


# **From the Lane to the City:**

## **The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project's Low Cost Sanitation Model**



**A WaterAid report  
by Akbar Zaidi**





*Men dig a trench and lay pipes through compacted sewage, earth and rubbish in Hassanpura, Faisalabad.*

This report is one of a series which analyse WaterAid's experience in supporting integrated water, sanitation and hygiene education projects in developing countries. Other reports in the series are:

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# From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project's Low Cost Sanitation Model

## A WaterAid Report

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June 2001

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# Introduction

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In 1994, WaterAid started a relationship with one of Pakistan's most influential non-governmental organisations (NGO) and perhaps the world's best-known non-governmental project in the large-scale provision of sanitation for the urban poor – the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP). This relationship was primarily aimed at learning lessons from the 'OPP experience,' and in funding projects to replicate this process inside and outside Pakistan. Five years later, as WaterAid was to carry out some form of assessment of this funding, it received a proposal for a broader study on the impact of the OPP.<sup>1</sup> Wishing to contribute to an independent critical assessment of the OPP, WaterAid funded the broader study, from which this abbreviated report is derived.

The OPP started in 1980 in the depressed and crowded Orangi settlement, one of Karachi's<sup>2</sup> most blighted districts and its largest *katchi abadi* with a population of 1.2 million. Led by the renowned Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan (see box p.12), the OPP evolved in just a few years to be a remarkable self-funded, self-administered and self-maintained grassroots movement relying on nothing more than the resources and skills of its urban poor constituents using local materials and labour in building hundreds of kilometres of extremely low-cost underground sewers.<sup>3</sup> By April 2001 these had benefited 92,184 families in 6,134 lanes, representing almost 90% of the entire settlement. There have also been 409 collector sewers built, and collectively the community have invested Rs. 82.141 million (£924,000) in their sewerage system. By the late 1980s, the OPP

had radically changed the Orangi settlement. Gone were the murky, stinking open sewers that crisscrossed the settlement and which posed considerable health and physical hazards to its residents. Mobility improved within the community both for goods and human traffic, boosting home-based enterprises and small-scale trading. Infant mortality rate fell from 130 per thousand live births in 1982 to 37 per thousand in 1991, which was far faster than it had fallen in Karachi or the rest of Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> (Badshah, 1996: 49; and Reed and Vines, 1992a:19)<sup>4</sup> The availability of cleaner and extended space in front of houses had a significant social and recreational impact as well. New and relatively safer play areas for children emerged.<sup>5</sup> Women were able to move around more freely and be visited by friends and relatives, leading some to comment that it improved marriage prospects for young women.<sup>6</sup> Such success has naturally drawn attention from the world over. The OPP experience is, in WaterAid and many other development agencies' view, a most impressive demonstration of just how much urban poor communities can contribute to the development of quite complex large-scale infrastructure projects. It also presented a challenge to dominant development paradigms that are too technical, too reliant on government and donor support, and which generally treated poor communities as simply the objects of, rather than the central force of development.

Over time, the OPP expanded beyond sanitation provision to cover programmes for health, credit, low-cost housing and

education. By 1988, four autonomous institutions were in place to manage the OPP's expanding concerns. The main OPP Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) took charge of the Low Cost Sanitation Programme and the Education Programme. The Orangi Charitable Trust (OCT) ran the Family Enterprise Economic Programme that provided cheap and readily accessible credit. The Karachi Health and Social Development Association

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1 The proposal was submitted by the OPP and the London-based International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in early 1999.

2 Karachi is Pakistan's economic centre with a total population of over 9 million residents.

3 It is not very clear by how much the OPP low-cost sanitation model is cheaper than other alternatives because of difficulties in comparison. However, some studies have shown that sewer construction in Orangi are one-seventh the cost compared to those constructed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) due to the simplification of the technical design and the elimination of middlemen, contractors and the pay-off to professionals like engineers. (Siddiqui and Rashid, 1997).

4 The improvement in infant mortality rates can be attributed to many factors, including reduction of solid wastes, the reduction of children defecating in the streets, etc. But most observers and official sources agree that the most important factor is the construction of underground sewers.

5 In the Manzoor Colony where an 8-12 foot wide concrete case was built on a 2050-foot nala local enthusiasts acquired a continuous cricket pitch.


6 It is customary in Pakistani society for the potential husband's parents and elders to visit the house of their prospective daughter-in-law.



(KHASDA) implemented the Health Programme. And finally there was the OPP Society that administered funding from the Infaq Foundation, a Pakistani charity, for the OPP organisations.

The OPP, however, was as controversial as it was popular. Despite its ostensible success and tremendous potential, the 'OPP experience' was perceived not to be replicable on any serious scale outside of Karachi. It faced a number of critics – from government, the international donor community, as well as Pakistani NGOs – who posed a wide array of arguments that downplayed and sometimes denied outright the OPP's claims to success. There were critics who pointed out that the OPP experience was specific to Orangi. Orangi has a natural slope, which made secondary sewer lanes and collection points dispensable to a certain extent. Had Orangi been on flat terrain, the project may have had to rely on government and donor support from the outset. Furthermore, most Orangi householders were acknowledged owner-occupiers, who had more incentive and security of tenure than renters or squatters to invest their hard-earned income in sewer construction. Others say that the OPP was too 'Dr Khan-centred', and reliant on his involvement. Government engineers and industry professionals initially doubted the quality and technical standards of the OPP-facilitated sewer lines. Some critics look at sustainability, arguing that OPP-initiated community organisations created through this process do not actively continue once construction work has been completed.

But perhaps the main point that brought the OPP into conflict with a number of NGOs, the donor



Children cross over the sewage flow in Mansoor colony, Karachi.

community and government was its firm, resolute and active rejection of any form of subsidies or funding for what it termed as *internal*<sup>7</sup> development work for poor communities. The OPP stressed that the responsibility to fund the internal component rests solely with the community. It believes that government or donor money, when used for internal development, is a corrupting system that undermines the indigenous and self-motivated initiatives of communities. They condemned NGOs that readily accept donor money as contractors who make a business out of development work. The OPP became known for its consistent

criticism of NGOs that thrive on foreign funding which, as a result, reinforces development paradigms that depend on complex, technical inputs from highly-paid consultants and organisations rather than rely on what is available from communities. The OPP has in fact developed a reputation for taking on and challenging even international donor organisations. It called the

<sup>7</sup> The OPP used the term *internal* to refer to any form of development work that the people, communities, and lanes are supposed to do, while *external* refers to the responsibility of government. This is discussed in the following section of this report.

