrontation spread throughout the West Bank. In total, almost 100 Israelis and Palestinians died.52

Based on these confrontations, Israel decided it needed to plan to use massive force to quell Palestinian unrest. Major General Gabi Ofir, then outgoing commander of the Judea and Samaria [West Bank] Division, explained: “If the Palestinians conduct battles like that [1996 tunnel riots], we will have to respond much more harshly and painfully. I am not talking about notions of vengeance, but it will be an answer that the Palestinians will have to think very hard from the beginning if it makes sense for them to continue down this path, or if it is preferable for them to control their forces.”53 The massive use of force might deter, or if that failed, compel an end to the violence: “IDF planners were convinced that a real show of strength immediately following the outbreak of violence would make the rioters understand the heavy price they would have to pay for the continued violence, and that would cool their ardor at once.”54 Israel “was aspiring to rehabilitate its lost deterrence powers.”55

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According to an Israeli columnist, on the “second day of the [second] intifada, an angry [Mohammad] Dahlan phoned [then Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul] Mofaz. “How come we have 100 dead and you have none?” he asked. Mofaz took it as a compliment.”56 In other words, the Israeli plan was working.

Israeli preparations were further spurred on by Palestinian threats. Palestinian measures confirmed the fear of the Israeli military leaders that the Palestinians were preparing for war.57 In 1997, for instance, the Israeli Defense Minister warned members of the Israeli parliament that “there is a desire by Palestinian Authority people, and definitely by violent elements on the ground, to ignite the area, bring about confrontation and bloodshed, and an escalation.” He went on to explain that Israel was ready to respond.58
Thus, Israeli planners highlighted two objectives: deterring Palestinian violence and compelling the Palestinians to stop fighting if deterrence failed. Outsiders mentioned a third possibility: compelling Palestinian acceptance of Israel’s diplomatic aims. The perception was that Israel believed the use of force would compel the Palestinians to accept Israel’s “terms and conditions” at the bargaining table: “to impose by force of arms what Israel tried to achieve by force of negotiation at the Camp David summit.” The Palestinians could either accept the deal Israel offered or face being crushed by the IDF.

At the practical level, the Israeli military planned for the most far-reaching operation short of expulsion, the re-taking of Palestinian cities. The plan was known as OPERATION FIELD OF THORNS. Israel acknowledged the existence of a plan as early as June 1997. Sometime between May and September 2000, Barak “approved the operational and tactical plans of the IDF to halt the intifada.” One alternate possibility is that Barak favored a more gradual response, but the IDF planned for a harsh response: “Instead of taking pinpointed moves, moving gradually, collecting a price systematically, and letting the Palestinians understand that they would pay more every time violence escalates, the army slammed all across the sector.”

Israel prepared to use tanks and helicopters to “crush” the Palestinians and re-take land in Area A. The plans also called for an economic blockade and arresting PA officials. In the four years prior to the intifada, Israel held military exercises to practice the operation. On 13 April 2000, for instance, an Israeli media outlet reported that “the IDF has recently conducted extensive military exercises simulating armed conflict with Palestinians.” The Israeli Chief of Staff, Mofaz, spoke to Israeli soldiers in June 2000 about plans for controlling Palestinian unrest: “If tanks are needed, tanks will be brought in, and if attack helicopters are necessary, attack helicopters will be brought in.” Israel prepared special army units for assassinations.

In addition to IDF preparations, Israeli settlers in the West Bank were also arming. They acquired a range of military equipment: “Telescopic sights, night-vision equipment, four wheel drive vehicles, tactical combat gear, spare parts, and rescue and medical equipment are only some of the equipment being purchased with the donations collected abroad.” The equipment was purchased in “full coordination” with the IDF.

Not only did the Israel government have a plan, but it also publicly warned the Palestinians that renewed violence would be met harshly. On 26 July 2000, at the conclusion of the failed Camp David summit, Barak hinted at the alternatives: “To our neighbors, the Palestinians, I say today: We do not seek conflict. But if any of you should dare to put us to the test, we will stand together, strong and determined, convinced in the justness of our cause in the face of any challenge, and we shall triumph.” Israel’s general position was the same: “Some Palestinian circles have intimated and even declared that they intend to resort to
violence should the Camp David Summit fail. There is not justification for such a reaction, and Israel will do everything within its authority to maintain calm and prevent violence.” According to General Tawfiq Tirawi, the head of Palestinian General Intelligence in the West Bank, “Both [the commander of the West Bank, Brigadier General Shlomo] Oren and Mofaz threatened to bomb us before everything began.”