Urban Basic Services (UBS) programme – nominated by the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) as one of the 'Best Practices' projects for the Habitat II conference – a failure, despite its own involvement with it.

In 1990, when the OPP-RTI learned about an Asian Development Bank funded project for Orangi, which was ignoring the work the people had done and was building both *internal* and *external* sanitation, it lobbied with the Mayor to adopt the OPP principles. The OPP campaigned actively, pointing out design flaws and technical defects of the plan while proposing alternatives. As a result, a project that was to cost Rs 1,300 million (£14.7 million) was reduced to a cost of Rs 36.2 million (£410,000) and 21,866 houses benefited from it and improved community monitoring roles were introduced.

Further, a major component of the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan, the US\$70 million (£50 million) ADB loan for the Korangi Sewerage Project, was withdrawn altogether due to intense lobbying, creating both friends and enemies for the OPP both within government and in donor organisations who were embarrassed by the cancellation.

Critics have charged that the OPP tends to be 'rigid in its thinking' and that it is an organisation that does not agree with any analysis, even when not critical, if it does not fit their own organisational framework and values. The OPP, they contend, would not accept that transparent funds from donor organisations may serve a useful purpose.

What compounds the controversies is that analyses on these issues are often difficult to make, because there have been too few independent studies of the OPP.

Most of the many materials on the OPP are documentation assembled by the OPP itself, leading to a charge that there is a lack of reliable information and analysis that can capture, put into context, and critically analyse the various aspects of the 'OPP experience'.

A further criticism aimed at the OPP revolves around how it distanced itself from the violence that made Karachi one of the most violent and divided cities in Asia. This peaked in 1985-86, and was largely localised, with ethnic roots, although there was the significant involvement of the land mafia that were prevalent in *katchi abadis*. By 1988 however, the violence took a more political colour, controlled from areas outside Orangi, and involving partisans of factions within the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) and the national government. Thousands of lives were lost in this strife, with curfew being imposed on Orangi for days on end. The OPP initiated the repair and rebuilding of infrastructure after incidents of violence, offering its offices as a place for debate and discussion to the leaders of the various ethnic groups. However, critics say the OPP should have used its influence to intervene and mitigate the violence. The OPP says it is precisely its non-interference policy, its particular focus on sanitation, and its non-involvement in issues where it has not consolidated expertise, that has been its source of strength and which has made it successful. Until today, the OPP stays away from issues that do not concern it, and as a result, is generally seen in Orangi as a non-partisan organisation.

This study is thus a preliminary critical assessment of the Orangi Pilot Project that tries to put the 'OPP experience' as well as the controversies around it into a

longer-term and relatively more objective perspective. Among others, it argues that the OPP philosophy is based on simple community-centred principles and practice whose main goal is to make NGOs and outside change agents peripheral to the community, that is, that the poor community is empowered to the point that they could do things on their own without relying much on NGOs, donor organisations or even government.<sup>8</sup> The OPP ethic is simply to be researchers and facilitators. It does not carry out development and does not take its "model" to the people unless it has first established substantial links with the community. Thus the OPP appears as a paradox. It does not seek a power agenda, it keeps a non-state, non-party role, and sometimes even identifies itself as a non-NGO player in Pakistan's development matrix. Yet this very character is what makes it successful and consequently, threatening to those who have power. This explains why it has become controversial to many development players, and why it has fiercely strived to retain its independence.

This study however, is not a full evaluation of the OPP. It focuses only on OPP's low-cost sanitation programme, rather than the whole range of programmes it has developed since its inception. These include housing, health, education and micro-credit. It reviews the nature and philosophy of the organisation, its technical, social and training approaches, the efforts to replicate it at the micro level, its effect on the macro policy

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<sup>8</sup> This is for the internal components of the work; the OPP has always expected that donor organisations and the government would take responsibility for the external components.



WaterAid/Caroline Penn

*Raw sewage and rubbish fill the 200-foot wide drainage creek for Mansoor colony.*

level as well as its overall impact in Pakistan. The lessons are then identified and discussed in a long-term development policy perspective.

The study methodology is chiefly based on a thorough review of the published and unpublished reports on the OPP; visits to the OPP project sites in Karachi and the OPP-advised projects initiated by other NGOs outside Karachi; and direct interaction with key people involved as well as informed observers. Interviews and focus group discussions were held in Pakistan, which included a participatory assessment and review of impact sessions conducted with the concerned communities in Orangi (Karachi) and Hasanpura (Faisalabad). E-mails were sent out to donor organisations, NGOs, academics, and professionals for opinions on the OPP from outside of Pakistan.



WaterAid/Caroline Penn

*Mansoor colony after the community laid the drainage system and pavement was put down by the municipal authority.*

## OPP Principles of Good Practice

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The Orangi Pilot Project has really done nothing extraordinary in terms of implementation, intervention or invention. The considerable success of the Orangi Pilot Project and its model, are not so much its technical innovations, but the nature, philosophy, and methodology of the organisation. This approach has its roots in the community research and extension work of OPP's founder, Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, in the rural and agricultural communities of Comilla, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the 1960s. This approach, which made Dr Khan a well-known development theorist and worker, is based largely on the idea of 'social preparation' – that before development work and physical infrastructure can be built especially in poor communities, there has to be a prerequisite phase of 'social infrastructure building.' Social infrastructure building can be broadly defined, ranging from basic education, identification and training of local leaders, to complex community consultation approaches, to setting up and maintaining actual social organisations. The social preparation that the OPP undertook in Orangi was identified as early as 1985 when an evaluation wrote, "It is apparent that considerations of external application relate principally to programme approach and organisation rather than the type and design of sanitation systems," and that "a totally self-help sanitation programme is only partly dependent on technical competence. The crucial component is the sociological input if successful implementation is to be achieved ..." (Abbott and Lumbers, 1985: 30).

A community therefore needs to be 'socially prepared' to embark on a large-scale infrastructure project. But there are different interpretations of 'social preparation.' Certain local politicians as well as NGOs in Pakistan, for instance, will interpret social preparation in terms of conducting formal socio-economic surveys and using this as a basis for convincing the national government or donor organisations to allocate funds and inaugurate projects. National governments will have different ideas of social preparation more closely aligned to a self-interested local political agenda. The OPP has a more altruistic, community-oriented and community-inspired idea of social preparation. Social preparation is guided by a general strategy to promote community organisation and self-management, by providing social and technical guidance that encourages the mobilisation of local managerial and financial resources and the practice of co-operative self-action. Applying these principles in Orangi was, in many ways, facilitated by the community's own self-preparation – they were already building sewers long before the OPP was established. The general principles of the OPP's social preparation, which is not a one-off but a continuous on-going process through the project, are as follows:

- Existing local community organisations are the primary and principal players in the project. They need to be carefully identified from the beginning, and a serious, consistent dialogue with them and general members of the community started to identify

what *they*, not the NGO or government, consider to be *their* priority problems. Formal physical and socio-economic surveys should only be supplementary to these dialogues and consultations.

- Projects should generally rely on what is readily available. The community has some of the needed resources for development but it needs support to fully use these resources. A survey and documentation of what exists is useful: physical conditions, social actors and their relationships, economic conditions, technologies in use. How the community tackles the priority problems needs to be identified and studied. A study is not needed to identify projects, but is required to understand the people, their processes and relationships, and to identify their choices. Decisions can then be made on whether existing systems could be either improved or whether a completely new approach is necessary.
- The conceptual plan is a necessary tool in the process. The development of a conceptual plan should be based on the following principles: division of work into internal and external infrastructure components, component sharing between the community NGO and/or government, while making sure that there is no cost sharing;<sup>9</sup> decentralisation of functions/technology; establishment of the optimum relationship between needs, resources and standards.



- Local lane leaders and activists are the key 'frontline' development workers. In each lane there are generally two people identified, who are either nominated or elected by the residents of the lane. They are accountable to the residents, not to the OPP, but are given technical and social support by the OPP. The two play the different roles of organiser, who represents the needs of the community to the OPP, and a treasurer who collects and keeps the money and accounts. The organiser is generally male, but the treasurer is frequently a respected older woman, who has long-term standing with the residents.
- Social organisers and technicians (paid employees of the OPP) are trained to provide technical advice, and to motivate the residents. These people are also themselves drawn from the community.<sup>10</sup>
- Local communities are the repositories of wealth in 'traditional knowledge' developed from daily experience. They can therefore become 'experts' in improvisation and innovation. Training should be provided to develop necessary skills within the community, especially those involving local para-professionals and 'street' technicians. Conventionally trained professionals such as engineers and architects, should preferably *not* be used as alternatives. This will also make sure that skills for the maintenance of the project are developed by members of the community in the construction phase.

Following the principle of relying on knowledge that already exists, and after extensive consultations,



*A metal worker makes steel shuttering for a drain manhole in Hassanpura, Faisalabad.*

the decision was made by the community at large to improve on the existing technologies, trying this out in lanes which had not yet installed sewers, rather than replacing existing sewers. This resolution was first taken by a couple of brave lane committees, and following the successful installation of sewers has now been replicated throughout Orangi, either with OPP assistance, or in some lanes, residents have been inspired by the OPP, but not used their services. A process of community mobilisation in the organisation and implementation of the project emerges. It is described as follows:

9 Component sharing is the separation between the internal component which is the lane sewers and household connections and the external component, which is the trunk sewers and treatment plants, lane sewers and the sewers outside the community boundaries: the bulk sewers. In many NGO projects, costs are shared between the NGO and the community on the lane sewers, through subsidies. This is not permissible within the OPP approach.

10 The concept of identifying activists from the community who were responsible for motivating people in the earlier days of the project was criticised by more formal development consultants, like the UNCHS chief technical advisor who called them 'musclemen' when differences in approach between him and Dr Khan emerged very early on in the project. (Hasan, 1999: 58)

Through social organisers, an initial dialogue with the community/lane is made. The OPP identifies and then contacts an influential/active individual with good reputation, who in turn contacts the lane residents. At this stage, the OPP staff arranges a slide show/public meeting explaining the salient features of the low-cost sanitation programme. If the people show willingness and submit a written request to the OPP, the OPP surveys the lane and prepares a map and cost estimates of the sewer line. These documents are handed over to the representative of the lane who is confirmed by the lane residents as their representative/lane manager. The lane manager collects money from each household as per prescribed contribution and requests the OPP to provide technical guidance. The OPP establishes physical levels in the lane and demarcates the position of the sewer line. Materials are then purchased by the lane manager and labour is hired. The work begins. The OPP provides tools and shuttering and supervises the entire execution. The lane manager expects technical co-operation and supervision from the OPP while the OPP expects the lane manager would generally manage the overall process as well as facilitate the maintenance of accounts. But it should be stressed that the lane manager is not accountable to OPP and vice versa. (Development Consortium, 1998:4)

With time, much of the inputs of the OPP in projects are taken over by local masons and contractors who have been trained over the years, and by the community itself, who have learnt by doing and observing.

The Orangi experience is more than just a case study on the issues and principles around the social

preparation of a community for development. It also informs on key technical details on the particular practice of NGOs and external agents in grassroots community development. The OPP considers itself to be primarily a research organisation whose objective is to analyse problems and then through prolonged action research and extension education, discover viable solutions. What differentiates it from other similarly-situated NGOs is the strict observance of the following operational principles:

- The OPP does not itself lay the sewers or physically undertake the projects. Whilst they provide technical advice and support social organisation, they make sure that those living in the lanes were the very persons responsible for managing finances and constructing lane sanitation. All decisions and responsibilities on individual lane sewers rest with lane people, while the household connection from the latrine to the lane sewer is the responsibility of the household owner. The community is the client, responsible for supervising any contractor. The OPP role is limited to providing motivation, technical inputs (surveys, plans and cost estimates), and the loan of construction equipment. The OPP consciously avoid creating any form or notion of dependence on them by the community.
- The OPP support the building of smaller and functional, rather than large-scale, social organisations. It makes the lane, with around 20-40 households, the informal unit of organisation, rather than following the conventional practice of most NGOs of setting up large, formal organisations

on the basis of neighbourhood or area committees. The lane made more sense as well given the sanitation technology used. For secondary sewers linking lanes to the main trunk sewers, a 'confederations of lanes' have been created, to address the needs of a collection of lanes.

A further principle that needs to be clarified is OPP's position on funding. As noted earlier, the OPP philosophy clearly differentiates between *internal* and *external* components of development. The internal component is defined as the tertiary level sewer lines, at the lane level, while the external component is the trunk sewers, removing the effluent from the settlement. Funding for the internal component, the OPP maintains, is solely the responsibility of the community. It should be emphasised that the OPP rejects matching grants or subsidies as well – wherein, for example, a donor provides 50% of the cost and the community shoulders the rest. The OPP believes this complete community self-financing for internal development is the only way to create a far greater sense of ownership, a factor that is important in the construction phase and critically important during trouble-shooting and maintenance. It also ensures that the sanitation system will be used and be functional.<sup>11</sup> The OPP has not only distanced itself from NGOs and community groups that were funded by donors and were subsidised by non-community sources, it has also discouraged some of its partners from taking funds from donors.<sup>12</sup> But the OPP is not strictly opposed to donor funding. When it is available, they make sure it is used only for the external component of the development, including research and training, and that such funding

should be autonomously administered by the organisation. It is on this basis, for example, that WaterAid support has been managed.