One alternative to the IDF’s approach was a plan drawn up by the Peace Administration, an organization outside the IDF formed during Barak’s government. The Peace Administration’s “grid” plan aimed to contain fighting in isolated pockets while allowing Palestinian life to continue in other pockets. The plan sought to avoid both “smashing everything to pieces” and escalation.

Palestinians

As Israel was planning and practicing, so too were many on the Palestinian side. Three factors motivated Palestinian military preparations, especially among leaders and factions associated with Fatah and the nationalist Palestinian movement. These factors included the internal struggle for leadership and power within Palestinian society; the response to Israeli preparations; and the belief that threatening the use of force would improve the Palestinian bargaining position and make a two-state solution more likely.

Palestinian society has often been depicted as split between nationalist forces typified by Arafat, the PA, the PLO, and Fatah, and Islamist forces typified by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Such a dichotomy, however, misses the internal splits within the nationalist movement that are central to understanding the outbreak of the intifada. Arafat and members of the old guard who moved with him from Tunis to Gaza and the West Bank in 1994 held the reins of power in the Palestinian Authority. These “outsider” politicians ran the negotiations with Israel and were dubbed the “luxury hotel activists” by one analyst. They faced, however, a challenge internal to their movement from the younger generation who helped lead the first intifada that started in December 1987.

The young guard, largely composed of the Fatah cadres, chafed under the rule of the old leadership. The younger generation or insiders dominated the security organizations like the Tanzim and the Preventive Security Force in the West Bank. The most important leader was Marwan Barghouti, the central player in the growth of the Tanzim and the young guard. From 1994-99, about 2,500 new local leaders were elected to various committees within Fatah. The goal, which remains unfulfilled, was to take control of the leading Fatah organs.

The old/young split itself also obscures important distinctions and interrelationships. The PA’s effort to co-opt the young guard with government employment and the young guard’s efforts to take over Fatah meant the two were
inter-mingled. One analyst concisely captured the tension: “For, on the one hand, the tanzim provides the military and political base of the PA’s rule. On the other, they are its loyal – and yet potentially most seditious – opposition.” Moreover, within the young guard there were political leaders striving for control of Fatah and, ultimately, Palestinian “state” institutions, and militants directly fighting with Israel including Fatah offshoots (e.g. the al-Aqsa Brigades). After the start of the intifada, the same Palestinian fighter might be a member of the Tanzim, a PA security or intelligence service, and the newly-minted al-Aqsa brigades.

Why did factionalism promote militarization and arming? In the absence of democratic governance for Palestinians, being armed was the major currency of political power. One’s ability to defend one’s political strength turned, in part, on one’s ability to show or use force. Furthermore, in the contest for the support of the Palestinian public, the commitment to the use of force was the default position. If a faction rejected this approach, they risked looking like an American-Israeli accomplice and thereby losing support. For some aspiring leaders, “their prestige, status, and popularity, relies on their image as fighters for freedom and against corruption.” This was especially a problem in the face of repeated Islamist charges that the PA, Fatah, and the nationalist camp had sold out and were no longer true to the goals of ending the occupation and destroying Israel.

The main political dividing lines between the old and young guards were over corruption in the PA, exclusion from the decision-making process, and the diplomatic approach to Israel (in short, “misgovernment” and “defeatism”). Members of the Tanzim sometimes acted as opponents of Arafat’s regime, whether at the street-level or as members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. On Israel, the young guard felt that diplomacy alone would not end the occupation; only when coupled with the threat of force would Israel make diplomatic concessions and allow a legitimate two-state solution to emerge.