There are other reasons why the OPP has been opposed to subsidies being used for internal components of infrastructure. Its experience in Orangi shows that when subsidies are used, it most often opens the route for the collapse of the project. It creates dependence, which spirals into a point where the community expects others to take responsibility for paying for the services, and when started in one community, this quickly spreads to other areas. It ends up with a whole population just waiting to be helped and simply not doing anything themselves. But perhaps most important is that community self-funding is the principal instrument that brings down the costs of projects. Subsidies, the OPP believes citing experience, tend to raise costs and give rise to wastage. When the community pays for a project on a purely self-help basis where they provide or pay for the labour and supervise the work, costs are

11 Experiences around the world show that sanitation systems constructed for poor communities many times end up not being used completely for the purposes for which it was built, for example children would continue to defecate in the streets.

12 The OPP for instance stopped working with a possible partner in Quetta (Taraqqi) because they also applied to the World Bank Social Action Programme for core funding, and another NGO, PIEDAR in Khanewal. This is because these organisations did not accept the approach of 'component sharing', but used the more standard 'cost-sharing'. See box. Among the partners it discouraged from getting donor money is the Anjuman Samaji Behbood in Faisalabad and Anjuman Falahi Behbood in Rawalpindi, predominantly because these organisations did not yet have the capacity to handle large amounts of funding.



WaterAid/Caroline Penn

*Razia Begum works in Hassanpura, Faisalabad to support her family with her garment business.*

immediately cut – designs are simplified, methods of construction become extremely cost-efficient, profiteering and kickbacks, as well as professional fees for contractors, engineers and supervisors are eliminated. The process is self-reinforcing – without the drastic reduction in costs, it would be impossible to persuade low-income families to undertake the responsibilities of self-financing.

Finally, with the principle of component rather than cost sharing, the NGO or government can spend scarce funding over a wider area.

The OPP stresses that quality is not compromised by this system. The OPP's support role include improving designs to make the construction of pipes and joints more cost-efficient, like plain ended

spun concrete sewer pipes manufactured in small casting yards or a standard cast-in-situ concrete chamber for lane sewers. The OPP also developed its own manhole design adapted to local conditions. The quality of the OPP's simplification of technology and design to cut costs and make the sanitation project affordable has been confirmed by experience to be appropriate.<sup>13</sup> (Siddiqui and Rashid, 1997 and UNDP-World Bank Conference, 1996).

As the project developed, more good practice principles emerged. In 1992, an OPP-RTI report summarised some of these principles:

"Working with communities requires consistency, flexibility and a low profile. An attitude of mutual respect, sharing and learning is needed. The concept that the community knows all, or that technicians know all – both are equally incorrect. It has to be a combined effort. Importantly, and unlike most NGOs, the OPP emphasises the importance of identifying and dealing with one priority problem in one area before

moving on to tackle other problems and extend the programme in other areas. (The desire for) quick results can have a damaging effect on the programme. For instance, to achieve quick results in one lane, subsidies will be given; then others will expect the same. What makes the OPP approach unique is their continual effort to respond to the initiative taken by local communities and to support and enrich these whenever possible through research and extension programmes. Fundamental to the philosophy of OPP-RTI is the training of local community people in technical and social organisational skills at different levels. This training is conducted to develop an autonomous network of community organisers and a local resource of technical skills, enabling the communities to deal with problems independently." (Rahman and Rashid, 1992: 2-4).

Other principles identified by the OPP-RTI which are guidelines for good practice are the following:

- Monitoring of communication and constant feedback are

essential. Weekly meetings, informed discussions between staff and community members, keeping minutes and documentation and regular follow-up are to be maintained.

- Building public support for the project and encouraging contributions from academics and consultants are necessary. However, aggressive marketing like public relations blitzes should be avoided.
- Transparency is standard good practice. All accounts of the organisation, including and most especially the salary of staff, are to be published regularly and made public.
- Wider collective decision-making is always more desirable.
- Local issues, realities and concerns have to be properly transmitted through dialogue to the concerned government agencies and politicians.

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<sup>13</sup> Government engineers and NGOs are now using the OPP models and standards for their own sewerage systems.

### BOX 1: AKHTAR HAMEED KHAN AND THE OPP'S GROWING INFLUENCE

In order to understand the OPP ethic better, it is essential to look at the personality of its founder, Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, and how his and the OPP's work ethic have put a distinctive stamp on development work in Pakistan.

Dr Khan was perhaps Pakistan's best known development worker. He argued strongly that functions of the state could not be taken over by NGOs. He considered the seminars, workshops and meetings arranged by foreign donors for promoting their concepts as "dating and dining get togethers." (Hasan, 1999: 34). He criticised the donor-dependence of Pakistani NGOs, and steered the OPP to be a fiercely independent and autonomous NGO that negotiates on its own terms. The austere, frugal, and almost sufiistic personal style of Dr Khan is translated into the OPP work ethic. Unlike most Pakistani NGOs with airconditioned offices, four-wheel drives and state-of-the-art gadgetry, OPP seems poor. Salaries at OPP are far lower than at other NGOs. Yet the OPP takes pride in this. Surprisingly, by most NGO standards, there is very little staff turnover at OPP – its personnel stay on, with some moving from being the apprentices of Dr Khan for fifteen years to becoming today's OPP leadership.

OPP is thus admired, but not emulated by many NGOs inside and outside Pakistan. The OPP is unconventional in many respects and prefers to be left alone in its work. But this is precisely where its strength lies. Its influence is important and growing, though indirect and perhaps limited by the fact that it does not play a direct role in broader NGO-led advocacy campaigns. Recently, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (a NGO providing capacity building and advocacy support to CBOs and other NGOs), and the UN's Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Local Initiatives for the Environment (LIFE), have accepted some of the OPP's basic principles and applied them to their direct and indirect interventions in the sanitation sector.



## Problems of Replication

While the OPP model has inspired attempts at replication in 59 settlements in 11 cities in Pakistan, with 23,151 households having laid their sanitation lines at a cost of Rs. 31.993 million (£360,000) (outside Orangi) the most persistent criticism levelled against it is the lack of any substantial replication of its approach outside Orangi. If indeed it is a model that offers a solution to the varied sanitation problems of poor communities, a lack of replication suggests that the approach simply fails in other areas where it has been attempted or that it is dependent on many factors that are present only in Orangi. A closer examination of the problems of replication will indeed reveal that to a certain degree, the OPP may have been successful in Orangi because of factors and conditions peculiar to the organisation, to Orangi and Karachi. These factors therefore have to be discussed as well, in order to properly appreciate the success of the OPP.

What makes the Orangi township and the other urban poor settlements of Karachi different is that a large percentage of residents are second generation urban residents, unlike in many towns and cities in the rest of Pakistan, and the Punjab in particular, where urbanisation is still largely due to recent rural-urban migration.<sup>14</sup> Residents of urban poor settlements in Karachi are therefore familiar with urban basic services, and have had some experience with sanitation problems as well as sanitation solutions in crowded urban areas. Also a key factor is that Karachi's literacy level is about thirty percent higher than the rest

of urban Pakistan. The city's female literacy, in particular, is higher by about fifty percent. The average Karachi income earner also gets 1.6 times more than his or her counterpart in other cities. More recent estimates suggest that Karachi's per capita income is two and a half times that of the national average. (Hasan, 1999:141). It can therefore be assumed that Orangi's residents are generally better off than those living in *katchi abadis* outside Karachi.

Another key factor is Orangi's advantage of topography – its natural slope eliminates the need for pumping sewerage. The slope makes it easier to demonstrate the efficacy of the OPP model, and the existence of natural *nalas* makes links between the internal and external sanitation far easier. In cities with flat terrains, external sanitation and sewerage facilities – such as pumps, trunk and secondary sewers – are a prerequisite before any internal development efforts can be started. In Orangi, there was no immediate need for external development, which usually increases the costs of sanitation systems. Also, this made it possible to be independent of the municipal governments, at least initially, the municipality being responsible for the management of the secondary and trunk sewers.

A factor often overlooked is that in many communities where there is a desire to introduce the OPP's low cost sanitation model, an open drain sewerage system already exists, unlike in Orangi where no formal sewerage systems existed. Hence the problem in these areas is much more complicated as it is

about replacing or incorporating a system rather than introducing a new one.

Despite these Orangi-specific advantages, it can still be argued that the reason for the failure of replication in other communities may have to do more with problems of social preparation or with the nature, ability, capacity and resources of community groups and local NGOs, rather than with the technical OPP model itself.<sup>15</sup> For example, residents of Faisalabad and Lodhran, despite their lower incomes, have paid much higher costs for their sewerage systems than the residents of Orangi. Also, in Karachi, 2,950 houses in Manzoor Colony alone built their system in flat terrain. In Faisalabad, 2,578 houses have also built their sewage systems in flat areas and are continuing to do so.

Another reason why replicability is likely to be low is that in many communities where OPP's help is sought, community groups and NGOs are not prepared to observe the OPP's strict adherence to self-reliance and freedom from dependence on donors. This was initially the case with the community group *Anjuman Samaji Behbood* (ASB) in Dhuddiwala, Faisalabad, led by social worker-cum-politician Mr Nazir Ahmad Wattoo who thought that the OPP was a funding agency that doles out funds (see box). The Boo Ali

<sup>14</sup> 1998 Pakistan Census.

<sup>15</sup> For more, see Zaidi (1999) *The New Development Paradigm: Papers on Institutions, NGOs, Gender and Local Government*, and Jalazai (1998) *The NGOs Conspiracy in Pakistan*.



WaterAid/Caroline Penn

*A clean street after the project in Hassanpura, Faisalabad.*

Sena Welfare Society in Muzzaffargarh and the Organisation for Participatory Development (OPD) in Lahore were initially interested in replicating the OPP model. But organisational problems and high personnel turnover at Boo Ali Sena worsened, and since then it has folded. In the case of OPD, an internal review led to the closure of their sanitation programme, and the organisation eventually shifted its focus to credit, education and health, also initiated and supported by OPP. The Youth Commission for Human Rights (YCHR) formed in 1989 in the Punjab was seen as the best replication of the OPP model. But its success led to many offers of funding from multilateral and bilateral donors for different kinds of community-based work. YCHR now allows a 30 percent subsidy

for internal development, arguing that since there is money available, why not subsidise potential beneficiaries. Since taking an approach that utilised subsidies for the internal components of the infrastructure development, YCHR has not been as successful in this aspect of its work, only expanding the number of households covered from 720 to 1391 in the last five years.<sup>16</sup>

The ASB initiative however, as well as the project started by the Anjuman Falahi Behbood (AFB) in Rawalpindi, turned out to be successful sanitation projects as well, not because they strictly followed the OPP model, but because they improvised and adapted innovations to suit local situation and problems, on OPP-RTI advice, and through OPP – RTI research. Both experiences provide

lessons on dealing and working with government institutions. The AFB, which made initial errors in the beginning, has now installed some 9206 running feet of sewerage lines funded by about Rs1,042,000 (£11,840) of community money<sup>17</sup> (OPP Progress Report, December 2000).

The attempts at replication tell us that models should only be used for guidance – each community will have its own specific context and problems that require certain innovations. These attempts suggest that there are some basic principles that need to be adhered

<sup>16</sup> YCHR progress reports.

<sup>17</sup> The cost of this community initiative is one-eighth the cost of what it costs government, a piece of information conveyed by a councillor who used to have civil works done in the area.

to in order to attain some level of accomplishment, rather than follow a preconceived map or structure. Once those basic principles are followed, there is enough room to adapt and innovate, which perhaps in itself is also a principle to be recognised. Apart from the principle of the rejection of subsidies and external funding for

internal development that the OPP adheres to very strictly, there is much room to manoeuvre under its basic principles. Another thing to consider is that the OPP experience is only one case study. There is a growing body of organisations which have been influenced by the OPP, which are providing many other important lessons and

principles for good practice.

Three other NGO projects that have recently started offer potentially important and interesting lessons. These are Lodhran Pilot Project in Lodhran, the Environmental Protection Society in Swat, and the Conservation and Rehabilitation Centre in Uch.