One manifestation of the inward emphasis of Palestinian militarization was the numerous intra-Palestinian clashes that occurred in the late 1990s and into 2000. The most striking aspect of the clashes is that many took place within the nationalist (Fatah) camp rather than across the nationalist-Islamist divide. Ami Ayalon, head of Israel’s Shin Bet under Barak, was fearful of violence but predicted that an intifada could be directed against the PA or Israel. In 2000, prior to the intifada, there were dozens of violent outbursts, including clashes between Palestinian police and opposition forces in Ramallah and Beit Jala. On 22 March 2000, Pope John Paul II’s visit to a refugee camp near Bethlehem ended with a battle between PA police and members of the camp committee (drawn from Fatah and the Popular Front). Palestinian sources tried to block media coverage of such fights.

A central issue around which Palestinian disagreements crystallized was Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. Much of the Palestinian public believed
that the release of such prisoners proceeded too slowly during the Oslo years. As a result, this often pitted the leadership of the PA who negotiated with Israel for the release of prisoners against other grassroots Fatah elements. The latter charged that the PA was not doing enough. By 1998-2000, prisoner hunger strikes and solidarity protests were not uncommon.

In May 2000, serious violence erupted. On 1 May, hundreds of Palestinian political inmates in Israeli jails began a hunger strike led by members of Fatah. On 10 May, protests in the occupied territories in support of the hunger strikers “began in earnest.” On 15 May, the anniversary of al-Nakba, “the violence escalated dramatically.” IDF and Palestinian police forces clashed, and Fatah members were again at the forefront of the protests. According to one analyst, Arafat (and the PA leadership) was in the position “where he has little alternative but to go along with the popular mood.” Arafat might also have hoped to improve his bargaining position by demonstrating that he, like Barak, could not ignore his domestic constituents.87 By the end of the protests, eight Palestinians had been killed.88

The second major factor that explains Palestinian militarization was Israeli policies. Palestinians assumed that Israel’s contingency planning was a signal of Israel’s desire to re-take the Palestinian cities. In mid-1997, Jibril Rajoub, then head of the Preventive Security Force in the West Bank, responded to reports that Israel had simulated re-taking Area A of the West Bank by saying, “if your extremists try to conquer the territories in which we are now, I am sure you will not be received with rice or roses but by a more suitable action on our part.”89 In late 1999, “the Palestinian leadership [was] convinced that, should negotiations fail, the Israelis could decide to reconquer the autonomous territories. They are preparing for such an event, and Shin Bet is receiving more and more information on arms smuggling, forbidden by the accords, especially in Gaza.”90 In this context, Arafat’s remarks on 25 June 2000 to thousands of Fatah supporters in Nablus was seen as a reaction to Mofaz’s warning that Israel would use tanks and helicopters to stop unrest if the process fell apart. One can imagine how Israelis heard Arafat’s words: “Our people will not be scared, not by tanks, not by aircraft, and we remind those who doubt our resolve of the battle of Karama and the [first] Intifada.”91

On 29 June 2000, Israeli political and military leaders met to discuss Israel’s response to the possibility of a unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence. Among other points, they discussed OPERATION FIELD OF THORNS. When Arafat learned of this meeting, it confirmed Palestinian fears that Israel was thinking of re-taking even Area A of the West Bank.92 In reaction to Sharon’s planned visit, Fatah organized “scores of Fatah youth to come to the Temple Mount ‘to protect the site.’”93

The third major factor for explaining Palestinian military preparations was the growing belief among the young guard that threatening the use of force was
the only way to get Israel to end the occupation and embrace a genuine two-state solution. The young guard bought into an ideology that said threatening the use of force would move the diplomatic effort; in a repudiation of what was seen as the failed logic of Oslo, the use of force was necessary and legitimate. “The only thing the Israelis understand is force,” said Barghouti. For instance, the tunnel riots led to an Israeli withdrawal from part of Hebron. After the outbreak of the second intifada, Barghouti explained:

How would you feel if on every hill in territory that belongs to you a new settlement would spring up? If your best friends, with whom you fought shoulder to shoulder, continue to rot in jail? I reached a simple conclusion. You [Israel] don’t want to end the occupation and you don’t want to stop the settlements, so the only way to convince you is by force. This is the Intifada of peace.

This tendency to believe in the efficacy of force was reinforced for some Palestinians when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Hizbollah’s military campaign succeeded in sending the occupier home and was worthy of emulation in the territories, they argued.