## **BOX 2: THE ANJUMAN SAMAJI BEHBOOD (ASB) EXPERIENCE IN FAISALABAD**

Since the 1960s Mr Watoo's social work in Dhuddiwala consisted of inviting local politicians to dole out funds and inaugurate projects. In 1979 and 1984, Mr Watoo ran in local elections but lost both times. In 1987, he met the OPP's Arif Hasan at a seminar in Islamabad, and was subsequently invited to visit the project in Karachi. Disappointed when he found out the OPP was not an organisation that could provide funding for his project, he nevertheless became interested in its work. He visited the OPP a number of times over six years, and posed the problem of how the OPP approach could be replicated in his community that was dependent on the promises of politicians, on the infrequent public work schemes of the municipality, and would therefore likely reject any self-help initiative. A partnership eventually developed, and OPP proposed that ASB begin a credit programme so that the trust of the community could be regained. A loan of Rs 100,000 (£1,136) was made available to ASB by OPP for this credit programme, and soon after a six-month agreement was signed between ASB and WaterAid for the former to map the existing water and sewerage facilities in Dhuddiwala in order to initiate and replicate the OPP infrastructure model.

The credit programme became a success, and laid the groundwork for initiating other projects and a pilot water supply project in nearby Hasanpura financed and managed by the community. The social preparation entailed showing each household how much they were to save if water connections were undertaken on a self-help basis. Community activists were identified to further reach out to the community. Eventually a Water Supply Committee of the residents was set up. A loan from WaterAid was made available to the ASB, with responsibilities for payment resting with the Water Supply Committee. Soon the project necessitated negotiations with the Faisalabad Water and Sanitation Authority (WASA) to tap into their main line. But this proved to be a difficult task, as numerous reasons were given why this could not happen. The principal reason though was the typical reservations government departments had in dealing with NGOs. Conflicts also emerged within the residents' Water Supply Committee. A connection to the main line was eventually made. By June 1999, about 30 percent of houses in Hasanpura had been given legal connections, and 30% of WaterAid's loan has also been recovered.

At about the same time, the sanitation project for Dhuddiwala was also started. Since some degree of social mobilisation and community contacts had already been established and activists identified, work here became far easier. Again, the problem was negotiating with WASA to connect lane sewers to their trunk sewers as Faisalabad was on a flat terrain. ASB had to build a collector sewer, and it was decided that its cost would not be paid by the community directly until the lane sewers have been built. This increased the costs to each household to twice that in Orangi. When the first lane sewer was being built, differences arose amongst its members and work stopped. In order to expedite the process and revive community interest, ASB gave a loan to the community to complete the construction. Knowing OPP's position, the ASB kept this move secret. The demonstration of the success of this first lane became the key for the residents of other lanes to take interest and approach the ASB for assistance in laying their sewerage lines. The ASB's innovation paid off. ASB has now assisted communities in installing 52,120 running feet of sewerage lines, serving 2578 households at a cost to the community of Rs7,182,137 (£81,615). In many ways, the ASB experience has disproved many of the OPP's critics.

## OPP – The Wider Impact

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As the OPP experience in low-cost, community-based sanitation projects increased, its organisational philosophies, methodologies as well as its technical expertise developed. The OPP's technical capabilities even surpassed those of government's. Survey plans and maps of Karachi's *katchi abadis* made painstakingly through the years are stored in its databases, which is something that not even the relevant government agencies have. It was inevitable that in time, the OPP would be drawn into larger policy debates as well as projects on a wider level. The OPP expanded its focus from community-managed projects to include large-scale projects addressing multiple communities, secondary level trunk sewerage and ultimately, advocacy and lobbying on Karachi-wide sanitation plans and policy. From OPP's experience the knowledge as well as the vantage point developed, which enabled it to actively engage state agencies, local politicians, international NGOs and donor organisations.

The OPP's wider impact and growth into a more strategic organisation can be analysed from its experience in four areas:

- The attempts to scale up the OPP experience in Sukkur and Hyderabad in partnership with UNICEF and the World Bank (WB);
- The attempts to work with the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) in developing *nalas* into trunk sewers;
- The research and lobbying on the ADB-funded Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan; and

- The efforts to respond to calls for policy advice, from government groups and organisations working with community-based organisations, both international and Pakistani.

In 1990, the OPP was invited by UNICEF and the commissioner of Sukkur to participate in the Urban Basic Services (UBS) programme to replicate the OPP process in Sukkur a city in Sindh. The OPP became a consultant to UNICEF and took some responsibility for shaping the programme, provided technical inputs, trained project engineers, organisers and activists, and monitored and documented the entire process.<sup>18</sup> The first thing that the OPP learned from this project was how partnerships like this had a more complicated nature: despite clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, problems and conflicts amongst partners almost routinely occurred. UNICEF and the Sukkur Municipal Corporation (SMC) were co-financiers of the external components of the project. The Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) was to design the external sanitation and supervise construction. The Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) was to ensure that the residents got leases and ownership rights for the land. The OPP was the consultant, technical adviser and trainer. And like all other OPP projects, the community had to finance the internal component.

As soon as the project started, conflicts arose between the three government departments (SMC, PHED, SKAA), mostly concerning the timely allocation of resources for operation and maintenance. The construction of the external

components slowed down, compounded by the frequent transfers of government personnel assigned to the project. As a result, the internal components that were installed did not function properly. The OPP also felt that the SMC was technically incompetent, having no concept of levels, joints and gradients and a general disinterest in the work. This department's organisational culture was deemed to be too ad hoc. The OPP thus considered the project a failure, and was surprised when UNICEF nominated it as one of the 'Best Practices' project for the Habitat II Conference.

The OPP was invited in 1991, this time by the World Bank, to participate in the Collaborative Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme (CKAIP).<sup>19</sup> Like the UBS, the project had many partners, including the SKAA and the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (HMC). The SKAA was responsible for the overall co-ordination and co-financed the project. The HMC was the other co-financier and was responsible for the implementation and maintenance of external sanitation. OPP was the principal advisor, providing training in social and technical matters on external and internal sanitation. The World Bank Shelter Team was to take responsibility for the facilitation and monitoring of the project and for channelling funds to the OPP.

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<sup>18</sup> UNICEF was interested in initiating the programme in two other towns in the Sindh simultaneously, but the OPP, following its philosophy of focusing and consolidating in one area before moving to other localities, insisted on working only in Sukkur initially.

<sup>19</sup> The CKAIP was a World Bank and Swiss Development Co-operation initiative.



As with the UBS project, delays were recurrent. Work on the external component had not begun one year after the agreement, and four years later was not even completed. In these four years, the SKAA had seven Director Generals replacing one after the other. The HMC had eight administrators during this period. The project director, appointed from the HMC, was replaced three times. The project also suffered from having to follow cumbersome government procedures, affecting payments and eventual work output and speed. The World Bank team, like UNICEF, also wanted to work in three towns simultaneously. There were also procedural issues regarding monitoring and reporting, which often ignored the way OPP operated. Hence, the project likewise failed.

OPP learned from these two experiences that working with government, especially in donor-funded schemes, was fraught with difficulties. On one hand it was essential for the OPP to work with these projects, as wider impact can only be achieved when working directly with government, which often brings in the donor organisations. But on the other hand, government was in itself an arena for competing political interests and factions, and its bureaucracy ran inefficiently and was tainted with corruption. Not wishing to totally abandon interaction with government, the OPP decided that its role in future similar programmes would be to strengthen the community through motivation, training and technical assistance. Rather than spend time on indifferent, if not hostile government functionaries and engineers, it would arm community organisations with surveys, plans, estimates, and viable alternatives. With these, the communities could



*Abdul Razak and Ershad Bibi have a piped water supply at their home in Hassanpura, Faisalabad, making it easier for them to make chutneys which they sell for a living.*

then establish a more equitable relationship with government agencies and get them to serve their interests. (Hasan, 1997: 95) The OPP realised that perhaps the better way to change government was to create conditions outside government – in the community and amongst NGOs – that would force government to shape up. But even then, government was not at all totally resistant to change from within. Further interaction by the OPP with the SKAA did produce positive results, owing largely to results-oriented and reforming civil servants who managed to get into key positions once in a while.

The OPP and SKAA began talking to each other in 1988. The SKAA was created to regularise the katchi abadis in Sindh. It was to take charge of processing ownership or entitlement claims, upgrade and develop these areas, and provide social and physical services once the locality was 'notified', i.e. accepted as a proper legal settlement. The SKAA, especially during the times when Tasnim Siddiqui was Director-General, had an open mind and interest in working with NGOs, and

also improved and streamlined its own structures and procedures to improve such relations. In the coastal areas of Karachi, there has been an OPP-SKAA partnership, with the OPP playing the role of facilitating internal development, while the SKAA took responsibility for external development. In 1994, a formal agreement was signed that gave the OPP a training and monitoring role as well as an advisory role for the SKAA. Change from within soon became evident. Weekly meetings, site visits and community interaction became routine for SKAA employees. Mobile lease offices and site offices were brought into the localities to make it easier for people to reach SKAA services. And the SKAA slowly took on more community-centred principles, taking extensive measures to involve the community in its work and innovating to adapt itself to the requirements of the community. This mode of working proved itself as the SKAA became one of the few, if not only government department that had become financially self-sufficient. But like other government departments, the SKAA was subject

to repeated changes in its leadership, which has had an impact on the working relationship between SKAA and OPP.

The OPP has been able to build on this positive experience and is currently training municipal engineers from three cities, Faisalabad, Multan and Gujranwala, as part of a new UNDP Plus Programme, which is using the OPP approach as the basis of the programme.

The OPP's experience with the Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project provides some contrasts between different approaches. The FAUP is a government project that undertakes internal development, as well as secondary and tertiary external infrastructure building in the Islamnagar, Noorpura and Shadab Colonies of Faisalabad.<sup>20</sup> It is principally funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID).<sup>21</sup> As the FAUP was starting, they requested assistance in policy development from the OPP and the FAUP uses the technical standards set by the OPP. Over time OPP realised that their principle of no cost-sharing for the internal component was being ignored, and withdrew their support, although dialogue between the OPP and the FAUP continues. The community only had to pay 50% of the internal component costs, with the Faisalabad Development Agency (FDA) providing the balance, drawing from the DFID grants and government resources. Also, the FAUP provided full funding for trunk sewers.

The contrast between the ASB and FAUP brings into focus the disparity between two different approaches to funding. The FAUP's fifty-percent internal development subsidy can be challenged for creating more dependence than

empowerment, but it can also be argued that this in fact is what government can do in terms of making full use of resources while requiring some amount of community contribution. This is clearly only a valid argument if it can be shown that the government has resources to spend on essential infrastructure development, which at present is not the case. Part of the success of the ASB is due to their argument that unless the people carry out this essential work themselves, the work will not be carried out at all. The FAUP is scheduled to close in December 2001 after which its long-term impact on government approaches can be assessed.

The biggest advocacy challenge of the OPP to date was the campaign it launched when it found out in 1997 that the Karachi Water Sewerage Board (KWSB) was set to implement the Korangi Waste Water Management Project. The cost of this project was US\$100 million (£68 million) and US\$70 million (£48 million) of this was to be provided through an ADB loan. The project was part of the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan. At that time, the OPP was already dealing with the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, the SKAA and other government agencies. The project was to make an extensive investment in physical infrastructure at great cost to the city. It consisted of constructing a sewerage treatment plant, the rehabilitation and extension of about 120 kms of sewers, and extensive construction of new trunk sewers. The OPP, with a coalition of NGOs, academics and others, documented the existing infrastructure in the Korangi settlement. On that basis, by providing a detailed study and an alternative proposal in the process, this coalition argued that the existing infrastructure could be put to better and far more cost-effective

use. The project design had not taken cognisance of conditions in Korangi, and ignored that already in 72% of the lanes, sewerage lines and small secondary sewers had already been laid by the residents at their own cost or using funds from local councillors. The design did not consider as well that these sewerage lanes drain out into natural *nalas* flowing in the area, and instead planned to install expensive trunk mains along the main roads in Korangi.

OPP and its allies lobbied the Governor of Sindh resulting in the establishment of a committee in 1999 to review the design and to follow the OPP principles of internal and external components. As a result, a least cost option for the project was prepared which brought down the cost to US\$20 million.

Through this work, the most significant victory was the cancellation of the US\$70 million (£48 million) ADB loan for the Korangi<sup>22</sup> Waste Water Management Project, of the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan. This was despite the presence of strong vested interests, especially in the Foreign Aided Projects Office of the KWSB. ADB officials, according to newspaper reports, were surprised at how the "country rejected a loan by a lending agency."

The provision of alternative strategies is an important feature of this work.

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20 Faisalabad is a major city in the Eastern Punjab, with a population of 2 million. The city almost tripled in size from 70,000 to 180,000 between 1941 and 1951, due to the influx of refugees from India after 1947 (Alimuddin; 1999; 3).