Among the negotiators, Abu Ala warned Uri Savir that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would be interpreted to mean that the use of force would lead Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines. Mofaz, later warned Mohammed Dahlan, a senior Palestinian security official, not to draw such a conclusion.

Some of the Palestinian warnings prior to Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary may be seen in a similar light. Rajoub and Barghouti, for instance, predicted that if riots erupted they would spread to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and turn violent. Such comments may have been intended to escalate the potential stakes and thereby deter Sharon or compel the Israeli government to stop the visit. In short, they highlight the possibility of violence so as to avoid violence and promote diplomacy. Yet Israelis may have read such comments as inflammatory rather than as an effort to avoid confrontation.

The result of the internal struggle for power, responses to Israeli preparations, and belief in the efficacy of force was Palestinian militarization. Palestinian organizations were arming and organizing for military action. Various organizations sought arms and stockpiled food. Most importantly, Fatah built and strengthened the Tanzim, a street-level militia composed of fighters from the younger generation. The Tanzim later played a central role on the Palestinian side in the early days of the intifada.

**Implications**

The military steps each side took reinforced the belief on the other side that the adversary wanted violence. The signal one intends to send may be very different from the one that is received. More generally, this case illuminates the
operation of a classic spiral of insecurity and two factors that might exacerbate
the spiral, namely misperceptions about the relative importance of domestic and
external factors for understanding one’s adversary, and the linkage of diplomacy
to the threat to use force.

The preparations undertaken by both sides spurred an escalatory spiral that
contributed to the outbreak of the second intifada. For both parties, the other’s
military preparations had the two effects predicted by Robert Jervis – they were
“doubly insecure.” By arming and organizing, the other party had demonstrated
both “an increased ability to do harm” and that it was “actively contemplating
hostile actions.” Both the IDF and the young guard thought in terms of deter-
rence and compellence; a show of strength would dissuade the adversary. In
truth, it had the opposite impact by further ratcheting up tensions and causing
more military preparations: “attempts to increase one’s security by standing firm
and accumulating more arms will be self-defeating.”

Unintended spirals of insecurity may be even more likely given existing
hatred, fear, and mistrust. These poor relationships between (one-time) adver-
saries may intersect with an accidental spark. In general, but similar to the sec-
ond intifada, “accidents and incidents by soldiers not completely under control
of their faction leaders, or by civilians who have been polarized by war can also
escalate and drag the country back toward war.”

Two other factors helped fuel the spiral. Actors may misunderstand the bal-
ance between domestic and external motivations for policy. Rather than an
intense factional struggle, Israel saw Palestinian militarization as a PA policy
aimed at Israel. What the Tanzim did was seen as part of the PA and Arafat’s
Fatah rather than as a challenge to Arafat and the PA. Klein said there was “total
blindness” in Israel to the reality of this Palestinian factionalism. Israel mis-
takenly saw the Palestinians as a unitary actor. Israel’s reading of Palestinian
action, in turn, fed the escalatory spiral of military preparations.

The final implication is a reminder of the risks of a policy that links diplo-
macy with the threat to use force. Some Palestinians implicitly followed Carl von
Clausewitz’s famous dictum: “War is the continuation of politics by other
means.” Threats to use force, however, may undermine diplomacy, as was the
case here. Israel probably saw the Palestinian threat of violence as an alternative
to diplomacy; they did not see the two as inter-related. In other words, Israel
probably assumed the Palestinian militants preferred to resort to force rather than
an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines.

Camp David Failure

The failure to reach a final agreement at the Camp David summit in July
2000 also contributed to the perception on both sides that the parties were headed
down a military path. For Israelis, Arafat spurned a generous Israeli offer
because the Palestinians wanted a military, not a diplomatic, solution. For Palestinians, the many limitations of Israel’s offer at Camp David reinforced the belief that Israel was using the final status talks to make the occupation permanent. Neither portrayal was accurate, yet taken together they created the widespread but false perception that the diplomatic route had been exhausted.105

After Camp David, many Israelis argued that the failure showed the Palestinians were not serious about a negotiated settlement as can be seen in Barak’s critique of Arafat. As Barak later wrote, “At Camp David, Mr. Arafat well understood that the moment of truth had come and that painful decisions needed to be made by both sides. He failed this challenge.”106 Barak saw “[t]hat at the deepest level Arafat does not accept the moral and juridical right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state. That . . . Arafat’s obsession is not to establish Palestinian sovereignty in part of the land but ‘to correct the injustice of 1948’ – in other words, to destroy the State of Israel.”107 Though such perspectives began to crystallize after Camp David, the outbreak of the intifada was taken as strong confirmation that the Palestinians did not want – and had never wanted - the negotiations to succeed.

Palestinians, too, learned from Camp David but they contended that the shortcomings of Israel’s offer proved Israel wanted to continue the occupation. Israel’s diplomacy was merely a facade. Israel wanted to keep control of some Arab areas of East Jerusalem, keep a sizable percentage of the land of the West Bank, and agree upon a host of intrusive security measures, all of which would have allowed Israel to maintain control of Palestinian life.108 In short, talks would not end the occupation or bring about independence. Thus, to some Palestinians, a different route, a military one, was the only way to get Israel to leave.109

More generally, the failure of Camp David suggests the great risks associated with high-level diplomacy. To the extent that failed negotiations signal to each side that the diplomatic route is dead, they may make the military option seem more attractive.

The Israeli and Palestinian Responses to the First Signs of Protest

Once the protests started on 28-29 September, the initial responses by multiple parties greatly worsened the situation. The harsh Israeli response, based on the IDF’s belief that overwhelming force would contain the protests, escalated rather than calmed the situation. Tanzim and Palestinian militants saw the initial confrontations as the opportunity they had been waiting for to confront and pressure Israel. Arafat and top Palestinian leaders failed to rein in the militants. But these dynamics also were inter-related. As the number of dead Palestinians quickly climbed, the ability of any Palestinian leader to press for moderation became more limited.110
As both the IDF and the Tanzim followed their game plans, the confrontations became a self-fulfilling prophecy. They treated the initial clashes and protests as if this confrontation was what they had been preparing for and, in part as a result, it became what they had been planning for, a massive Israeli-Palestinian clash. As the Mitchell report noted, the most significant elements were “the decision of the Israeli police on 29 September to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.”

Israel responded to the initial protests with a heavy hand, incorrectly believing that such an approach would calm the situation. The IDF, as had been planned, made extensive use of snipers, even in the absence of Palestinian gunfire. Sniper squads were reinforced following the 1996 riots, and in 2000 they played “a central role in the fighting.” According to the IDF, Israeli forces fired one million rounds in the first three weeks of the intifada, “a bullet for every child” according to one Israeli officer. In the first five days of fighting, Israeli forces killed 50 Palestinians and wounded more than 1,000. Palestinian doctors said the nature of the injuries suggested an Israeli shoot-to-kill policy. Most injuries were to the upper body (head, chest, abdomen), and only 20 percent of those injured in the first three days were discharged on that day. Israel’s disproportionate use of force was quickly noted by human rights organizations, and Dennis Ross expressed US concerns to Barak.

The IDF’s emphasis on force backfired and led to further escalation: “Contrary to the expectations of the IDF planners, the hard blows that had been dealt the Palestinians did not subdue them. Instead, the Israeli response led to an escalation of violence as the Palestinians became increasingly angry at the strikes directed at them.” Observers of specific Israeli-Palestinian confrontations in the first weeks of fighting described the causal link: “[T]he policy employed is crucial. The greater the force used by [Israeli] soldiers and the more people killed and wounded, the longer and more violent the demonstration.” The rising Palestinian death toll spurred Palestinian fighters to want to even the score by evening out “the blood balance,” the casualty numbers on each side.

The intensity of the Israeli response was the result of Israeli generals who disregarded the will of politicians to take a softer approach. This divide may have broader implications for civil-military relations in a democracy engaged in a long-running conflict. Israeli military leaders blocked political efforts to de-escalate the conflict. The IDF, for instance, refused to carry out orders from the political side after the summit at Arab-Israeli summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in October 2000. Israel’s deputy minister of defense, Efraim Sneh, warned Barak, who held the defense portfolio along with being prime minister: “From the chief of staff down to the last sergeant at the roadblock, no one is implementing your policy.” When Barak officials pushed for a more restrained response along the lines of the Peace Administration’s grid plan, the IDF dragged its feet and
blocked it both at the start of the intifada and when the Peace Administration made a second push in October 2000. Israeli generals frequently pressed Barak to take a harder line.\textsuperscript{122} For one Israeli journalist, Israeli policy-making during the intifada proved the army dominates the state and not vice-versa.\textsuperscript{123}