21 FAUP do not publish their accounts, so it is not known the extent of funding for this project.

22 Korangi is an industrial area in the south of Karachi.

# Conclusion

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In many ways, the OPP model is unique. By not doing very much, it has achieved a great deal. The main feature of the OPP model is its simplicity, based primarily upon the notion that people/communities have been dealing with problems from time immemorial, and they always come up with solutions. The solutions may be inappropriate, costly and badly designed. Nevertheless, the spirit of the OPP model is that people can and do help themselves. Perhaps a key assumption of the OPP model is this faith in the ability of people to address their own problems. Unlike many well-meaning 'social workers' or NGO development workers, the OPP model acknowledges the community's ability to help itself.

Another aspect of the originality of the OPP model is its co-option of activists working in the community. As a result, those who work with the community to explain the OPP model are members of the community itself, rather than outsiders who may not be sensitive to or familiar with the sociology and dynamics of the community.

A key factor that makes the OPP model unique and adds to its simplicity is the view that OPP will not *do development* and will not take its model to the people unless it has first established substantial links with the community. The OPP is not in the business of constructing infrastructure. It is simply a support organisation of an advisory nature. Because the OPP does not need to get involved in construction, it does not need to make any promises and does not

need to make any financial decisions regarding its own or the community's money. Unlike many other groups working with communities, OPP does not invest any of its own money in the form of physical infrastructure, nor does it take any money from the community. This 'money-less' relationship between OPP and the community, where the OPP does not invest cash directly other than some of the broad overhead costs which OPP incurs, is quite unique to the NGO sector.

The OPP model works on the premise that the community will identify what they want, rather than outsiders (whether local or foreign) coming and telling them what is good for them (the community). OPP feels that people have been too dependent upon government coming and solving their problems. As governments have become less able to address growing problems, donors seem to have filled that void. A key issue of the OPP model is the aim to end any sort of dependence, and allow the community to build its own confidence in its own abilities. The OPP does interact with donors, and is funded by international donors as well, but primarily for research and extension. The main form of 'subsidy' that OPP itself gives other CBOs/NGOs is in the form of its considerable experience and technical and social expertise.

Estimates show that 82 percent of lanes in Karachi now have sewer lines laid in them. It is logical that one thinks about the next stages in the disposal system. Collector lanes, secondary and trunk sewers and treatment plants, should become the concern of any

organisation interested in sewerage disposal. Consequently, OPP's emphasis has turned to dealing with issues of the *nalas* and addressing issues related to the Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan, looking at the city as a unified integrated whole, rather than at pockets or areas of the city. Some critics of the OPP felt that it needed to look at the city as a whole from the time of OPP's inception. With hindsight, the influence of OPP in policy making and in giving advice, could not have been possible had it not focused on Orangi and consolidated its gains there. It is the result of that work which has permitted OPP to play a far more influential role in the city's sanitation and sewerage programmes.

While much of this Study has argued that the OPP low-cost sanitation model has been a success, one cannot ignore the areas where OPP has failed to measure up to expectations. There are some areas of weakness in the OPP model and its intervention and they are highlighted in this final section. Some recommendations on how to overcome these problems are also discussed.

The OPP's methodology in mobilising communities could benefit from a review. While in essence, this process has been extraordinarily successful in laying sewers and improving the sanitary environment of the *katchi abadis*, and the residents have continued to maintain these sewers and improve their environment through the planting of trees, developing home schools and health programmes, starting up small businesses and other linked activities, there is some

criticism that the voice of the weakest and most vulnerable within the community such as women or new settlers, is not fully heard.

There are a few issues specific to the OPP as an institution which are also problem areas. Whereas one recognises the high commitment of OPP staff and acknowledges the fact that unlike most NGOs, there has been little staff turnover, the fact that the same people have been involved in OPP and that it has not grown in terms of professional staff, is also cause for concern. As OPP considers moving into new areas and beyond the lanes where it started, it may also need to acquire the services of more professionals. It already has a number of important links with professionals and also runs training sessions, but perhaps it needs further full-time staff, especially at a mid- and senior level. This is also true for the *Anjuman Samaji Behbood* in Faisalabad, which is largely a one-man show; there is far greater need to incorporate more staff at the ASB.

Visits to Orangi where OPP had helped in laying sewers showed

that there was evidence of broken manhole covers and blocked sewers (although a very small percentage of all sewers laid). This suggests that there could be a problem with standards and maintenance, but as the government's own engineers are now also using these standards for their own designs, this should be effectively monitored. Further, there could be a need to modify manhole cover design to take into account the heavier trucks which are now using the roads.

Solid waste is a problem of endemic proportions and unless this issue is also addressed simultaneously with the laying of sewers and health education, sewers will continue to be clogged causing problems with maintenance. AFB in Rawalpindi has included a solid waste management aspect to their work.

Now that OPP is increasingly involved in city-level projects, designing treatment plants, external sanitation infrastructure, etc., and is being asked to design many of the structures it criticises,

it must also acquire competent technical expertise in these areas.

OPP too, may have to 'learn' to accommodate NGOs that look to it for inspiration but find difficulty in implementing its principles. 'Aloofness,' a term used to describe OPP's general attitude towards many NGOs, could perhaps be replaced by advocacy (amongst NGOs), a function and role that it has to execute. Also, it needs to disseminate its materials more widely, and written in a more reader-friendly and accessible manner, especially as it strives to generate further policy dialogue between NGOs, government, donors, policy makers and politicians and as it takes on larger issues that it has often set aside before.

Even with these concerns, it is clear that the OPP experience is replete with lessons and insights that can create an impact not only for these communities, but also for NGOs, donor organisations and government agents far beyond Pakistan's borders.



## **Acronyms and Terms used throughout *From the Lane to the City***

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OPP	Orangi Pilot Project
OPP-RTI	Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute
KHASDA	Karachi Health and Social Development Association
OCT	Orangi Charitable Trust
KMC	Karachi Metropolitan Council
BCCI	Bank of Commerce and Industry
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
SKAA	Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority
HMC	Hyderabad Municipal Council
FAUP	Faisalabad Area Upgrading Programme
CKAIP	Collaborative Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
UBS	Urban Basic Services
FDA	Faisalabad Development Authority
<i>Katchi abadi</i>	Informal settlement
<i>Nala</i>	Natural drainage channel

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## **WaterAid – Water for Life**

**WaterAid is the UK's only major charity dedicated exclusively to the provision of safe domestic water, sanitation and hygiene promotion to the world's poorest people. Clean water is essential for life. Without it we die. Safe water is a necessity not a luxury, but a billion people in the world do not have it.**

**WaterAid, with its partners, works with individuals and families in their communities, using practical solutions to enable them to take ownership of projects to maintain a lasting supply of safe water. We also influence others to do the same. Together with our supporters we strive for a world where everyone has access to safe water for life, for living and for a lifetime.**

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