On the Palestinian side, street-level militants, such as members of the Tanzim, saw the outbreak of protest as an opportunity to confront Israel and pressure the Jewish state to end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Marwan Barghouti was disappointed with the initial results but persisted in seeking greater Tanzim involvement. Israeli leaders were convinced that members of the Tanzim were playing a key role in fueling the Palestinian protests.\textsuperscript{124}

Arafat did not launch the intifada, but once the protests erupted he believed the Palestinians could improve their position by allowing the violence to flare rather than trying to immediately bring the conflict to an end. He was ready to “ride the storm” for several weeks.\textsuperscript{125} The Mitchell committee found that there is “no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain the demonstrators and control the violence once it began.”\textsuperscript{126} Though one Palestinian analyst described Arafat’s policy as studied non-interference, his role was not totally passive. The decision to travel outside the territories for several of the early days of fighting, allegations that he met with and encouraged Tanzim leaders on 29 September 2000, and the release of some Hamas prisoners fall more on the active than passive side of the ledger.\textsuperscript{127} As an Israeli major general claimed, “Arafat’s unwillingness to intervene is tantamount to giving license to Tanzim operatives to continue to run amok.”\textsuperscript{128}

Past research on organizational behavior also informs assessments of IDF and Tanzim policies. Organizations tend to act based on “preestablished routines.” Organizations lack, however, much flexibility: “programs cannot be substantially changed in a particular situation” even if they are ill-suited to the emerging situation.\textsuperscript{129} Even if IDF leaders, for instance, had recognized the escalatory spiral in which they were engaged, they might not have been able to rapidly modify the organizational mechanisms that had led them to that point. Furthermore, the very commitment to the heavy use of force to crush Palestinian protest may have blinded them to the possibility that it was not working and to the idea that Israel had other options.

CONCLUSION

The second intifada was not caused by Yasser Arafat or Ariel Sharon, though both played a role in it outbreak. Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Nobel Sanctuary was a trigger that set events in motion. Arafat’s refusal to attempt to restrain Palestinian militants helped allow events spin out of control.

To focus only on Arafat and Sharon, however, misses the more important
elements. The deepening of the Israeli occupation during the Oslo years, in contrast with Palestinian expectations for greater political freedom and economic gains, led to popular discontent. By the late 1990s, both the IDF and Palestinian factions were engaged in military planning and preparation that helped set the stage for a clash. Once the protests began, Israel’s heavy-handed response and the Palestinian leadership’s unwillingness to rein in militants resulted in a rapid escalation and high Palestinian casualties.

Many Israeli and Palestinian officials thought that by looking strong and responding harshly to the other side, they could deter violence and compel submission. Instead, efforts to deter and compel led to more violence and a renewed commitment by both sides not to back down. The thousands of dead since that time are a testament to the failure of such an approach.

The intifada was not a fundamental rejection of the diplomatic route for important factions on both sides. Some actors saw this confrontation as a way to strengthen their hand at the bargaining table. Moreover, while the confrontation was not wholly unintended, the pathway it took was not what most parties expected.

With the resumption of high level diplomatic talks, leaders will need to pay careful attention to signaling and perceptions. They may be taking certain military steps even as the diplomats negotiate. To avoid another spiral of insecurity, leaders will either need to minimize such military measures or fully, clearly, and convincingly explain their motivations to the other side. Third party engagement may prove crucial to this effort.

Endnotes


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8. Palestinians first talked of declaring statehood on 4 May 1999, exactly five years after the signing of the Cairo Agreement, the document that provided the implementation framework for the DOP (also called Oslo I) of 13 September 1993. The 4 May 1999 declaration date was pushed back to 4 May 2000 and then 13 September 2000.


17. “Storm over Sharon’s plan to visit Mount,” Ha’aretz, 28 September 2000, p. 1.


21. This was the initial reaction of the US Department of State and many Arab states. See Amos Harel, Nitzan Horowitz, Baruch Kra and Amira Hass, “No end in sight, as violence spreads also to Israel,” Ha’aretz, 2 October 2000, p. 1; and Daniel Sobelman, “Arafat ‘not ruling out war on Israel,'” Ha’aretz, 2 October 2000, p. 2.


25. Lahoud, “Rajoub warns of riots if Sharon visits Temple Mount today,” p. 1; see also Rubinstein, “Kindling a religious war,” p. 3.


31. The source of growing political demands in Huntington’s work is different from the argument presented in the rest of this section. Huntington emphasized, for instance, literacy, education, and mobility. See Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

32. The Declaration of Principles stipulates that the five year clock would begin when Israeli forces withdrew from Gaza and Jericho. (Article V:1) The texts of all major Israeli-Palestinian agreements are available at http://www.mfa.gov.il.

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36. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail every aspect of how the Israeli occupation continued, so this list is meant to be suggestive not exhaustive. For a more detailed look at the occupation, see Hass, Drinking the Sea at Gaza; and Jeff Halper, “The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix of Control,” Middle East Report, no. 216 (Fall 2000), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer216/216_halper.html.

37. The Oslo II agreement, formally called the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, contained a more general limitation: “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” (article 31, clause 7)

38. The Foundation for Middle East Peace (femp.org), citing the statistical abstract of Israel, puts the 1993 figures at 3,000 (Gaza) and 117,000 (West Bank). The Foundation’s November-December 2000 report, citing Israeli Ministry of Interior officials on 28 July 2000, puts the Gaza figure for 2000 at 6,700. The Foundation’s September-October 2000 report puts the West Bank at 200,000. For 2000, the CIA World Factbook puts the figures at 6,500 and 171,000, respectively.


43. For specific examples, see Hen Alon’s story of his army (reserve) duty in the West Bank in a report by Jennifer Ludden on “All Things Considered,” National Public Radio, 13 April 2001

52. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 53-58.
53. Gabi Ofir interviewed by Yoav Limor, Ma’ariv, 18 July 1997, pp. 6-7 (of shabbat supplement); and Yoav Limor, “If the Palestinians will conduct battles — we will respond in a harsh manner,” Ma’ariv, 18 July 1997, p. 3.
57. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 171.
60. Other sources mentioned names such as Molten Lead or the Magic of Melody. Gen. Ofir inadvertently referred to the plan in an interview about the September 1996 confrontations: “You have to remember that those demonstrations were organized with the encouragement of the PA, with shooting by individuals who spread out like in a field of thorns. In all the contacts that have taken place since then we have made clear to the Palestinians that events in this vein will not be allowed to recur, and it is clear to them that this time our response will be different.” [emphasis added] Gen. Ofir interviewed by Yoav Limor, Ma’ariv, 18 July 1997, pp. 6-7 (of shabbat supplement).


64. “Israel lays plan for West Bank re-occupation,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 27, no. 26 (2 July 1997),
p. 15; “The magic of melody,” Jane’s Foreign Report, no. 2605, 17 August 2000, pp. 1-2; and
Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 60. For an earlier mention of this scenario, see Ya’akov Peri,
“Dynamics of Escalation,” Ma’ariv, 18 July 1997, p. 7 (of shabbat supplement). Peri had been
the head of Israel’s Shin Bet. For a limited Israeli denial, see Arieh O’Sullivan, “Civil
Administration: We didn’t practice retaking PA areas,” Jerusalem Post, 25 June 1997, p. 2. For
significant details on the Israeli plan, see Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel versus the
Palestinians: The ‘Second Intifada’ and Asymmetric Warfare,” Center for Strategic and

65. “Israel lays plan for West Bank re-occupation,” p. 15.

66. Graham Usher, “Palestine: The Intifada this Time,” p. 74; and “Israel lays plan for West Bank
re-occupation,” p. 15.

67. Arutz-7 reported on IDF training as cited in Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Settlement
Timeline,” Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories 10, no. 4 (July-August 2000).

68. Yediot Aharanot (Israel), 16 June 2000, as cited in Halper, “The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix
of Control.”


70. Margot Dudkevitch, “Settlers raising funds to buy arms,” Jerusalem Post, 12 September 2000,
p. 1.

71. “Statement by Prime Minister Barak on his return from the Camp David Summit,” 26 July
2000. Ya’akov Peri’s mid-1997 commentary also contained an implicit warning: the PA needs
to crack down so Israel does not have to re-take Palestinian areas (Area A).

document]


75. I use the term Islamist to refer to individuals and organizations that use Islam as a political
guide and seek a theocratic form of government. This includes, Hamas (an acronym for the
Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Islamic Jihad. Such groups are not monolithic. For more
on such movements, see Ziad [also Ziyad] Abu Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank
and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1994); Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1997); Khaled Hroub [also Khalid Harub], Hamas: Political
Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); and
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, violence, and coexistence

2000), pp. 77-90 at 77; and Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided.”

77. Robinson, “Palestine after Arafat,” p. 82.

78. Usher, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On,” p. 23; and Usher, “Fatah’s Tanzim: Origins
and Politics,” Middle East Report 217 (Winter 2000). For an Israeli view that Arafat tightly con-
trolled the Tanzim, see Gal Luft, “Palestinian Military Performance and the 2000 Intifada,”
MERIA Journal 4, no. 4 (December 2000).

79. Usher, “Fatah’s Tanzim: Origins and Politics.” See also Sayigh, “Arafat and the anatomy of a
Revolt,” p. 53; and Robinson, “Palestine after Arafat,” p. 82.
84. Enderlin, *Shattered Dreams*, p. 139.
90. Enderlin, *Shattered Dreams*, p. 137. See also the quotation from Tayeb Abdul Rahim, the secretary-general of the Palestinian cabinet, in Arieh O’Sullivan, “Civil Administration: We didn’t practice retaking PA areas,” *Jerusalem Post*, 25 June 1997, p. 2.
91. Khaled Amayreh, “Arafat’s dilemma,” *Middle East International* no. 628 (30 June 2000), pp. 4-5. Palestinians see the battle of Karama in March 1968 as an example of Palestinian bravery and heroism against Israeli forces, especially in contrast with the crushing Israeli defeat of the Arab states in June 1967.
95. Ben Kaspit’s interview with Marwan Barghouti, “Assassinate me, so what. You will miss me yet. The Intifada will continue even after me,” *Ma’ariv*, 9 November 2001, pp. 2-3 at 3. See also Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided.”

101. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, p. 65. Is the Tanzim threat to use force to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza an expansionist or security-seeking goal? I assume the latter. In contrast, if one assumed it was an expansionist objective, only part of Jervis’s spiral model would be applicable. This case would still illustrate the manner in which military steps spur further military action by one’s adversary. The case would not, however, demonstrate that steps initiated for defensive purposes were misunderstood and seen as offensive policies, thereby provoking counter-measures and decreasing security for all.


104. Also translated as “policy.” Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832).

105. For more on this subject, see Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?”


108. For instance, see the eight-part series on Camp David by Akram Haniyah in al-Ayyam (2000)[also translated by FBIS] or an abridged version of Haniyah’s “Camp David Papers” in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 75-97; Dahlán, “A Palestinian View - Nothing Tangible Was on the Table”; Gideon Levy, “Dahlán’s Complaint,” *Ha’aretz* (Magazine), 13 April 2001, pp. 6-8; and Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided.”


110. For the argument that popular opinion may have limited leadership efforts to rein in violence, see Danny Rubinstein, “Dragged into the fracas,” *Ha’aretz*, 3 October 2000, p. 1; and Zvi Barel, “The religious mind of Arafat,” *Ha’aretz*, 3 October 2000, p. 5.


113. Kaspi, “Israel is not a state that has an army,” p. 8.


119. Kaspi, “Israel is not a state that has an army,” p. 8.

120. Enderlin, *Shattered Dreams*, pp. 317-18; Peri, “The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy,” p. 34. See also Kaspi, “Israel is not a state that has an army.”

121. Kaspi, “Israel is not a state that has an army,” p. 10.

123. See Kaspit, “Israel is not a state that has an army,” and “The Army Will Decide and Approve.”

124. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 287, 291, 299; Amos Harel, “Who’s fooling whom?” Ha’aretz, 3 October 2000, p. 3; and Harel et al., “No end in sight, as violence spreads also to Israel,” p. 1.


